Law in Plain English: Comptroller v. Wynne

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Comptroller v. Wynne

Argument: Nov 12 2014 (Aud.)

Background: The Wynnes are part owners of Maxim, a company that does a national business providing health care services. For tax purposes, the business is treated as an S corporation. As a result Maxim's income was "passed through" to its owners for federal income tax purposes, and the Wynnes reported a portion of the corporation's income on their 2006 individual federal income tax return. Because Maryland accords similar pass-through treatment to the income of S corporations, the Wynnes also reported pass-through income of Maxim on their 2006 Maryland tax return. A substantial portion of the pass-through income had been generated in other states and was taxed by those states for the 2006 tax year. The Comptroller of Maryland made a change in the computation of the local tax owed by the Wynnes and revised the credit for taxes paid to other states on the Wynnes' state tax form. According to the Comptroller, Maryland law allowed the Wynnes to receive a tax credit against their Maryland state taxes for income taxes paid to other states, but it did not allow the Wynnes to claim a credit against their Maryland county taxes. The net result was a deficiency in the Maryland taxes paid by the Wynnes, and the Comptroller issued an assessment. After several appeals, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the failure of the Maryland income tax law to allow a credit against the county tax for a Maryland resident taxpayer with respect to pass-through income of an S corporation that arises from activities in another state and that is taxed in that state violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the United States Constitution prohibits a state from taxing all the income of its residents -- wherever earned -- by mandating a credit for taxes paid on income earned in other states.

Holding:  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Maryland’s personal income tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

Law in Plain English: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar

Argument: Jan 20 2015 (Aud.)

Background: In September 2009, Lanell Williams-Yulee became a candidate for County Court Judge, Group 10, Hillsborough County, Florida. On September 4, 2009, Williams-Yulee signed a campaign fundraising letter, in which she personally solicited campaign contributions. She admitted to having reviewed and approved the letter. A referee determined that Williams-Yulee violated Canon 7C(1) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides in pertinent part: “A candidate...for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candidates shall not personally solicit campaign funds....” Williams-Yulee appealed, alleging that Canon 7C(1) violated the First Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the finding, ruling that Canon 7C(1) served compelling State interests in protecting the integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary; and that it was narrowly tailored to effectuate those interests.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violates the First Amendment.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Florida Bar's rule was narrowly tailored to serve the State’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary. As a result, the Rule did not violate the First Amendment.

Law in Plain English: Heien v. North Carolina

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Heien v. North Carolina

Argument: Oct 6 2014 (Aud.)

Background: The defendant Nicholas Heien was the passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a non-functioning rear taillight. The subsequent consent search revealed cocaine. Heien sought to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, alleging that the stop was an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, finding that that North Carolina's statutes only required one working brake light. Because one taillight was working, Heien's vehicle was not in violation of the law. As a result, the stop was objectively unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, finding that the police officer's mistake of law was objectively reasonable and that he had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.

Holding: In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because the police officer's mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion justifying the stop under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment requires government officials to act reasonably, not perfectly, and gives those officials “fair leeway for enforcing the law.”

Law in Plain English: Riley v. California

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Riley v. California (see also Wurie v. United States)

Argument: Apr 29 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Following a gang shooting, Riley (a known gang member)'s car was stopped by police and searched. The search found two handguns. As a result of the arrest, police seized his cell phone, and discovered (without a warrant) pictures of Riley making gang signs and videos showing Riley's gang affiliation. The trial cout ruled the search of the cell phone was lawful, and the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether evidence admitted at petitioner's trial was obtained in a search of petitioner's cell phone that violated petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.

Law in Plain English: Hall v. Florida

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Hall v. Florida

Argument: Mar 3 2014

Discussion: Freddie Lee Hall was tried and convicted for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. His conviction and sentence was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal. After multiple appeals, Hall filed a motion to vacate his sentence because Florida law prohibits the trial court from sentencing to death a mentally retarded defendant who is convicted of a capital felony. The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of mental retardation mandates a cutoff IQ score of 70. According to several IQ tests, Hall's score was recorded at 73, 80, and 71. Florida law requires the defendant to show that the trial court's finding that Hall was not mentally retarded was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Florida Supreme Court found that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Hall is not mentally retarded. As a result, the Court denied his motion.

Issue: The questions before the Court is whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the state's threshold requirement as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court is unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment and disregards established medical practice.

Law in Plain English: Navarette v. California

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Navarette v. California

Argument: Jan 21 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Lorenzo and Jose Navarette were detained by officers of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and subsequently arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. The marijuana was discovered in the Navarettes' pickup truck during a traffic stop after the officers received a report from an unidentified citizen that the vehicle had been observed driving recklessly. The Navarettes' motion to suppress the evidence seized from their truck was denied, and they pled guilty to transportation of marijuana. On appeal, the Navarettes alleged that the evidence against them should have been suppressed because the anonymous tip received by police was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying an investigative stop of the vehicle, where the officers directly confirmed only significant innocent details of the tip but did not directly observe any illegal activity. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of California denied review.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck's driver was intoxicated.

Law in Plain English: Fernandez v. California

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Fernandez v. California

Argument: Nov 13 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Police responded to an apartment where there was a report of an assault with a deadly weapon by members of a gang. Police heard screaming from an apartment, and knocked on the door. A bruised woman answered the door and told the police she had been in a fight. When police tried to conduct a sweep of the apartment, Fernandez stepped forward and denied entry to the police. He was then arrested. Police went back to the woman and asked for the woman's consent to search, which she gave. The police found weapons that tied Fernandez to the gang. He was tried and convicted of robbery, assault, and the use of a weapon in connection with gang activity. The Court of Appeal of California ( Second District) affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied review. Under a previous Supreme Court case, a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Randolph does not extend to this situation, where the woman's consent was provided well after petitioner had been removed from the apartment. In other words, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search. That Fernandez was absent because he was arrested does not matter because the police had probable cause to arrest him (and he conceded as much).

Law in Plain English: Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper

Argument: Dec 9 2013 (Aud.)

Background: William Hoeper was a pilot for Air Wisconsin who was authorized to carry a firearm as a TSA federal flight deck officer. When Air Wisconsin discontinued the type of aircraft that Hoeper piloted, the airline required him to undertake training and pass a test certifying his proficiency in piloting another type of aircraft. Over the course of four failed tests, Hoeper lost his temper, confronted a test administrator, raised his voice, and used profanity. Patrick Doyle, a manager at Air Wisconsin involved in Hoeper's testing, called TSA to report Hoeper as a disgruntled employee (an FFDO who may be armed)" and that he was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Hoeper's] firearm, and [Hoeper's] mental stability at that time." TSA officials arrested Hoeper and searched him. Hoeper then sied Air Wisconsin for defamation. Air Wisconsin assertedthat it was entitled to immunity as a matter of law under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. § 44941 (2006), but the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that the two statements were defamatory and that Air Wisconsin made one or more of the statements "knowing that they were false, or so recklessly as to amount to a willful disregard for the truth." Air Wisconsin appealed and both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether immunity under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act may be denied without a determination that the air carrier's disclosure was materially false.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision (with a partial concurrence/dissent), the Supreme Court ruled that ATSA immunity may not be denied without a determination that a disclosure was materially false. The ATSA immunity exception is patterned after the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, which requires material falsity. As a result, the airline is entitled to immunity as a matter of law.

Law in Plain English: Kansas v. Cheever

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Scott Cheever. Photo from HutchPost.

SCOTUSblog: Kansas v. Cheever

Argument: Oct 16 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Cheever was charged with murder in federal court for the death of a law enforcement officer. Cheever intended to claim that although he killed the sheriff, he was intoxicated (by methamphetamine). As a result, the judge ordered a mental examination. The federal charges were later dismissed and reinstated in Kansas state court, where Cheever raised the same intoxication claim and presented an expert witness on his behalf. In response, prosecutors called the doctor who had examined Cheever in the federal case as a witness to testify that Cheever was not impaired at the time of the crime. Cheever was convicted and sentenced to death. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the admission of the doctor's testimony violated Cheever’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether, when a criminal defendant who affirmatively introduces expert testimony that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit capital murder of a law enforcement officer due to the alleged temporary and long-term effects of the defendant’s methamphetamine use, the state violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by rebutting the defendant’s mental state defense with evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant.

Holding: In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence. As a result, the court-ordered mental examination and the doctor's testimony was admissible. The Court distinguished Estelle v. Smith, in which the Court had previously held that the state may not force a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination solely for the purposes of sentencing, with Buchanan v. Kentucky. In Buchanan, the Court ruled that if the defendant had raised a psychiatric defense and joined in the motion for a mental evaluation, the Fifth Amendment was not offended if the prosecution used the examination results to rebut the defense's claims. The practical impact of this decision is that prosecutors will continue to be able to use the defendant's mental evaluation as rebuttal evidence when the defense raises issues concerning the defendant's requisite mental state as an element of the crime.

Controversial Court Decisions: Raleigh Avenue Beach Assn. v. Atlantis Beach Club

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe controversial, notorious, infamous, and outrageous court decisions. For similar posts, click here.

Case: Raleigh Avenue Beach Assn. v. Atlantis Beach Club, 185 N.J. 40 (2005).

Map note: The property in question is the dry beach area listed below as the "Atlantis Beach Club Property." To its south is property of the United States Coast Guard which is closed most of the summer. To its north is Seapointe Village's Beach, which is open to the public.

Facts: Tony Labrosciano, a member of the Raleigh Avenue Beach Association, was issued a summons for trespassing when he attempted to leave the wet sand area and walk across the private property of the Atlantis Beach Club to the eastern terminus of Raleigh Avenue in Cape May, New Jersey. The Association, which consists of individuals who reside on Raleigh Avenue in the Diamond Beach neighborhood, filed a complaint against Atlantis, and claimed that Atlantis was in violation of the public trust doctrine and sought free public access through the Atlantis property to the beach, and to a sufficient amount of dry sand above the mean high water line to permit the public to enjoy the beach and beach-related activities. The public trust doctrine is the principle that certain resources are preserved for public use, and that the government is required to maintain them for the public's reasonable use. The doctrine was born in Roman times, when Justinian ruled that seashores were open to the public, so that fishermen could dry their nets.

Trial Court: The trial court held that the public was entitled to a right of horizontal access to the ocean by means of “a three-foot wide strip of dry sand, immediately landward of the mean high water line and extending from the northern to the southern boundaries of [the Atlantis] [p]roperty, which may be utilized by the public, at no charge, for the purpose of entering into and exiting from” the area located below the mean high water line. The trial court also held that the public was entitled to limited vertical access to the ocean, consisting of a path from the bulkhead through the dunes on the property. The trial court also ruled that the Public Trust Doctrine does not apply to permit the Department [of Environmental Protection] to regulate the use of the Beach Area. (emphasis added)”

Appellate Court: The Appellate Division of the Superior Court, and then the Supreme Court of New Jersey, ruled that Atlantis could not limit vertical or horizontal public access to its dry sand beach area nor interfere with the public's right to free use of the dry sand for intermittent recreational purposes connected with the ocean and wet sand. Atlantis could charge reasonable fees to access the beach, but was required to pick up trash, provide shower facilities, and provide lifeguard service. 

Why It's Controversial: The public trust doctrine was born in Roman times from the need to protect the livelihood of fishermen. In New Jersey, the courts recognized that the public trust doctrine focused on the preservation of the “natural water resources” of New Jersey “for navigation and commerce and fishing, an important source of food.” In an earlier case, New Jersey extended this doctrine to recreational uses, without any legal justification. And even in New Jersey, the public trust doctrine had never extended to purely private property as was the case with the Atlantic Beach Club. Doubling down on an expansive use of the public trust doctrine ("The public trust doctrine...should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.was created to benefit"), the New Jersey Supreme Court decimated the private property rights of the Atlantic Beach Club, despite the fact that Seapointe Village's Beach was open to the public just a few hundred feet to the north (see map above).

Law in Plain English: Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice

Argument:N/A

Discussion: In 2011, Oklahoma passed a law that regulates doctors’ prescription of drugs that have been approved for public use by the FDA, and that have the medical effect of inducing abortions. A trial court in Oklahoma found the bill unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed in a brief opinion without any discussion. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, but first asked the Oklahoma Supreme Court to answer a certified question: Whether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibits: (1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies. Once the Oklahoma Supreme Court responds, the Supreme Court will then determine how to proceed.

Issue: Whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court erred in holding – without analysis or discussion – that the Oklahoma law requiring that abortion-inducing drugs be administered according to the protocol described on the drugs’ FDA-approved labels is facially unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Pursuant to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Okla. Stat., Tit. 20, §1601 et seq. (West 2002), respectfully certifies to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma the following question: Whether H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011 prohibits: (1) the use of misoprostol to induce abortions, including the use of misoprostol in conjunction with mifepristone according to a protocol approved by the Food and Drug Administration; and (2) the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies. Further proceedings in this case are reserved pending receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Holding: On November 4, 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of ceriorari as improvidently granted.

Law in Plain English: Conley v. United States

Antwaun Conley v. United States

Docket No.	Opinion Below	Argument	Opinion	Vote	Author	Term
No. 11-CF-589	N/A	Nov 20 2012	Sep 26 2013	3-0	Glickman	N/A

Plain English Summary: In 2009, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted a statute making it a felony offense for a person to be present in a motor vehicle if the person knows that the vehicle contains an illegal firearm (“PMVCF”), even if the person has no connection to or control over the weapon and is not involved in any wrongdoing whatsoever. The statute was enacted in order to allow convictions to be obtained when a firearm is found in a car with more than one occupant and the government cannot prove who possessed it. Conley was arrested after police found a loaded handgun in the center console of a car he was driving (there was also a passenger in the front seat; and two passengers in the rear of the vehicle). The jury acquitted Conley of several possessory offenses. It found him guilty only of PMVCF, and the judge sentenced him to thirty-four months in prison.

Holding: The DC Court of appeals found the PMVCF unconstitutional because it violated due process. Instead of requiring the government to prove that the defendant‟s continued presence was voluntary, the law requires the defendant to shoulder the burden of proving that his presence in the vehicle was involuntary. This shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a critical component of the crime is incompatible with due process. Additionally, the Court found it s incompatible with due process to convict a person of a crime based on the failure to take a legally required action—a crime of omission—if he had no reason to believe he had a legal duty to act, or even that his failure to act was blameworthy. In other words, the statute criminalizes entirely innocent behavior—merely remaining in the vicinity of a firearm in a vehicle, which the average citizen would not suppose to be wrongful (let alone felonious)—without requiring the government to prove that the defendant had notice of any legal duty to behave otherwise. As a result, Conley's conviction was overturned.

News Coverage

• Blog of Legal Times (Sep 26 2013)

Controversial Court Decisions: O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe controversial, notorious, infamous, and outrageous court decisions. For similar posts, click here.

Case: O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169 (1983).

Facts: O'Brien trespassed at the home of the Henrys and dove into their above ground pool (either from the platform by the pool or from the roof of the adjacent eight-foot high garage) made by Muskin Corp. As O'Brien’s hands hit the vinyl lined pool bottom, they slid apart and he sustained injuries when his head hit the bottom. The water in the pool was filled to a depth of three and one-half feet and a warning decal saying "Do Not Dive" appeared beneath the manufacturer’s logo in letters approximately one-half inch high. O'Brien sued the manufacturer of the pool on the grounds that it was liable for having failed to warn him of the risks of diving into the pool, and that the pool was defectively designed because its bottom had been lined with vinyl.

Trial Court: The trial court determined that O'Brien had failed to prove a design defect in the pool. The jury determined that the pool was defective, but that O'Brien was a trespasser at the time of the accident, thus exculpating the Henrys. Finally, the jury found that O'Brien was guilty of contributory negligence (85% to O'Brien and 15% to Muskin). Thus, under New Jersey's comparative negligence statute, O'Brien was barred from recovery.

Appellate Court: After the Appellate Division ordered a new trial, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that held that even though O'Brien could not show that the vinyl lined pool bottom could be designed more safely, he could still prevail if he could convince a jury that the "risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility."  The Court used a multi-factor risk-utility analysis test, which included examining "[t]he feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance."As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's order of a new trial. 

Why It's Controversial: Muskin Corp. was held strictly liable for O'Brien's injuries even though he trespassed onto the Henry's property and dove into a shallow pool despite the posted warning.

Controversial Court Decisions: Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe controversial, notorious, infamous, and outrageous court decisions. For similar posts, click here.

Case: Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49 (1983).

Facts: Bigbee was was injured when an allgedly intoxicated driver lost control of her car, veered off the street into a parking lot, and crashed into a telephone booth in which the man was standing. The phone booth was about 15 feet from the road, and the door was allegedly "sticky."  Bigbee sued the driver and the companies that served her alcohol. In addition (and this is what this case is about), he also sued the companies responsible for the design, location, installation, and maintenance of the telephone booth. 

Appellate Court: The California Supreme Court ruled that the risk someone might veer off the road and crash into the telephone booth was not unforeseeable as a matter of law. The Court also determined that it was of no consequence that the harm to the plaintiff came about through the negligent or reckless acts of an allegedly intoxicated driver. The Court concluded that "there are no policy considerations which weigh against imposition of liability" against the defendants, and referred specifically to "the probable availability of insurance tor these types of accidents." After the case was remanded, the defendants settled with Bigbee for an undisclosed amount.

Why It's Controversial: The Court's decision that the companies responsible for the design, installation and maintenance of the telephone booth could be held liable endorsed a wide-ranging definition of forseeability: A jury need not find that the defendants could forsee an intoxicated driver crashing into a phone booth located on that particular street, but rather whether a jury could foresee any driver crashing into a man standing in any phone booth similarly situated (the dissent notes that public telephones have long been maintained adjacent to roads for the convenience of the public, despite obvious but remote risks). This broad definition of forseeability is a license for a considerable expansion of liability. For more background and a different perspective on the Bigbee case, see here.

Controversial Court Decisions: Walt Disney World v. Wood

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe controversial, notorious, infamous, and outrageous court decisions. For similar posts, click here.

Case: Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).

Facts: Aloysia Wood was injured in November 1971 at the grand prix attraction at Walt Disney World (Disney), when her fiance (and later husband) Daniel Wood, rammed from the rear the vehicle which she was driving. Aloysia Wood filed suit against Disney, and Disney sought contribution from Daniel Wood. Disney's contribution claim alleged that Daniel, who was not a party in the original suit, was at least partially liable for the injuries to Aloysia.

Trial Court: The jury returned a verdict finding Aloysia Wood 14% at fault, Daniel Wood 85% at fault, and Disney 1% at fault (for more information about apportioning fault via comparative negligence, see here). The jury assessed Wood's damages at $75,000. Because Daniel Wood was judgment proof (basically, financially insolvent), and because of the concept of joint and several liability, the court entered judgment against Disney for 86% of the damages.

Appellate Courts: The Fourth District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Why It's Controversial: Despite a finding from the jury that the Woods were a combined  99% at fault (Aloysia 14% and Daniel 85%), Aloysia Wood received 86% of the damages: Disney's liability (1%), and Daniel's liability (85%, also paid by Disney). Because Disney was partially responsible (if only 1%), joint and several liability provided that Aloysia Wood could recover the entire amount of damages ($75,000), minus her liability (14%, or $10,500), from Disney. The Woods enriched themselves on their own negligence. Approximately 15 states follow the rule that defendants are joint and severally liable, even under a comparative negligence regime.

Law in Plain English: Blue v. PG County

Roguell Blue v. Prince George's County, Maryand, et al.

Docket No.	Opinion Below	Argument	Opinion	Vote	Author	Term
No. 87	CSA	Jun 5 2013 Vid.1 Vid.2	Sep 27 2013	4-3	McDonald	ST 2012

Issue - Public Safety - In applying the "supervisory employee" exemption to the handgun control law, should the requirement that the employee be "within the confines of the business establishment" be restricted to inside the building only, as the Court of Special Appeals ruled?

Plain English Summary: Subject to various exceptions, the Maryland handgun law prohibits a private individual from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun without a handgun permit. An exception under that law allows a supervisory employee to carry a handgun with the authorization of the owner of the business “within the confines of the business establishment” in which the employee works.

Roguell Blue, the head of security for a nightclub, was arrested by the Prince George’s County Police for carrying a handgun without a permit on the open parking lot of the nightclub. Mr. Blue brought suit against the County, contending at trial that his arrest was illegal because the parking lot should be considered to be “within the confines” of the nightclub.

The question before the Maryland Court of Appeals was: In applying the supervisory employee exemption to the handgun control law, should the requirement that the employee be "within the confines of the business establishment" be restricted to inside the building only, as CSA ruled?

Holding: In a 4-3 decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the supervisory employee exception to the handgun law allows such an employee to carry a handgun, with the employer’s permission, but only within the enclosed premises of the business in which the employee works. The Court reasoned that “within the confines of the business establishment” appeared to mean only the interior space of a commercial enterprise, where one may find its furnishings and staff, enclosed by walls or similar bounds; and not an exterior parking lot. The exception was not intended to include an unenclosed parking lot adjacent to a nightclub. As a result, when Mr. Blue left the “confines” of the nightclub and took his handgun into the parking lot, he was no longer within the exception. Thus, the Court of Special Appeals' decision was affirmed and Mr. Blue's suit was dismissed.

Can a wedding photographer be compelled to provide services to a same-sex couple?

Yes, says the New Mexico Supreme Court:

{1} By enacting the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -13 (1969, as amended through 2007), the Legislature has made the policy decision to prohibit public accommodations from discriminating against people based on their sexual orientation. Elane Photography, which does not contest its public accommodation status under the NMHRA, offers wedding photography services to the general public and posts its photographs on a password-protected website for its customers. In this case, Elane Photography refused to photograph a commitment ceremony between two women. The questions presented are (1) whether Elane Photography violated the NMHRA when it refused to photograph the commitment ceremony, and if so, (2) whether this application of the NMHRA violates either the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or (3) whether this application violates the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act (NMRFRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (2000). 

{2} First, we conclude that a commercial photography business that offers its services to the public, thereby increasing its visibility to potential clients, is subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the NMHRA and must serve same-sex couples on the same basis that it serves opposite-sex couples. Therefore, when Elane Photography refused to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony, it violated the NMHRA in the same way as if it had refused to photograph a wedding between people of different races.  

{3} Second, we conclude that the NMHRA does not violate free speech guarantees because the NMHRA does not compel Elane Photography to either speak a government mandated message or to publish the speech of another. The purpose of the NMHRA is to ensure that businesses offering services to the general public do not discriminate against protected classes of people, and the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the First Amendment permits such regulation by states. Businesses that choose to be public accommodations must comply with the NMHRA, although such businesses retain their First Amendment rights to express their religious or political beliefs. They may, for example, post a disclaimer on their website or in their studio advertising that they oppose same-sex marriage but that they comply with applicable antidiscrimination laws. We also hold that the NMHRA is a neutral law of general applicability, and as such, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 

{4} Finally, we hold that the NMRFRA is inapplicable in this case because the government is not a party. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Baby Veronica case timeline

From TulsaWorld.com:

September 2009: Baby Veronica born in Oklahoma, taken to South Carolina for adoption.

January 2010: Father, Dusten Brown, signs away custody but files an appeal a few days later.

December 2011: Baby Veronica returns to Oklahoma after a family court in South Carolina grants custody to the father.

July 2012: South Carolina Supreme Court upholds the custody decision.

January: U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear an appeal from the adoptive parents, Matt and Melanie Capobianco.

April: U.S. Supreme Court hears arguments in the case.

June 25: U.S. Supreme Court rules that federal law doesn't require that Veronica be given to her biological father. The court did not clear her adoptive parents to immediately regain custody.

July 9: Cherokee Nation District Court officials confirm that Dusten Brown's mother and father, Alice and Tommy Brown, have filed for adoption of Veronica - in line with Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor's dissenting opinion.

July 17: Cherokee Nation courts name three of Dusten Brown's family members as joint guardians, giving them the power to make legal and medical decisions for Veronica and complicating the issue for South Carolina courts. Later that day, the South Carolina Supreme Court terminates Brown's parental rights and gives full custody to the adoptive parents.

July 24: Christy Maldonado, Veronica's birth mother, files a lawsuit with several other women who have placed children for adoption, seeking to have part of the Indian Child Welfare Act declared unconstitutional.

July 26: Dusten Brown files a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case and require South Carolina courts to hold a best-interest hearing for Veronica.

July 31: Prior to a hearing on transition details for Veronica, a Cherokee Nation attorney appointed for Veronica files a federal lawsuit in South Carolina seeking to temporarily stop the hearing and hold a best-interest hearing. It is denied.

Aug. 2: The U.S. Supreme Court denies Brown's July 26 petition. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor were the only dissenters.

Aug. 5: A South Carolina judge orders Brown to surrender custody "immediately" after he didn't bring Veronica to a court-ordered visitation with the adoptive parents in South Carolina.

Aug. 9: South Carolina officials issue an arrest warrant for Brown. He is expected to be taken into custody in Iowa, where he is training with the Oklahoma National Guard.

Aug. 10: National Guard officials grant Brown requested leave from training after he is subpoenaed to appear in Cherokee Nation tribal court for an emergency hearing in Tahlequah.

Aug. 12: Brown does not appear at the emergency hearing. He turns himself in to authorities in Sequoyah County and is released after posting $10,000 bond. South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley signs a warrant for Brown's extradition and sends it to Gov. Mary Fallin for her approval.

Aug. 13: Fallin declines to sign off on the warrant, saying Brown has a right to contest extradition in court. She says she will not act upon the warrant until after Brown's next extradition hearing on Sept. 12. Capobiancos arrive in Tulsa that night.

Aug. 14: Capobiancos hold news conference in downtown Tulsa saying they had been denied a chance to see Veronica and meet with Brown. Fallin says she will speed up Brown's extradition to South Carolina if he does not allow the Capobiancos to see Veronica. A South Carolina family court judge reiterates that he wanted Veronica returned to the Capobiancos "forthwith."

Aug. 16: Both sides appeared in Cherokee County court as well as Cherokee Nation court. Records show that Brown and the Capobiancos have entered into a mediation agreement. A judge-imposed gag order prevented either side from speaking afterward.

Upcoming court action:

Aug. 23: Deadline for Brown to contest South Carolina's custody order in Oklahoma court.

Sept. 4: A Cherokee tribal court will consider extending a temporary guardianship for Veronica's stepmother and grandparents, potentially claiming jurisdiction over the case.

Sept. 12: Brown to return to Sequoyah County Court for a hearing on his extradition.

Law in Plain English: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Update (8/18/13): For a full timeline of events in this case, see here.

For a previous discussion of this case, see here.

SCOTUSblog: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Matt and Melanie Capobianco with Veronica.

Argument: Apr 16, 2013 (Tr.) (Aud.)

Discussion: A South Carolina couple adopted the daughter of a young woman who was not a tribal member, but the child was considered to be an Indian because of her father’s tribal membership. The couple had to give up the child after raising her for two years, because the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the federal law took priority over state law.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether a non-custodial parent could invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63, to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law; and (2) whether the ICWA defined “parent” in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings. The Court ruled that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not bar termination of the biological father's paternal rights because it applied to a child who was removed--the ICWA’s primary goal is not implicated when an Indian child’s adoption is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights. In other words, the provisions were not designed to apply to the circumstances presented by this case. As a result, the order returning the baby to the biological father was thrown out. It will be the job of the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide custody--although without the ICWA in the way, it seems likely that the adoptive parents will regain custody of the girl.

Update (6/29/13): In an order of June 28th, Justice Alito wrote that the mandate to the South Carolina Supreme Court will issue on July 5th (normally, such mandates happen 25 days after the original decision; the Capobiancos had applied with the Court for a faster timetime and Justice Alito agreed).

Update (7/17/13): In a 3-2 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court  remanded the case to the Family Court for the prompt entry of an order approving and finalizing Adoptive Couple's adoption of Baby Girl, and thereby terminating Birth Father's parental rights. As a result, the court ruled that custody of Baby Girl shall be transferred to Adoptive Couple.

Update (7/24/13): In a 3-2 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court ordered the adoption to be finalized.

Update (7/26/13): Refusing to give up, the birth father filed an application for a stay of the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Update (7/30/13): On Wednesday, a family court in Charleston, S.C., plans to have a hearing Wednesday to decide how - not if - to transfer custody of Baby Veronica back to her adoptive parents.

Update (7/30/13): Attorneys for Adoptive Couple filed a response to the birth father's application for a stay of the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Update (8/2/13): The Supreme Court denied the birth father's application for a stay.

Update (8/7/13): A South Carolina family court issued an enforcement order which found that Dusten Brown (the birth father) violated the terms of a previous court order by not showing up at the appointed time and place via the terms of the transition plan (Brown himself need not have shown up; Veronica's grandparents or other guardians could have done so). As a result, the court canceled the transition plan and ordered immediate custody of Baby Veronica to the Capobiancos. It also referred the matter to the Charleston County Solicitor's Office, the United States Attorney's Office, and Brown's commanding officer (Brown is in the Army National Guard).

Update (8/18/13): For a full timeline of events in this case, see here.

The Maryland Court of Appeals and judicial restraint

Judicial restraint is a theory that judges should limit their own power, primarily by giving deference to legislatures. Two recent cases from the Maryland Court of Appeals illustrate this theory.

Coleman v. Soccer Association of Columbia (case page): Coleman (a volunteer soccer coach) was retrieving a ball from a soccer goal when he jumped and grabbed the crossbar. The goal subsequently collapsed and injured him. The jury found that the Soccer Association of Columbia was negligent, but that Coleman was also negligent.

Maryland is one of only a few jurisdictions (the others being Alabama, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and Virginia) that allows the defense of contributory negligence. When a plaintiff is found to have contributed to his own injuries, he cannot recover (even if his contribution was minimal). Because the jury found that Coleman was partially negligent in causing his own injuries, he could recover nothing.

Most states allow a defense of comparative negligence, which reduces the amount of damages that a plaintiff can recover in a negligence-based claim based upon the degree to which the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to cause the injury. In other words, if a plaintiff is found to be 30% responsible for an injury based upon a $100,000 claim, he would recover 70%, or $70,000.

The question before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether the Court should ameliorate or repudiate the doctrine of contributory negligence and replace it with a comparative negligence regime.

In a 5-2 decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the General Assembly’s repeated failure to pass legislation abrogating the defense of contributory negligence is very strong evidence that the legislative policy in Maryland is to retain the principle of contributory negligence. As a result, the Court declined to repudiate the doctrine of contributory negligence and replace it with comparative negligence.

The Court said that:

The General Assembly’s repeated failure to pass legislation abrogating the defense of contributory negligence is very strong evidence that the legislative policy in Maryland is to retain the principle of contributory negligence...For this Court to change the common law and abrogate the contributory negligence defense in negligence actions, in the face of the General Assembly’s repeated refusal to do so, would be totally inconsistent with the Court’s long-standing jurisprudence.

Warr v. JMGM Group: The Warrs filed suit against JMGM Group, LLC, which owns the Dogfish Head Alehouse (Dogfish Head), to recover for injuries they and their daughter sustained and for the death of their second daughter in a car accident. The Warrs alleged that the driver of the vehicle that struck the car Mr. Warr was driving had been served alcohol while “clearly intoxicated” at Dogfish Head. Because members of the Dogfish Head’s staff had served him alcohol while he was so compromised, the Warrs alleged, the tavern had breached its duty to them to “not furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons,” which caused their injuries.

The question before the Court of Appeals was whether Maryland should recognize a cause of action against a tavern for harm caused by an intoxicated patron, off premises, in the absence of a special relationship between the tavern and the person harmed or between the tavern and the actor who caused the harm.

In a 4-3 decision declining to find such liability against Dogfish Head, the Court wrote that:

The Legislature...“is in a far better position that this Court to gather the empirical data and to make the fact finding necessary to determine what the public policy should be....”  We agree.

In both cases, the decision rested not on whether proposed change in the law was a good idea, but whether it was appropriate for the Court (instead of the legislature) to change the law. In both cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals deferred to the legislature.