Podcast subscriptions, April 2020

Here is my list of podcast subscriptions as of April 2020:

Backstage Journal with Rhett Shull
The Bob Murphy Show
Bound by Oath
The Brion McClanahan Show
Cato Daily Podcast
Contra Krugman
Daily Audio Bible
Grammar Girl
Lexicon Valley
The Libertarian Podcast
Make No Law
Part-Time Genius
RadioLab Presents: More Perfect
Serial
Short Circuit
This American Life
The Tom Woods Show
The Way I Heard It with Mike Rowe
The Week in Review at Abbeville Institute

William Adams and Religion Beyond the Walls of the Church

Ever since the founding of the American Republic, authors have contemplated the relationship between Christianity and the world outside of the church, whether it be government, the arts and sciences, or other intellectual pursuits. The Sabin Americana database at the Jerry Falwell Library provides a number of insightful examples of historical works that elaborate on the myriad of discussions regarding this relationship. The purpose of this blog post is to highlight two of them as a roadmap to further research regarding the importance of Christianity in early American history. Our focus will be on William Adams, the pastor at the Central Presbyterian Church in New York City.

Our first example is Adams's Christianity and Civil Government: A Discourse Delivered on Sabbath Evening, November 10, 1850. According to Adams, the purpose of this discourse was to "explain the duties of citizens according to Christian ethics." Adams outlined what he believed were important doctrines of the New Testament as they related to government. First, government was ordained by God and therefore the people should respect their government. And second, while God ordains civil government, He does not advance or prescribe a particular method of government. Despite this, Adams concedes that there are appropriate circumstances in which it is permissible to resist government, and cites the American Revolution as an example. According to Adams, a patriotic Christian citizen should be required to show that "the authority of God requires that resistance." To do this, people must discern God's will through their conscience:

We arrive at that high conviction by the calm exercise of our own reason; by intelligent thinking; by honest judgments, and by the use of all human and inspired wisdom which we can command. It will not be communicated to us miraculously. We must think; we must study; we must compare; we must judge; we must pray. 

Adams concedes that Christian ethics cannot give weight to a judgment of the constitutionality of any particular law. That is the province of the courts. Adams concludes that Christian ethics support the right of the people to revolution when they believe that God's will requires it, but that they should not do it rashly. Rather, they should come to that determination.

The second example is an address that Adams gave to his alma mater (Yale) in 1847. Entitled "Christianity the End and Unity of All Sciences and Pursuits," Adams argued that Christianity is the basis upon which everything else is built. According to Adams:

[The Cross of Christ] is the one fact which is central to all other facts; the one knowledge which is ultimate to all other departments of knowledge. We announce it here not merely as the Sabbath-day religion of the pulpit ; but as a great intellectual truth before an university of scholars, that the true philosophia prima is the knowledge of Christ; that the only object which gives relationship, harmony, unity, connection, to all this world's affairs, is the grand purpose of God to diffuse a stable and substantial happiness over the world, through the all-pervading beneficence of Christianity, as the central power ; and consequently, that our true interest and duty, in all the variety of our pursuits, is to devote ourselves to the service of our race, in seeking to make the world better.

According to Adams, the Enlightenment philosophy in continental Europe (especially in France) presaged an antagonism between science and religion. But in the United States, science and religion worked in concert and this would be the basis for intellectual advancement.

These two examples are representative of Adams's larger body of work which stressed the importance of Christianity beyond the walls of the church. Adams saw a larger role for religion in both civil government and in the advancement of arts and sciences.

References

Adams, William. Christianity and Civil Government: A Discourse Delivered on Sabbath Evening, November 10, 1850. New York: C. Scribner, 1851. Sabin Americana: History of the Americas, 1500-1926 (accessed February 13, 2020).

Adams, William. Christianity the End and Unity of All Sciences and Pursuits. New York: Leavitt, Trow & Company, 1847.

Adams, William, and New England Society in the City of New York. An Address Delivered Before the New England Society in the City of New-York, December 22, 1852. New-York: J.F. Trow, 1853. Sabin Americana: History of the Americas, 1500-1926 (accessed February 13, 2020).

Podcast subscriptions, May 2016

Here is my list of podcast subscriptions as of May 2016:

The Art of Manliness
Cato Daily Podcast
Contra Krugman
EconTalk
The Eric Metaxas Show (new addition)
Federalist Society SCOTUScast
Grammar Girl
The Lara Murphy Report
The Libertarian Podcast
Tech Policy Podcast
The Tom Woods Show
The Way I Heard It with Mike Rowe

FYI: I use Doggcatcher for podcasts and some audiobooks.

Is money the root of all evil?

This is one of those Facebook memes that you read, smile or laugh at, click Like, and move on. It's meant to demonstrate, by referencing something in the Bible, that churches are hypocritical by for asking for money. It may reinforce what you already believe. There's a problem with it, though. The actual verse says: "For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil. Some people, eager for money, have wandered from the faith and pierced themselves with many griefs." 1 Timothy 6:10. This is part of a larger letter from the Apostle Paul to Timothy, and here he's talking about obsession for money, not money itself. Paul is not demonizing money. This is an important distinction, and leaving these words out of the meme makes a big difference. But maybe that's the point. Whether you believe in the Bible or not is not important here. Instead, it's about the lack of nuance; the loss of understanding that comes with 140-character limits or trying to make a statement with a picture. I'd like to think that if we want to make a point, we should find a more accurate way to do it. I know, too much to ask. I can hope, right?

Is this man a terrorist?

Many people across my Facebook feed are quick to call Christian pastor Josh Feuerstein a terrorist for a video he posted to his Facebook page back in July:

In case the video gets taken down, here's what Feuerstein said:

Planned Parenthood has hunted down millions and millions of little innocent babies, stuck a knife into the uterus, cut them, pulled them out, crushed their skull with forceps, ripped their body apart, sold their tissue, and threw them bleeding into a trash bin.

I say, tonight, we punish Planned Parenthood. I think it’s time that abortion doctors should have to run and hide and be afraid for their life.

This is pretty detestable stuff. But I don't think Feuerstein is a terrorist. In fact, I think his speech is probably protected. Let's review a little history...

In 1966, the NAACP ran meetings in Mississippi to organize protests and boycotts against white-owned businesses. The NAACP "store watchers" wrote down names of blacks who violated these boycotts. Names of boycott violators were read aloud at meetings and published in a local black newspaper. At one meeting, Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP, stated: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."

This was a direct threat aimed by an NAACP official toward specific blacks who had been named, listed, and published as boycott violators. This is a much more direct threat than Feuerstein's video posted above. Yet the Supreme Court found that the store watchers' actions, and Evers' speech, was protected.

Unless speech is directed to inciting, and is likely to incite, imminent lawless action, it's protected by the First Amendment. It would be very difficult to argue that a Facebook video (posted last July) meets this standard. The mere advocacy of violence is not enough. No, in my opinion, this is not terrorism. Rather, it's very possible that this is protected speech. And yes, I'd stand up for his right to say these abhorrent things. That doesn't mean I agree with him.

Garrett Epps is Right (and Wrong) on Indiana's RFRA

Indiana Gov. Mike Pence

In his latest article at the Atlantic, Professor Garrett Epps highlights two key differences between Indiana's recently-passed state RFRA law and the federal RFRA law. The first distinction is that Indiana's law provides explicit protection for for-profit businesses. The second distinction is that Indiana's RFRA provides a defense for claims against private lawsuits where the government isn't a party. Professor Epps is right that these two differences do not exist within the text of the federal RFRA law (or most state RFRA laws). But a cursory examination of these two issues shows that Professor Epps is wrong when he asserts that these differences are significant.

First, whatever one may think of RFRA protection for for-profit businesses prior to Hobby Lobby, that case is now the "law of the land" and its protection is effectively written into law. Epps suggest that, pre-Hobby Lobby, many believe this idea was "outlandish," but that's beside the point post-Hobby Lobby (I think it was perfectly reasonable, but we can agree to disagree here). So while the federal RFRA law does not contain the same language as Indiana's RFRA law, the end result is precisely the same. Any federal court ruling on a RFRA claim today would rule with the understanding that for-profit businesses are protected by RFRA. It is disingenuous to suggest that this provision is a significant difference from the federal law since Hobby Lobby. As to the states, Epps can point to only two (Louisiana and Pennsylvania) that specifically exclude for-profit businesses. It is not unreasonable to believe that other states may fall in line with the the federal interpretation, especially since some states, like Arkansas's recently passed RFRA, look to the federal courts for interpretation. Absent court decisions (beyond the singular Elane Photography) that specifically exclude for-profit businesses, it is a difficult leap to suggest this distinction is significantly different. 

Second, Epps focuses on the language in Indiana's RFRA which provides RFRA protection "regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding." He then claims that "[n]either the federal RFRA, nor 18 of the 19 state statutes cited by the Post, says anything like this; only the Texas RFRA, passed in 1999, contains similar language." Again, this is a true statement, but it excludes important context. As Josh Blackman has pointed out, of the six federal Circuits that have ruled on the issue, four of them have held that the federal RFRA law may be used as a defense in a private lawsuit. Within these four Circuits (the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit), RFRA is a defense in a private lawsuit, just as it would be under Indiana's state RFRA. To be sure, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the federal RFRA extends to private party lawsuits. Blackman also points out that the Justice Department under Attorney General Eric Holder wrote that it believed Wheaton College (a private party) could use RFRA as a defense to a lawsuit by one of it's employees (another private party). Given that the majority of circuits that have ruled on the issue have ruled this way, consistent with the Justice Department's apparent position on the issue, it is puzzling for Professor Epps to exclude this information in his article. Based on the lack of state RFRA cases regarding private parties, this distinction (as it applies to state RFRAs) is most generously described as undetermined rather than significantly different.

Professor Epps points to two reasons why Indiana's RFRA law is significantly different from the federal RFRA, but these distinctions start to fade away once you take a closer look.

Building permits, religious freedom, and the cardinal rule of legal journalism

I have said on many occasions that it is unforgivable for journalists to report on court decisions without, at the least, linking the reader to the text of the court's decision.

Here is an interesting article from Wisconsin that discusses the ruling in a case about several Amish families' failure to obtain building and sanitary permits, which would require the families to install smoke and carbon monoxide detectors in their homes. The Amish families believe that the installation of these electronic devices would violate their religious beliefs.

You may agree or disagree with the ultimate result, but what I really want to know is what basis the judge used to rule against the families. Unfortunately, you can't read the text of the decision without further sleuthing because the article doesn't link to it. Worse, the article doesn't even name any of the families so you wouldn't even know what parties to search for.

These articles from last December lists the names of some of the defendants: Eli Gingerich, Clemens Borntreger, Mahlon Miller Jr. and Roman Borntrager. Unfortunately, the Wisconsin's court system's webpage doesn't list any recently closed cases involving these Amish gentlemen. In fact, these four men might be a set of companion cases that haven't been decided yet.

My best guess is that the decision was in one of the Gingerich cases, but even the Wisconsin courts website doesn't have a disposition:

It is also true that these cases are at the trial level, which typically don't produce written opinions. But still, there should be some order that can be reproduced and linked for the reader.

This is the problem with legal journalism: without a link to a court opinion or order, we readers have no idea what was really decided, or even who was ruled against. This Facebook page has more information than most of the articles I've read about these cases. For shame.

A few thoughts on Hobby Lobby and for-profit corporations

One of the most interesting distinctions, and perhaps the most crucial distinction, in the Obamacare contraceptive mandate cases is not whether corporations can "practice" religion, but the differences between a non-profit corporation and a for-profit corporation.* Many opponents of the decision have argued that a corporation cannot practice religion. But this ignores a long-standing understanding of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Under RFRA, no one (not even the dissenters on the Supreme Court) questions that a non-profit corporation like a church can practice religion. Non-profit corporations are unambiguously covered by RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. For if RFRA does not cover a church, then what is it good for?

(Nor is RFRA part of some ridiculous notion of a "war on women" by Republicans: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was introduced in the House by then-Representative Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and 169 other co-sponsors, and passed by a voice vote. It passed the Senate by 97-3. President Clinton signed it into law. It was backed by the New York Times. It was primarily designed to protect Native American religions from the federal government.)

Rather, you must be able to make a principled distinction as to why a non-profit corporation like a church can practice religion, but that a for-profit corporation like Hobby Lobby or Conestoga Wood Specialties or Mardel cannot. In my opinion, the dissent tries but fails to do this in a convincing way. The Dictionary Act, a federal law codified at 1 U.S.C. § 1, states that

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise—

...

the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals....

(Yes, you read that right: since 1947, federal law says that anytime another law refers to "person" it includes corporations).

The dissent argues that "the context indicates otherwise," but this is not convincing. The only defining difference is profit, but "that dog don't hunt." Making profit is not mutually exclusive with practicing religion.   It is not, as the dissent suggests, that "religious exemptions had never been extended to any entity operating in 'the commercial, profit-making world,'" but rather that RFRA, when combined with the Dictionary Act, makes no such distinction. The dissent, in my opinion, must do better than this.

Good and smart people can disagree about the scope of RFRA, as evidenced by the 5-4 vote in this case. But when you try to argue that corporations cannot practice religion, without understanding that non-profit corporations are already unambiguously protected in this regard, you start to look foolish. To start to convince me, find a principled distinction between a non-profit corporation and a for-profit corporation that goes beyond the profit motive.

* A reminder: It is important to note the distinction that the holding in this case does not apply to all corporations, just those that are defined as closely-held. The IRS defines a closely-held corporation as one in which more than 50% of the value of its outstanding stock owned (directly or indirectly) by 5 or fewer individuals at any time during the last half of the tax year; and is not a personal service corporation.

Law in Plain English: Obamacare contraceptive mandate cases

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (consolidated with Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell)

Argument: Mar 25 2014 (Aud.)

Discussion: Hobby Lobby and Mardel (a craft store chain and a Christian bookstore chain, respectively) and Conestoga Wood Specialties (a manufacturer of wood cabinets) brought actions challenging an Affordable Care Act regulation that requires them to provide certain contraceptive services as a part of their employer-sponsored health care plan. Among these services are drugs and devices that the employers believe to be abortifacients, the use of which is contrary to their faith. The employers grounded their claims in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a federal law aimed at preventing laws that substantially burden a person's free exercise of their religion. The Tenth Circuit ruled that Hobby Lobby and Mardel were "Persons Exercising Religion" Under RFRA, and thus entitled to bring their claims. On the other hand, the Third Circuit ruled that for-profit, secular corporations like Conestoga Wood Specialties could not engage in religious exercise, and as a result, were not entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the RFRA.

Issue: The question before the Court in Hobby Lobby is whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., which provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest, allows a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives to which the employees are otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation’s owners.

The question before the Court in Conestoga Wood Specialties is whether the religious owners of a family business, or their closely held, for-profit corporation, have free exercise rights that are violated by the application of the contraceptive-coverage mandate of the Affordable Care Act.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that, as applied to closely held corporations, the HHS regulations implementing the contraception mandate violate the RFRA. It is important to note the distinction that the holding in this case does not apply to all corporations, just those that are defined as closely-held. The IRS defines a closely-held corporation as one in which more than 50% of the value of its outstanding stock owned (directly or indirectly) by 5 or fewer individuals at any time during the last half of the tax year; and is not a personal service corporation.

Law in Plain English: Town of Greece v. Galloway

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Town of Greece v. Galloway

Argument: Nov 6 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Since 1999, the Town of Greece, New York, has begun its Town Board meetings with a short prayer. In 2008, Galloway and other  town residents brought suit against the town, asserting that aspects of this prayer practice violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court rejected the claim and ruled for the town. The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that an objective, reasonable person would believe that the town's prayer practice had the effect of affiliating the town with Christianity. The Government filed an amicus brief supporting the position of the town.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a legislative prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause notwithstanding the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers or forbidden exploitation of the prayer opportunity.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the town’s prayer practice does not violate the Establishment Clause. Legislative prayer, while religious in nature, has long been understood as compatible with the Establishment Clause, and insistence on nonsectarian prayer is not consistent with this tradition.

Obamacare is headed back to the Supreme Court--and here's why it's a big deal

UPDATE: My case page is here.

As I noted the other day, the the Supreme Court granted cert in two cases (Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius) challenging the Obamacare contraceptive mandate.

The Affordable Care Act contains a regulation that requires employers to provide certain contraceptive services as a part of their employer-sponsored health care plan. To be clear, these employers are not challenging the provision of all contraceptives--just some of them. Among these contraceptive services in question are drugs and devices that the plaintiffs believe to be abortifacients, the use of which is contrary to their faith.

It is true that, as a practical matter, these cases will not likely have a huge impact on Obamacare itself--at stake is one small provision of the law, not the individual mandate at the center of NFIB v. Sebelius. Rather, what makes these cases a big deal is nexus of Obamacare and Citizens United, the case in which the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting political independent expenditures by corporations, associations, or labor unions. While corporations have had some personhood rights at early as the 19th century, the public perception of corporate personhood rights is strongly tied to the unpopular Citizens United decision. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is poised to expand Citizens United when it rules in McCutcheon v. FEC.

As a result, the combination of an unpopular Citizens United decision (potentially expanded by McCutcheon) with the controversial Obamacare contraceptive mandate is a high profile mix of politics and religion--sure to be a big deal when the decision comes down (quite possible a 5-4 decision the last week of June).

This seems legit

Westboro Baptists prevail at the Supreme Court, but questions remain

Today's Supreme Court decision in favor of the Westboro Baptist Church is just another indication of how difficult it is to read the Court, especially during oral argument.  A good deal of the oral argument focused on the distinction between a public figure and a private one, and public speech vs. private speech, ostensibly in the context of both the Westboro Baptists signs, but also the Internet "epic" posting.

It turns out that, despite its discussion during oral arguments, the "epic" was never even considered by the Court.  According to footnote one of Chief Justice Robert's opinion:

A few weeks after the funeral, one of the picketers posted a message on Westboro’s Web site discussing the picketing and containing religiously oriented denunciations of the  Snyders, interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations.  Snyder discovered the posting, referred to by the parties as the “epic,” during an Internet search for his son’s name. The epic is not properly before us and does not factor in our analysis. Although the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts below, Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari.

In the context of this statement, the Court's ultimate result is wholly unsurprising.  When I wrote about this case back in January, I thought the Court would lean in Snyder's direction not because of the signs, but because of the epic:

...But it is much more about an "epic" or online posting that the Westboro Baptists made about Matthew Snyder which was personally about him, and directly addressed to him and his parents.

This case is about the clash between free speech and if and when that speech infringes on the Snyder’s personal interests protected by Maryland tort law.  To the extent that the Westboro Baptists' "epic" speech was private in nature (in other words, about Matthew specifically, and not public issues) and directed toward a private individual (Albert Snyder), it likely deserves less protection than otherwise pure political speech.  And to the extent that they may have intentionally caused emotional distress to Albert Snyder, the Westboro Baptists' speech may be are liable.

[The] oral argument...will give you a better sense of the issues surrounding the case and why it's about more than just the signs.

I have to believe that if the Court considered the epic, as Justice Alito did in his dissent, the outcome may very well have been different.  As it was, by focusing solely on the signs, the speech became public and Snyder's burden became that much higher.  And as a result, the holding is considerably narrow.

Snyder v. Phelps, the Westboro Baptists, and free speech

Sometime this spring, the Supreme Court will rule in the case of Snyder v. Phelps:

The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words."

If Supreme Court rules, as I believe they will, in favor of Snyder, I suspect there will be outrage among many who are just peripherally following the case.  There will be a lot of, "I don't agree with their message, but this is still free speech!" and "We need to protect the free speech of those we don't agree with!"  These are true statements, but they're also simplistic because people who are just peripherally following the case are going to think this case is about the signs, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and such.  And to some extent, the case is about the signs.  But it is much more about an "epic" or online posting that the Westboro Baptists made about Matthew Snyder which was personally about him, and directly addressed to him and his parents.

This case is about the clash between free speech and if and when that speech infringes on the Snyder’s personal interests protected by Maryland tort law.  To the extent that the Westboro Baptists' "epic" speech was private in nature (in other words, about Matthew specifically, and not public issues) and directed toward a private individual (Albert Snyder), it likely deserves less protection than otherwise pure political speech.  And to the extent that they may have intentionally caused emotional distress to Albert Snyder, the Westboro Baptists' speech may be are liable.

I strongly recommend listening to the oral argument at Oyez.  It will give you a better sense of the issues surrounding the case and why it's about more than just the signs.  I also recommend Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court's Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations by Deana Pollard Sacks in the Yale Law Journal Online, which I believe is the best analysis of the case that I have read.

So if and when the Supreme Court rules against the Phelps (and like I said, I believe they will), take a minute to temper your thoughts before you go all "high and mighty" that we need to protect the speech of people we don't agree with.  Sometimes that speech goes too far and intentionally invades the privacy of others.  In those cases, the speech is no longer protected.  We can disagree about the extent of this protection.  But simplifying this case solely to the free speech of their signs should not be your argument.

High school football and Ramadan

From ESPN, a high school football team in Michigan moved its pre-season practices from daytime to night time because many of its players are Muslim and it's currently Ramadan. Personally, I think this is a great example of a school accommodating a religious group. I think, generally speaking, people are supportive of this idea. I haven't seen a whole lot of ruckus about this in the news.

I can only imagine though--if this school was accommodating a group of Christian students rather than Muslims--wouldn't the ACLU and every other atheist organization in the country be threatening First Amendment lawsuits and barking about separation of church and state?

Some thoughts about the "Ground Zero Mosque"

I have avoided posting anything about the "Ground Zero Mosque" on Twitter primarily for two reasons: 1) I feel as if I cannot express the breadth of my views in 140 characters, and while I could break it up into several tweets, they'll fall apart and potentially out of context; and 2) I recognize the fact that many of the people who follow me on Twitter do so for reasons other than politics and religion, and I respect that; while I do occasionally make political posts I try to keep to humorous things or lighthearted issues that don't inflame people's passions (there have been exceptions).

"Ground Zero Mosque"

So let's address a few issues right up front. I am going to refer to it as the "Ground Zero Mosque" (or GZM) or just "the mosque". I fully recognize that the mosque is not at Ground Zero, but two blocks away. I fully recognize that there are Burger Kings and Off Track Betting joints and all sorts of other things within a two block radius of GZ. So I'm not being inaccurate or insensitive to the issue when I say GZM, I'd rather just not say "the mosque two blocks from Ground Zero" every time. I also recognize that this structure is said to be a "community center," and not just a single house of worship. I think there is some significance to this, but I'll discuss this later on.

"Sacred ground"

I also recognize that this particular location has at least some significance to the 9/11 attacks. This building was the site of some damage on September 11th (landing gear from one of the planes hit the building), but I'm not going as far as to say this particular building is "sacred ground." I recognize that the damage to the building tends to extend what 9/11 families would consider sacred ground, but I just am unwilling to go that far. Did people die in this building? As far as I know, no one did.

Landmark status

I can only briefly comment on the issue of "landmark" status; while the building is said to be in the Italian Renaissance palazzo style, I don't think anyone who isn't well-versed in architectural history can really appreciate whether or not this building is deserving of a special status. So I am going to pass on this issue and say that if the Landmark Preservation Commission decided not to make this particular building a landmark, I think we should be willing to accept their decision.

Legality/Constitutionality

This, I think, is a no-brainer. Presuming that all the necessary permits and codes and so forth are met, there is no legal issue or constitutional issue that should prevent this mosque from being built. Freedom of religion is sacrosanct in my book, and laws like the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) were specifically written to make religious exercise easier, not harder.

End of story?

This is the end of the story for many people. Accepting the previous issues, they come to the reasonable conclusion that the mosque should be built. And I fully understand that view. I suspect that many of you who are reading this would agree with me on virtually all (if not all) of the previous points. The majority of Americans agree that the owners of the proposed mosque have a right to build it, even if they don't necessarily want it to be built. I agree with them; while I completely respect the right of the owners to build the mosque, I believe they just shouldn't build the mosque at that particular location. So now let me lay out my reasons why.

Córdoba

The names of the project are Park51 (the address is 45-51 Park Place) and Córdoba House. Córdoba probably doesn't set off any bells for most people, but perhaps it should. Córdoba is a city in southern Spain that was captured in 711 by the Muslims and soon became a provincial capital and later a full-fledged Caliphate. The Great Mosque of Córdoba was built there on the site of a Christian church (building mosques on the sites of conquered cities was not uncommon, see for example Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and Istanbul’s St. Sophia Basilica). While only the owners know the true reason why they chose the name Córdoba , to many it is a clear sign of Islamic triumphalism. You don't necessarily have to agree with this point, but you should at least understand that some people have issues with a mosque near Ground Zero that by name associates itself with a city and mosque whose name signifies such "conquest" issues (to be fair, the Christians later recaptured Córdoba and the building now houses the Cathedral of the diocese of Córdoba).

Community center

The GZM is not just a house of worship, but a $100 million, 13-story structure. I am truly torn about the issue of asking where the funding is coming from. On one hand, it's no one's business where the money comes from. Do we ask the source of the funding of every Catholic church or Mormon temple or Jewish tabernacle? Of course not. On the other hand, there seems to be legitimate concerns that Hamas and other organizations could be involved. Of all the issues, this is the one that I have trouble coming down on one side or another.

This mosque is said to be an Islamic community center, and there seems to be a concerted effort to references about inter-faith dialog. I also read one article (of which I can't find yet) that stated that anyone who paid the dues would have access to this facility. Well, parts of it, perhaps. There is some debate as to whether or not non-Muslims are allowed inside a mosque. I do know that non-Muslims cannot even enter the city of Mecca, and that some mosques are closed to non-Muslims, but it is said that mosques in Europe and the United States in particular may be more lax. Can anyone answer this question? Can a non-Muslim simply walk into a mosque as anyone could do in (most) Christian churches? Can a non-Muslim enter if permission is granted?

The larger issue to me is not so much the United States, but abroad. In Saudi Arabia, for example, there is no inter-faith dialog between Islam and other religions, because other religions can't build churches there. Religious freedom as we know it here in the United States does not exist in much of the Muslim world. I'm not suggesting that we should apply their standard to this situation, but I am suspect of the concept of inter-faith dialog from a religion that does not practice it when it is the majority religion.

There are also some issues surrounding Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and some of the comments he has made:

• he said that the United States was "an accessory to the crime" (in reference to 9/11);
• He has refused to say whether he agrees with the U.S. State Department's designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization
  

Muslim criticism

Some Muslims have criticized the decision to build the mosque so close to Ground Zero as insensitive. While I am not an expert on Islam and the Koran, it is intriguing to me that, for example, Raheel Raza and Tarek Fatah, board members of the Muslim Canadian Congress, said:

We Muslims know the ... mosque is meant to be a deliberate provocation, to thumb our noses at the infidel. The proposal has been made in bad faith, ... as "Fitna," meaning "mischief-making" that is clearly forbidden in the Koran.... As Muslims we are dismayed that our co-religionists have such little consideration for their fellow citizens, and wish to rub salt in their wounds and pretend they are applying a balm to sooth the pain. (1)

Is that argument not worth some weight in this debate? There are other such arguments as well. (2) and (3)

Sensitivity

Lastly, to me the issue comes down to sensitivity, or perhaps the lack of it. This area is largely a commercial district. It's not as if this particular location is the epicenter of Islam in New York. But this area clearly has significance to New Yorkers, who by majorities who oppose the mosque, and by nearly all 9/11 families, to whom this area (if not this exact building) is sacred ground. Surely, the builders understand this issue, yet they continue to push to build at this site. I have clearly and unequivocally said they have ever right to do so. To me, the issue is not can they, but should they. If the owners were to decide to build elsewhere, this issue would disappear. But at the current location, I suspect there will be more discord than dialog.

Racism / Intolerance / Etc.

I hope from talking about these concerns that is it possible to understand that from my perspective, it is perfectly acceptable to be opposed to the GZM without being racist, or intolerant, or dismissive of Muslims' freedom of religion. Disagreeing with particular tenets of a religious group does not mean I am intolerant of their religion. Quite the opposite. I consider myself a non-denominational Christian, precisely because I have issues with various sects/denominations and their interpretations of Biblical issues. Likewise, I have issues with Catholicism, and Mormonism, and many other groups, but I respect their right to practice their religion as they see fit, just like I support people to practice no religion if they so choose.

Opposed

I stated early on that legally speaking, there appears to be nothing stopping the building of the GZM. And I have a difficult time imagining how any such legal opposition could be realistically mounted. On the other hand, many of the circumstances surrounding the mosque suggest to me that the owners decide to build elsewhere. If tolerance is a staple of Islam, the owners, on their own accord, ought to practice some sensitivity and show respect not only to the 9/11 families, but to public opinion in general and build the mosque elsewhere. As Peter Kirsanow of NRO has said: "Merely because I have a right to do something doesn’t mean it should be done. Neither does it mean that my exercise of the right must be insulated from dissuasion or criticism."(4)

There are so many issues surround the GZM and I know I have only touched on a few. But I hope I have been able to demonstrate why I think there is legitimate opposition to building it. You may not and don't have to agree with it, but I think you should be willing to accept that it is legitimate to oppose the mosque without being the subject of ridicule for being racist, bigoted, or intolerant.

In the end, if the owners decide to "say tough luck, we're building it anyway," then that's something we have to live with. And while I will disagree with it, I'll accept it.

More War on Christianity

From the AP:

A high school choir was asked to stop singing Christmas carols during an ice skating show featuring Olympic medalist Sasha Cohen out of concern the skater would be offended because she's Jewish.

It never stops, but seems to boil to the surface during the Christmas season.

Religious discrimination

Some call it the War on Christmas because it flares up most often during the holiday season. I called it the War on Christianity. What am I talking about? Religious discrimination. And not against Muslims, Jews, or any other religious minority. I have argued for years that Christianity is the most discriminated religion in the United States. Throughout the rest of the holiday season I'll point out examples, like the Christmas trees being removed from the Sea-Tac Airport (they have since announced they are going back up).

Pick a copy of David Limbaugh's book Persecution as a primer, then simply follow the news. You'll be amazed at how often Christianity is the subject of overt discrimination for reasons of political correctness.