Showing posts with label writing samples. Show all posts
Showing posts with label writing samples. Show all posts

18 April 2014

No Ma’am: Progressive Reform as an Obstacle to Gender Equality (Full Paper)

As promised, here is a link to my full Supreme Court Seminar paper. It's entitled "No Ma’am: Progressive Reform as an Obstacle to Gender Equality" (the introduction by itself is available here). It's a bit lengthy, but your comments and feedback are appreciated. Thanks!

25 March 2014

No Ma’am: Progressive Reform as an Obstacle to Gender Equality (Introduction)

With a subtle reference to Al Bundy. Here is the introduction to my Supreme Court Seminar paper (you can read the full paper here).

Rapid industrialization in post-Civil War America brought with it swift economic growth and a substantial increase in both the labor force and labor wages.  Women moved out of the farmer’s field and into the factory.  Between 1870 and 1900, the number of women in the labor force grew from 1.9 million to 5.3 million.  The percentage of working women increased from 13.3% to 18.8%. 

At the same time, the period was marked by labor strife and the rise of the labor union.  This gave rise to the Progressive Era, a two-decade long period of social and political reform characterized by extensive government intervention in society and the economy. To the extent that classical liberalism and laissez faire economics were representative of late 19th century America, the Progressive Era sought to reign in the perceived excesses of capitalism. The period belonged to the likes of Richard T. Ely, Roscoe Pound, and Louis Brandeis.  To guard against the perceived exploitation of workers, progressives championed protective labor legislation. The most common reforms were minimum wage and maximum hours laws, especially so when they focused on women.

In the four decades between 1897 and 1937, conservatives (holding the mantel of classical liberalism) would repeatedly skirmish with progressives, especially in the labor arena. The chief weapons were liberty of contract on the conservative side and the state’s police power on the progressive side. To this end, Supreme Court decisions in Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v. New York ushered in decades of economic substantive due process that became a major thorn in the side of the progressive agenda. A distinct subset of these liberty of contract cases focused on women’s protective labor legislation.

Since the 1970s, a growing body of scholarship has taken a critical look at these Progressive Era cases with an eye toward evaluating the long-term legacy of women’s protective labor legislation. In an empirical sense, most of the work has focused on the period from the Reconstruction amendments until West Coast Hotel v. Parrish and the end of the Lochner era.  Other work has focused on the period from the New Deal forward. Little scholarly attention has been paid to the important links between these two periods.

This paper seeks to add a critical piece to the conversation. By balancing the sober discourse of modern scholarship with historical accounts, news reports, and legal scholarship contemporary to the events as they occurred, I intend to take a closer look at the intersection of two lines of cases. First, Muller v. Oregon and its progeny of cases that serve as precedents for treating women differently than men; and second, a series of cases beginning in the 1930s that abdicated meaningful judicial review in favor of expanded police powers jurisprudence. Beginning in Muller, efforts by the Court to acquiesce to the progressive political agenda did so by perpetuating gender stereotypes and prolonging a period of indifference toward the rights of women. This was the result of a deliberate strategy by progressives to downplay inequality and individual rights in favor of the state’s police power. Both state and federal courts were considerably more deferential to protective labor legislation when it focused on women as opposed to protective labor legislation in general. While my research is focused on the Supreme Court's protective labor jurisprudence as it relates to gender, I will occasionally highlight state cases, especially because much of the labor legislation being challenged originated in state courts. 

This paper will demonstrate that the courts’ already-deferential attitude toward women’s protective labor legislation was reinforced and enhanced by abandonment of meaningful rational basis review. Together, these two lines of cases provided a potent combination that established long-standing and difficult precedents to overcome, and ultimately doomed the prospects of equality for women until the 1970s. Progressive reform became an obstacle to gender equality.

Given a fair chance, the natural evolution of the liberty of contract doctrine might well have led to some fuller measure of gender equality, especially in the labor arena, considerably sooner than actually occurred. Untethered from anachronistic precedents that “perpetuat[ed] the treatment of women as less than full persons within the meaning of the Constitution,”  the struggle for gender equality might have achieved its first significant victory long before 1971.  To be sure, women who supported formal equality constituted a minority among feminists. Nonetheless, they agitated against women’s protective labor legislation as early as the time of Muller and brought cases on their own behalf. Ordinary women like May Cashel, Ethel Nelson, Elmira Simpson and Willie Lyons saw through the paternalistic veil and recognized these laws as restrictive rather than protective. The likelihood of their success may have been low, but the intellectual underpinnings of their argument were alive and well. Ultimately, though, the structural subordination of women doomed their chances.

Part I discusses the important historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment, concerning both its original understanding and the scope by which it was applied in the years immediately after its ratification. Of special interest during this period is the role of American feminists, particularly in terms of divisions within the feminist movement over how to both define and achieve equality.

Part II covers the historical development of liberty of contract. This section explains the history and doctrinal development of liberty of contract through the lens of 19th century scholars and judges. In this section, I’ll review how the progressive movement sought to refocus and carry out their strategy to push back against the perceived excesses of laissez faire capitalism. In particular, Part II focuses on Muller v. Oregon and its progeny as the foundation of progressive reforms, as well as “sociological jurisprudence” and the Brandeis Brief.

Part III demonstrates how a line of cases beginning in 1931 firmly established a modern incarnation of the presumption of constitutionality. By abandoning the traditional 19th century police powers jurisprudence, the Court confirmed that gender discrimination would be subject only to rational basis review. Then, the Supreme Court became so deferential to economic legislation that even reasonable rational basis review became eviscerated.

Finally, I will share the results of my extensive analysis of women’s protective labor cases in the years after West Coast Hotel. In Part IV, I will show how the legacy of Muller, together with the Court’s post-Lochner jurisprudence, created a structural barrier to gender equality. Progressives advocated a calculated strategy to advance their agenda. They did so at the expense of women, who became unwitting victims in a larger political game.

24 June 2013

Writing sample: Court Interpreters Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 1827)


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
          Plaintiff

          v.

GONZALEZ, ROBERT,
          Defendant

Case No.: 09-CR-1322

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR RECONSIDER THE SUPPRESSION HEARING AND
DISQUALIFY INTERPRETER FOR PROSECUTION WITNESS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 9, 2009, James Narren (an employee of the United States Postal Service) was assaulted and robbed in an alley behind Le Mar Café in New Orleans, Louisiana. R. at 2. The mugging was witnessed by Larry Rhet, a busboy working at the Café. Thauer Aff. ¶¶ 9-10.
Mr. Narren described his attacker as a Hispanic male, solidly built, and between 5'6" and 5'10" tall. R. at 2. The attacker was wearing blue jeans and a red and black shirt. R. at 2. This description was radioed to dispatch for wide release. R. at 2. Officer Michelle Belloit recognized the Defendant as meeting the description, placed him investigative detention, and transported him to the station. R. at 2.
At the station, the Defendant was escorted to an interrogation room. R. at 12. Detective Kevin Anderson testified that he read the defendant his Miranda warnings, the Defendant acknowledged understanding them, and the Detective questioned him for about fifteen minutes. R. at 12.
The Defendant’s attorney moved to suppress statements premised on insufficient or missing warnings of his constitutional rights. R. at 7. At his suppression hearing, the Defendant testified in English with an accent and occasionally lapsed into Spanish. On two occasions, he interrupted Officer Belloit and Detective Anderson. R. at 8, 11. He alleges he was never told that he had the right to remain silent nor that he could have an attorney, per Miranda. R. at 15.
Judge Redman found Detective Anderson’s testimony to be credible, and denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. R. at 18.
At trial, the United States seeks to use Angie Thauer as an interpreter for Larry. Angie is a 21-year old high school graduate, Thauer Aff. ¶ 1, dating 22-year old Larry Rhet. Thauer Aff. ¶ 2.  She has known Larry since she was four. Thauer Aff. ¶ 2. They grew up on the same street and attended the same schools, Thauer Aff. ¶ 2, and have a long-term friendship and began dating approximately two years ago. Thauer Aff. ¶ 4. Both work at Le Mar Café in New Orleans. Thauer Aff. ¶ 2.
Larry has a stuttering problem brought on by fear of speaking in public places. Thauer Aff. ¶ 5. He speaks softly and uses gestures with his hands and head when he is trying to speak. Thauer Aff. ¶ 5. When speaking to strangers, Larry often resorts to these gestures. Thauer Aff. ¶ 5. Because of their longtime relationship, Angie can understand Larry’s gestures. Thauer Aff. ¶ 8.
Because of his stuttering problem, Larry communicated to Angie, who called 911. Thauer Aff. ¶ 10. Angie facilitated communication between Larry and a police officer by interpreting his hand gestures and head movements. Thauer Aff. ¶ 11.
The Defendant asked this Court to dismiss the case, or alternatively, to provide a new suppression hearing based on the lack of an interpreter at the suppression hearing. The Defendant also moved to disqualify Angie as Larry’s interpreter based on Angie’s personal relationship with Larry.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Is the Defendant entitled to dismissal of the charges, or alternatively, a new suppression hearing, when neither the Defendant nor his lawyer asked the court to provide an interpreter, and he could understand the proceedings and communicate with his lawyer and the judge?
II. Can Angie Thauer serve as witness Larry Rhet’s interpreter, when Angie is Larry’s girlfriend, and Larry’s disability requires Angie’s assistance to communicate, while still protecting the Defendant’s constitutional rights?
ARGUMENT
I. THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE NEITHER THE DEFENDANT NOR HIS LAWYER ASKED THE COURT FOR AN INTERPRETER, THE DEFENDANT SPOKE ENGLISH, UNDERSTOOD THE PROCEEDINGS AND WAS ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIS LAWYER AND THE COURT. 
The Court Interpreters Act (“Act”) established a program to facilitate the use of interpreters for defendants or witnesses who are not proficient in English, or suffer from a hearing impairment, such that their comprehension becomes inhibited. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1827(d)(1) (West). The Act’s purpose is to enable communications and comprehension of court proceedings among parties. Id. The Act does not provide an absolute right to an interpreter, but rather gives the court discretion to determine whether the failure to provide an interpreter would inhibit a party’s communication or comprehension. United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980).
A. Neither the Defendant nor his lawyer asked for an interpreter.
The Defendant’s motion should be denied because neither the Defendant nor his lawyer ever asked the court for an interpreter.
It is not error for a court to fail to appoint an interpreter when the defendant never made such a request. United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1990). In Perez, the defendant indicated that he had some difficulty with the English language, but never made any request for an interpreter. 918 F.2d at 490. Similarly, in United States v. Paz, the defendant never asserted that she had trouble understanding the proceedings. United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, there is no indication that the Defendant or his lawyer ever asked the court to provide an interpreter. This failure weighs heavily against the Defendant.
It is true that in Tapia, the 5th Circuit ruled that the trial court should have inquired whether the failure to have an interpreter inhibited the defendant’s comprehension of the proceedings and communications with his lawyer, but did not do so. 631 F.2d at 1209. However, the Tapia court was on notice because the defendant had previously been arraigned through an interpreter. Id. Similarly, the court erred when it failed to inquire into the defendant’s need for an interpreter when the defendant made an express request for such assistance. Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707 F. Supp. 504, 507 (M.D. Fla. 1989). In both Tapia and Dugger, the courts were put on notice by a prior action or a request by the defendant. On the contrary, when a defendant expressed difficulty in understanding the proceedings, and asked for a translation of an “awkwardly-phrased question,” the court found that the Act had not been triggered. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007).
Here, there are no facts to suggest that the court had any indication of the Defendant’s language abilities prior to the suppression hearing. The Defendant’s situation is similar to those in Perez, Paz, and Edouard. While there may have been an indication of misunderstanding, the Defendant never made an express or implied request to trigger the Act. Likewise, nothing in the Act or the prior decisions of this Circuit requires the court to raise the issue sua sponte. To require such a prophylactic rule would overburden the court’s limited resources and run afoul of judicial efficiency.
As a result of these factors, the Defendant’s motion should be denied because neither the defendant nor his lawyer ever asked the court for an interpreter.
B. Misunderstandings, accents, and lapses into Spanish do not demonstrate a failure to communicate.
 The Defendant’s motion should be denied because the context of the Defendant’s misunderstandings, the Defendant’s accent, and his occasional lapses into Spanish do not demonstrate a failure to communicate.
Interruptions and misunderstandings of a witness who otherwise demonstrates English competency are not a sufficient basis for appointing an interpreter. United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2004).  In Black, a witness who spoke English but was more comfortable speaking Navajo occasionally misinterpreted a question. Id. On several occasions, the court interrupted the witness’s testimony because she could not be understood. Id. Nonetheless, the court concluded that she possessed an adequate mastery of the English language. Id. at 1174-175.
Here, the Defendant twice interrupted the testimony of Officer Belloit and Detective Anderson. R. at 8, 11. The context of the interruptions (and the fact that he interrupted at all) suggests that the Defendant appreciated the circumstances, but might have misunderstood a word. Even primary speakers of English might have occasion to make the same mistake, especially in an unfamiliar setting. This is hardly evidence of the need for an interpreter. Additionally, the transcript demonstrates the Defendant’s adequate fluency in English.
It is not error for a court to deny an interpreter to a defendant who speaks English with a heavy accent. United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1996). In Arthurs, the defendant spoke English with a Jamaican accent but was otherwise intelligible to the jury. Id. Additionally, counsel for the defendant never asserted any comprehension problems on his client’s behalf. Id. Here, the Defendant spoke accented English and occasionally lapsed into Spanish. The Defendant’s lawyer never raised the issue of the defendant’s accent nor made any references to his occasional Spanish. The Defendant was intelligible to the court. Likewise, neither of these facts shows any evidence that the Defendant did not also have a comparative understanding of English.
On the other hand, in United States v. Osuna, the 10th Circuit found that a defendant’s occasional lapses into Spanish might otherwise alert the court to the need to inquire about an interpreter. United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999). However, the Osuna court also noted that the defendant’s testimony was often unintelligible to the court reporter, that the judge expressed difficulty in understanding the defendant, and that the prosecutor suggested an interpreter. Id. at 1291, 1293. Here, none of those facts exist. Moreover, the Defendant was intelligible to the court reporter and the judge. The situation is more akin to Black, where the witness was more comfortable speaking Navajo, but was otherwise proficient in English. Black, 369 F.3d at 1174.
As a result, the Defendant’s motion should be denied because the context of the Defendant’s misunderstandings, the Defendant’s accent, and his occasional lapses into Spanish do not demonstrate a failure to communicate.
II. THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ANGIE AS LARRY’S INTERPRETER BECAUSE THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LARRY’S CONDITION AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ANGIE CAN AID THE COURT’S UNDERSTANDING WHILE PROTECTING THE DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Courts have discretion to determine whether the failure to provide an interpreter would inhibit a party’s communication or comprehension. Tapia, 631 F.2d at 1209. The legislative history of the Act suggests that courts are capable of “…providing, on [their] own initiative, assistance, where appropriate, to [individuals who suffer from a speech impairment which is not accompanied by a hearing impairment] if it will aid in efficient administration of justice.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1687, at 7 (1978). Likewise, a trial judge is uniquely positioned to evaluate a witness's comfort and intelligibility of language use in relation to the complexity of the proceedings and issues. United States v. Coronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1284, 1291 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Osuna, 189 F.3d at 1296 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
A. Close family and relatives can be interpreters, but the court must examine them for disinterest, necessity, and available alternate methods of testifying, to address issues of fundamental fairness. 
The court should deny the Defendant’s motion to disqualify Angie because she is disinterested, and her relationship with Larry is unique and necessary to aiding the court’s understanding of Larry’s testimony while protecting the fundamental fairness of the Defendant’s constitutional rights.
     While courts have preferred the use of disinterested interpreters, they have endorsed the choice of family members and close relatives as interpreters when it aided the court’s understanding of the witness’s testimony. Fairbanks v. Cowan, 551 F.2d 97, 99 (6th Cir. 1977) (father); see also United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 68 (3rd Cir. 1972) (wife). In Fairbanks, the father was an appropriate interpreter because he was one of the few people in a position to understand his son’s guttural sounds. 551 F.2d at 98. In United States v. Ball, the court permitted the wife of a deaf witness to interpret. United States v. Ball, 988 F.2d at 9 (5th Cir. 1993). Similarly, in United States v. Bell, the interpreter was the victim’s sister. United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2004).
On the other hand, the court abuses its discretion in appointing a family member when the interpreter is too emotionally attached to the outcome. Consequently, in Prince v. Beto, the husband of a rape victim (the only witness) as an interpreter “deprived petitioner of a fair trial and the unfairness [was] so fundamental as to deny him due process.” Prince v. Beto, 426 F.2d 875, 876 (5th Cir. 1970).
However, even in Prince the court recognized that it might not be possible to obtain a “wholly disinterested person.” Id. at 877, citing Almon v. State, 109 So. 371, 372 (Ala. 1926) (Prosecutor's mother was acceptable interpreter for infirm, tongue-tied victim). Close family and relatives can be interpreters, but the court must examine them for disinterest, necessity, and available alternate methods of testifying. Ball, 988 F.2d at 10. In Ball, these factors weighed in favor of the interpreter: the interpreter was married to a deaf witness, and the witness’s handicap necessitated the use of a family member (Ball did not address alternate means of testifying). Id. Prince is also distinguished by the fact that the husband-interpreter of the rape victim tried to extort $100 from the defendant in return for dropping a charge. This “direct and substantial interest” effectively disqualified him as an interpreter. 426 F.2d at 876. Here, the facts do not show any such “direct and substantial interest.” Id.
In Ball, the longstanding relationship between the deaf witness and his wife “allowed the two to communicate with one another freely.” Ball, 988 F.2d at 9. The victim’s sister in Bell was able to communicate with the victim by interpreting his grunts and gestures. 367 F.3d at 463. The wife in Addonizio was at her husband’s bedside and could “understand his words almost without hesitation,” despite the fact that he could only mumble. Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 68.
Larry and Angie have a long-term relationship that allows her to understand Larry when he becomes scared. While there is an emotional attachment, this is not disqualifying.  Similarly, Angie’s relationship with Larry places her in a unique position to assist the court’s understanding of his testimony. Angie’s relationship with Larry is similar to the unique familial relationships in Ball, Bell, and Addonizio.
Lastly, Larry is a witness, not a direct party. This fact distinguishes this case from Prince. As a result, Angie is likely to have less direct interest in the outcome. The strong emotional bias and interest in the outcome of a rape case (not to mention the attempted extortion) that the court found in Prince does not exist here. Accordingly, Angie and Larry’s relationship uniquely suits her to be his interpreter. An interpreter for a witness (and not a direct party) mitigates concern about bias. In sum, these issues do not rise to the level where they would be fundamentally unfair to the Defendant.
The court should deny the Defendant’s motion to disqualify Angie because her relationship with Larry is unique and necessary to aiding the court’s understanding of Larry’s testimony while protecting the Defendant’s constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Defendant nor his lawyer asked for an interpreter. Neither accented English, misunderstandings, or lapses into Spanish demonstrated evidence of a failure to communicate. The United States respectfully requests the Court to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss, or alternatively, to deny the Defendant’s motion for a new suppression hearing.
The court has discretion in accommodating parties, to include the appointment of interpreters, to aid in the court’s understanding of their testimony. Close family and relatives can be interpreters if the court considers the interpreter’s interest and involvement in the case, the necessity of having a relative or family member act as an interpreter, and available modes of testimony, to allay the defendant’s constitutional due process concerns. The United States respectfully requests that the Court deny the Defendant’s motion to disqualify Angie as Larry’s interpreter.

DATED: April 2, 2013                                               Michael Schearer___          
                                                                             United States Attorney

Writing sample: At-will employment

QUESTION PRESENTED
          Under the California presumption that employment is at-will, but can be overcome by the totality of the circumstances, can Electra prevail in a breach of contract claim when she believed the personnel policies, longevity, assurances of continued employment and industry practices created an implied contract to terminate only for cause?
BRIEF ANSWER
          Probably not. California employment is at-will, but this presumption can be rebutted by an implied contract. This can be demonstrated by the parties’ conduct and the totality of the circumstances. These include the personnel policies or practices of the employer; longevity of the employee's service; actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment; and practices of the industry. However, a vague combination of factors by itself does not necessarily give rise to an implied contract. The actual understanding of the contract must be determined from the circumstances. On Electra’s facts, a court would likely rule that Electra was an at-will employee. As a result, an implied contract probably did not exist and she could not recover for breach of contract.
FACTS
          Our client, Carmen Electra, worked for the First Bank of California (“FBOC”) for 22 years. During that time, she progressed from teller to branch manager to Assistant Accounting Manager, receiving positive performance reviews each year. Additionally, she received verbal assurances of continued employment; among them, that she would “have a long, fruitful career with the bank.”
Lucy Liu, Electra’s former supervisor, encouraged FBOC to create a new Assistant Accounting Manager position, and she recommended Electra for this position. Subsequently, PBOC chose Electra. Liu, preparing for retirement, started assigning duties to Electra with the expectation that Electra’s “continued hard-work would lead to another promotion” as the next Accounting Manager.
Upon Liu’s retirement in 2010, FBOC hired Gary Sinise as its new Accounting Manager instead of Electra. A personality conflict between Sinise and Electra soon developed. Approximately one year later, Electra was discharged, allegedly due to FBOC’s cost-saving measures that eliminated the Assistant Accounting Manager’s position. FBOC’s employee handbook states that the “First Bank of California may terminate any employee…with two weeks [sic] notice for any reason so decided by First Bank of California.”  Electra, unemployed for almost two years with no current prospects of a new job, came to us for assistance.
DISCUSSION
I. Was Carmen Electra an At-Will Employee?
California is an at-will employment state, but this presumption can be overcome by evidence to the contrary. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). Employers and employers retain the freedom of contract, and as a result, courts will look to the parties' actual conduct to determine if their actions demonstrate an implied contract. Id. at 677. To evaluate the parties’ actions, the courts will look at the totality of the circumstances, including the employer’s personnel policies or practices, longevity of the employee’s service, the employer’s actions or communications that would indicate assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the employee’s industry. Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).
However, promotions and salary increases are indicative only of lengthy employment and are not sufficient to establish an implied contract. Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Ct. App. 1989). See also Quist v. Columbia/HCA Health Care Corp., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13506, at *1 (9th Cir. June 17, 1999). Similarly, positive performance reviews, commendations, salary increases, and vague assurances of future positions are not adequate to overcome the presumption. Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1999). Lastly, a vague combination of factors by itself does not necessarily create an implied contract. The courts must use the totality of the circumstances to determine, by mutual agreement and meeting of the minds, the actual understanding of the contract. Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
A. The personnel policies or practices of the FBOC suggest at-will employment.
The first factor of the test is an examination of the personnel policies or practices of the employer. An implied contract can be inferred from an employee’s reliance on language in a company’s employee handbook. The handbook language may overcome the at-will presumption if it sets implied contractual limits on the circumstances under which an employer can end an employment relationship. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1104. For instance, in Foley the employee relied in part on the employer’s written “Termination Guidelines” which imposed limits on the employer’s ability to terminate. Foley, 765 P.2d at 388.
The courts distinguish these self-imposed limits on the employer from express at-will language in the company handbook. In Quist, at-will language in the handbook buttressed the presumption of at-will employment. Quist, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13506, at *6. Such provisions represent direct expression of an employer’s intent and should be considered alongside other relevant evidence. Id. Similarly, in Guz, the company’s personnel policy specified no guarantee of continuous employment to the employee. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1105.
The primary evidence here is FBOC’s employee handbook. The relevant provision states that the “[FBOC] may terminate any employee…with two weeks [sic] notice for any reason so decided by [FBOC].” Electra’s situation is similar to the facts in Quist, where the handbook language specifically reinforced the presumption of at-will employment rather than limited it. No other language suggests any implied contractual limits. Electra claims she had no knowledge of such provisions in the handbook; nonetheless, there is nothing in the cases to suggest the employee must be aware of such a provision for it to have force. But see Quist, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13506, at *6 (employee acknowledged receipt of company manual and was familiar with policies).  On the other hand, there is no evidence that Electra signed any written agreement. Here, the balance of evidence suggests that FBOC’s personal policies or practices lie in at-will employment, not an implied contract.
B. Electra’s longevity of service is probably sufficient to show conduct, communications, and assurances from the employer.
The second factor of the test is a measure of the longevity of service, which may aid in determining the existence of an implied contract. The cases that describe this factor indicate that longevity by itself does not create an implied contract, but is significant to the measure that it establishes an adequate base of time to accumulate conduct, communications, and assurances from the employer. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1104; Gould v. Md. Sound Indus., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 726 (1995).
In Miller, the employee asserted 11 years of employment (along with two promotions and regular salary increases) as indicative of an implied contract. Miller, 259 Cal Rptr. at 59. The courts noted Miller’s longevity, but qualified it by indicating that promotions and salary increases were “natural occurrences” of this longevity, and alone, were not sufficient to give rise to an implied contract. Id. See also Guz, 8 P.3d at 1104 (“longevity, raises and promotions are their own rewards for the employee's continuing valued service; they do not, in and of themselves, additionally constitute a contractual guarantee of future employment security”); Horn, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (evidence of laudatory performance reviews, commendations, and salary increases did not rise to an implied contract).
In the instant case, Electra worked for FBOC for 22 years. This fits squarely in between two cases where longevity was found to contribute to an implied contract (Foley, six years and nine months; and Pugh, 32 years). Foley, 765 P.2d at 387; Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918. However, as in Miller, Horn, and Guz, this time by itself does not rise to the level of an implied contract. Nonetheless, a court would likely conclude that this period of employment would satisfy the requirement to establish a timeline upon which evidence of employer conduct, communications, and assurances of employment can be stacked.
C. FBOC’s actions and communications indicating assurances of continued employment were too vague to create an implied contract.
The third factor of the test is a consideration of the actions or communications of the employer that would tend to indicate assurances of continued employment. Repeated assurances of job security and promotions may create a reasonable expectation of an implied contract, but they must be specific enough to establish an understanding between the parties. For instance, the court in Foley found that an employee could rely on repeated oral assurances of job security to contribute to the inference of an implied contract. Foley, 765 P.2d at 385. However, “oblique” language alone is not sufficient. Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. In Gould, the employee relied on oral assurances that the employer was looking for “long term” employees, but the court was not persuaded. Gould, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727. Similarly, in Horn, the employee cited positive text in performance evaluations and regular salary increases, and but the court found these were “vague assurances,” and thus not adequate to establish an agreement between the parties. Horn, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474.
Electra cites communications that she would have a “long and fruitful career,” and that “continued hard-work would lead to another promotion.” Additionally, she alleges that communications of FBOC led her to believe that she would become the Accounting Manager after Liu retired. Specifically, she points to the creation of the Assistant Accounting Manager position, and being groomed by taking on Liu’s responsibilities, Electra’s situation is closer to the facts in Horn, where positive performance evaluations and regular salary increases were too vague to create an implied contract. Id.
Here, while Electra may have genuinely understood these communications to mean she would become the next Accounting Manager, there are no facts to suggest FBOC actually shared the same beliefs. While Liu did hand off some of her responsibilities to Electra, this tends to demonstrate at best that she was considered a candidate for the position, not a communicative guarantee of promotion. Electra herself understood this to mean she was being groomed, but there are no facts to suggest anything more. Electra’s situation compares favorably to Guz, where the employee alleged an implied contract based upon an unwritten policy to terminate only for cause, but the court found that the employer’s general disclaimer of at-will employment was controlling. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1107.
The last potentially relevant communication is the greeting card given to Electra by Liu which wished Electra good luck “in her new position.” None of the cases deal with communications from a former employer. While the card would otherwise lean strongly in Electra’s behavior, a court would probably find this card to be irrelevant because Liu had already left FBOC when the card was given, and thus was no longer a representative of the bank. As a result, the language on this card likely holds no weight of authority.
On the third factor, a court would probably conclude that, while the actions or communications of FBOC may have suggested assurances of continued employment, these communications were too “oblique” or “vague” to reach any actual understanding between the parties.
D. Practices of the industry are insufficient to support an implied contract.
          The fourth and final factor of the test is an examination of the practices of the industry. Practices common among certain industries may contribute to the rise of an implied contract. In Guz, the court found that an industry that operated through competitive bidding was volatile and was not indicative of secure employment. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1107. In both Guz and Horn, the employees were terminated as a result of company-wide reorganizations. Id. at 1102; Horn, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463-64. No other cases cite the impact of industry practices, although an inference from Guz is that more conservative business models are likely to be less volatile industries, and potentially better indicators of job security.
          In this case, Electra alleges that during her tenure, the banking industry did not sign employment contracts. There are no other facts to determine the practices of the industry. However, the banking industry appears to be different from the industry in Guz, which was characterized by volatility. Id. Additionally, Electra’s situation is more similar to the circumstances in Horn and Guz, where a termination as a result of a company-wide reorganization was lawful. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1102; Horn, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463-64. Likewise, a court would probably find that the practices of the industry are insufficient to give rise to an implied contract.
CONCLUSION
Electra can rebut the presumption of at-will employment by demonstrating that the totality of the circumstances, including personnel policies or practices of the employer; the employee’s longevity; actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment; and practices of the industry; created an implied contract. An implied contract can be inferred from an understanding of the language in an employee handbook. Handbook language may overcome the presumption of at-will employment if it sets implied contractual limits on the circumstances under which an employer can terminate its employees. Longevity by itself does not create an implied contract, but is significant to the measure that it establishes time to accumulate communications, and assurances from the employer. Repeated assurances of job security and promotions may create a reasonable expectation of an implied contract if they are specific enough to establish an understanding between the parties. Lastly, practices in some industries may contribute to the rise of an implied contract.  The combination of Electra’s longevity of service and frequent promotions, top level performance reviews and raises, and verbal assurances of a lengthy career is noteworthy, but nonetheless it probably does not give rise to an implied contract. A court would probably rule that Electra was an at-will employee, and as such, an implied contract did not exist.

13 December 2012

Is a dog sniff considered a Fourth Amendment search?

Here is the submission I made to the ABA's Citizen Amicus Project.

The question presented in Florida v. Jardines is whether a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause. Because Franky’s sniff was a sense-enhancing technology not in public use, and because the police trespassed to obtain information, the dog sniff should be held to be a search.

The Fourth Amendment provides in part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”[1]

Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is derived from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.[2] There, he articulated a two part test that would later be adopted by the Court in Smith v. Maryland.[3] The Fourth Amendment is implicated when a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and when that expectation is (objectively) reasonable to society.[4]

More recently, the Court has supplemented the Harlan test with a property –focused approach that recognizes the connection between private property and a physical intrusion that would constitute common law trespass. Two recent cases that provide illumination on this issue are Kyllo v. United States[5] and United States v. Jones.[6]

In Kyllo, the Court addressed the role of technologically sophisticated surveillance as it relates to the Fourth Amendment. The police used a thermal imaging device to identify heat emanating from the home of a suspected grow house. Despite the fact that this device was used from a public street, the Court concluded that “[w]here …the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”[7]

The common law trespassory test was revived in Jones. There, the police placed a GPS tracking device on Jones’ vehicle to obtain his vehicle location over the course of 28 days. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found that in placing the GPS device, “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”[8] This physical intrusion constituted a “search” and thus implicated the Fourth Amendment.[9]

The dog sniff in Jardines has been compared with Illinois v. Caballes[10], where a dog sniff during a traffic stop was found to not violate the Fourth Amendment. Caballes, in turn, relied on United States v. Place[11] and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.[12] In Place, the Court found that a dog sniff of luggage did not constitute a search because it did not require opening the luggage or exposing items that would otherwise remain hidden from view.[13] Similarly, in Edmond the Court held that a dog walk around a car was not intrusive enough to be considered a search.[14]

The obvious and common nexus found in Caballes, Place, and Edmonds is that the alleged searches were done away from the home. Although not at all consistent in their application[15], the Court has undoubtedly indicated that the expectation of privacy in vehicles is lessened as compared to the home. Similarly, the privacy of the luggage of a traveler at an airport lessened due to the Government’s interest in protecting air travelers.

The facts in Jardines bring us close to the home, but not quite through the “firm line at the entrance."[16] Rather, here the police conducted the dog sniff from Joelis Jardines’ front porch. Based on the two approaches cited above, two questions arise. First, was the use of the dog sniff consistent with the sense-enhancing technology employed by the police in Kyllo; and second, did the dog sniff constitute a physical trespass upon Jardines’ front porch? Regardless of which approach the Court decides to take, the answer to both questions is most assuredly yes.

Using the Katz approach articulated by Harlan and refined in Kyllo, a trained drug sniff dog is not a device in general public use. But to suggest that these dogs only alert to contraband, and thus could never implicate Fourth Amendment protections (because, presumably, a person has no expectation of privacy in contraband) is a circular argument that did not convince (at least) three justices during oral arguments. Moreover, the sober evidence discussed by a number of Fourth Amendment scholars[17] indicates agreement with Justice Souter’s proclamation in Caballes: “ The infallible dog… is a creature of legal fiction.”[18]

Because the alleged search never crossed the threshold of Joelis Jardines’ home, the common law trespassory test requires us to address the issue of curtilage. The Court articulated a four factor test to define curtilage in United States v. Dunn.[19] However, the front porch of a home generally regarded as exempt from this protection because homeowners impliedly consent for visitors to come to the door to knock. Additionally, the police “knock and talk” tactic is a common procedure that does not appear to have received much recent scrutiny (notwithstanding the Court’s prior holding in Johnson v. United States[20]). But these are limited purposes.

Even presuming the legitimacy of the owner’s implied consent and the validity of the “knock and talk,” there comes a time when the limited purpose ends and reasonableness must prevail. A homeowner’s implied consent to visitors on the front porch only lasts until the homeowner has the opportunity to invite the visitor in, or on the other hand, turn the visitor away. Similarly, the police officer’s presence on the front porch can only said to be legitimate until an otherwise benign purpose disappeared. A police officer stationed on the front porch for several minutes (without knocking, to be clear), with Franky sniffing at the door and a supporting cast of law enforcement officials in the immediate vicinity, cannot said to have been benign.



[1] U.S. Const. amend. IV.
[2] 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[3] 442 U.S. 735.
[4] Id., at 740.
[5] 533 U.S. 27.
[6] 132 S. Ct. 945.
[7] Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
[8] Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
[9] Id.
[10] 543 U.S. 405.
[11] 462 U.S. 696.
[12] 531 U.S. 32.
[13] Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
[14] Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
[15] See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); and  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
[16] Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 590.
[17] See Brief of Amici Curiae Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of Respondent, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564.
[18] Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[19] 480 U.S. 294, 301.
[20] 333 U.S. 10.