The Great Depression is among the most consequential periods in American economic history. The collapse that began in 1929, and the economic, social, and political consequences of the subsequent decade, has been an enormously popular subject of historians, economists, writers, and novelists. And yet despite this significant scholarly achievement, we are still unable to fully understand what happened. As Ben Bernanke (who would later serve as Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 2006-2014) wrote in 1995:
To understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macroeconomics....[F]inding an explanation for the worldwide economic collapse of the 1930s remains a fascinating intellectual challenge. We do not yet have our hands on the Grail by any means....
To that extent, historians and economists have provided a range of explanations both for what caused the Great Depression and for how it ended. Some of these explanations overlap and some are contradictory or mutually exclusive. In either case, we would be wise to heed the words of the political theorist James Burnham, who wrote that "[c]hanges in society do not result from the exclusive impact of any single cause, but rather from the interdependent and reciprocal influences of a variety of cases...." We should consider single cause explanations, but only when they fit within a larger "pluralistic theory of history."
The monetarist explanation, as provided by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, argue that the Federal Reserve allowed a reduction in the money supply which caused deflation and its associated effects, including falling incomes and prices and more unemployment. This theory was endorsed and expanded upon by Bernanke, who in a 2002 speech said:
Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression, you're right. We did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.
A modern monetarist explanation for the end of Great Depression is provided by Christina Romer, who advances the argument that an inflow of gold to the United States during the mid and late 1930s served to stimulate aggregate demand.
Keynesian economics, on the other hand, finds the cause of the Great Depression in an unrestrained capitalist boom during the 1920s which eventually crashed; a reduction of investment then caused a decrease in aggregate demand. A negative difference between aggregate demand and potential output denotes a recessionary gap. The Keynesian prescription for a recessionary gap is to boost aggregate demand primarily through government-directed stimulus spending. This narrative also relies on a belief that then-President Herbert Hoover failed to act in any meaningful way following the stock market crash of 1929, which prolonged and worsened the Great Depression. The most prominent modern exponent of Keynes is Nobel laureate and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, who has
argued that World War II was "the great natural experiment in the effects of large increases in government spending" to stimulate a depressed economy. War spending as the reason for the end of the Great Depression is consistent with the standard Keynesian model.
A third explanation, which can be seen as an extension of the classical economic theory of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, is the Austrian school. According to the Austrians (among them, Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard), the boom of the 1920s was caused not by unrestrained capitalism but by the Federal Reserve through artificially low interest rates. Instead of reducing interest rates, as the Fed did after the crash, it should have allowed rates to rise (
the Fed's aggressive rate cuts between 1929 and 1931 cut strongly against the monetarist explanation). This would have allowed employment to shift to different areas of the economy. The Fed's intervention in the economy is the chief cause of
"boom" and "bust" business cycles, of which the Great Depression is the prime example. Moreover, Benjamin Anderson and Rothbard exploded the now-tired myth that President Hoover failed to act. The key distinction between monetarists and Keynesians, on one hand, and Austrians, on the other hand, is the role of the government in ending the Great Depression. Monetarist and Keynesian explanations support government intervention, while Austrians contend that intervention made the Great Depression much longer than it would have been. Mises would scoff at Krugman's notion that war could end a depression; he wrote that "[w]ar prosperity is like the prosperity that an earthquake or plague brings." Austrians argue, then, that wealth cannot result from destruction.
Scholarship by Robert Higgs, Steven Horowitz, and Michael McPhillips have shown that the "consensus" view that wartime spending ended the Great Depression is incorrect. Instead, as Higgs and Larry Schweikert explain, savings and bond holdings accumulated during the war were spent as the ending of the war became more certain. Optimism and confidence rebounded. Despite a 61 percent decrease in federal government spending from 1945 to 1947, a 20.6% decline in GNP in 1946, and an influx of ten million servicemen into the civilian economy, the private sector rebounded and flourished, in part because the "regime uncertainty" of the 1930s (as explained by Higgs) had subsided. As Horowitz and McPhillips write, "[t]hose who credit the war with economic recovery by virtue of giant government expenditures and rising GNP must also explain the absence of any genuine economic downturn following the war."
The monetarist and Keynesian explanations for both the cause of the Great Depression and for its end are compelling narratives. But heterodox views such as those of the Austrian school have continued to deflate the validity of these narratives, first, by challenging the underlying evidence; and second, by proposing an alternate theory that is more consistent with the available data. Although the debate over the economic theories of the Great Depression will not be resolved by a single blog post, my review of the relevant literature finds the Austrian narrative to be a more persuasive explanation.
Bibliography
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Bernanke, Ben S. "The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27, no. 1 (1995): 1-28.
Burnham, James. The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. New York: The John Day Company, 1943.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
Higgs, Robert. Depression, War, and Cold War: Studies in Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Horwitz, Steven and Michael J. McPhillips. "The Reality of the Wartime Economy: More Historical Evidence on Whether World War II Ended the Great Depression." The Independent Review 17, no. 3 (2013): 325-347.
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Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
Krugman, Paul. "Oh! What A Lovely War!" New York Times, August 15, 2011.
Mises, Ludwig von. Between the Two World Wars: Monetary Disorder, Interventionism, Socialism, and the Great Depression. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002.
______. Nation, State, and Economy. New York: New York University Press, 1983.
Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke, At the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, November 8, 2002. https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021108/default.htm.
Romer, Christina D. "What Ended the Great Depression?" The Journal of Economic History 52, no. 4 (1992): 757-84.
Rothbard, Murray N. America's Great Depression. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2000.
Schweikert, Larry. "The Economic Impact of War on Business." Liberty University.