Law in Plain English: Burt v. Titlow

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Burt v. Titlow

Argument: Oct 8 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Titlow was implicated for participation in a plot (with her Aunt Billie) to murder her uncle. Her first lawyer negotiated a plea deal (a 7-to-15-year sentence, on the conditions that she plead guilty, submit to a lie-detector test, testify against Billie at trial, and not challenge the prosecutor's recommended sentencing range on appeal). After the court accepted the plea agreement, but before sentencing, Titlow spoke with Eric Ott, a sheriff's deputy assigned to the jail, who advised her not to plead guilty if she believed that she was innocent. She ultimately brought on a new attorney who withdrew her guilty plea, but the attorney soon withdrew (he did not obtain Titlow's file, inspect the government's discovery materials, or speak with the previous attorney a half after the plea-withdrawal hearing). Titlow was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to 20-to-40 years. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Titlow then filed a habeas petition which the District Court denied. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, finding that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to give appropriate deference to a Michigan state court under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in holding that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allowing respondent to maintain his claim of innocence; (2) whether a convicted defendant’s subjective testimony that he would have accepted a plea but for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone, sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted the plea; and (3) whether Lafler v. Cooper always requires a state trial court to resentence a defendant who shows a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer but for ineffective assistance, and to do so in such a way as to “remedy” the violation of the defendant’s constitutional right.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit because it failed to apply the “doubly deferential” standard of review recognized by the Court’s case law when it refused to credit the state court’s reasonable factual finding and assumed that counsel was ineffective where the record was silent. The impact of this decision is that the Supreme Court continues to reinforce the strong deference federal courts should give to state courts' fact finding, as mandated by AEDPA and Strickland, even when the record is sparse. Rather, a defendant must go beyond an otherwise-silent record and present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptions of AEDPA and Strickland.

Law in Plain English: Chaidez v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Chaidez v. United States

Chaidez pleaded guilty to mail fraud in 2004. Immigration officials started proceedings to deport her in 2009. She challenged the proceedings, claiming that her lawyer did not advise her that pleading guilty would subject her to deportation. While her immigration case was pending, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that criminal defendants that receive ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment when their attorneys fail to advise them that pleading guilty to an offense will subject them to deportation. The issue here was whether the Court's decision in Padilla was retroactive to Chaidez's case (because the mail fraud judgment against her was final before Padilla was decided). The Supreme Court ruled that Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases that have already been decided. As a result, Chaidez could not challenge the ineffectiveness of her counsel. The practical impact of this decision is that criminal defendants will not be able to benefit from new rules of criminal procedure decided after their case is final.

Law in Plain English: Johnson v. Williams

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Johnson v. Williams

Williams was in prison for first degree murder. He appealed in state court and raised, among other things, a Sixth Amendment claim because one of the jurors had been dismissed during deliberations at his trial. The state appeals court found that the juror was properly dismissed, but did not specifically address if it was a Sixth Amendment claim. He later sought habeus relief in federal court (he was challenging the lawfulness of his imprisonment; habeus proceedings are very common among prison inmates--thousands are filed every year). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) says that a federal court considering a habeas petition may not grant relief to a state prisoner whose claim has already been “adjudicated on the merits in State court” (unless other conditions are met, that don't apply here, see comment). The issue in this case then is whether Williams's claim had been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of AEDPA where the appeals court denied relief in their decision but did not expressly acknowledge the Sixth Amendment basis for the claim. The Supreme Court ruled that when the  state appeals court ruled against Williams, the federal court considering his habeus petition should presume that his federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. The practical impact of this decision is that state prisoners filing habeus claims will have a more difficult time getting review in federal courts.