Law in Plain English: Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.

Argument: Jan 21 2015 (Aud.)

Background: The Inclusive Communities Project (ICP) is a non-profit organization that assists low-income, predominately African-American families who are eligible for the Dallas Housing Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program in finding affordable housing in predominately Caucasian, suburban neighborhoods. ICP filed suit action against the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) alleging that TDHCA's allocation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in Dallas resulted in a disparate impact on African-American residents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court held that ICP had proven that the allocation of tax credits resulted in a disparate impact on African-American residents. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to apply the burden-shifting approach found in HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 for claims of disparate impact under the FHA. First, a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice causes a discriminatory effect. If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the defendant must then prove “that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests....” If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must then show that the defendant’s interests “could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”

Issue: The question before the Court is whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.

Law in Plain English: Jennings v. Stephens

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Jennings v. Stephens

Argument: Oct 15 2014 (Aud.)

Robert Mitchell Jennings

Background: In 1989, Robert Jennings was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a Houston police officer. His conviction and appeal were affirmed on direct appeal. His state habeas application was denied. In 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that his attorneys were ineffective by 1) failing to present evidence of his disadvantaged background; 2) failing to find and present evidence of his mental impairment; and 3) conceding defeat and stating that he (Jennings's lawyer) could not quarrel with the jury's decision to find Jennings eligible for the death penalty. The district court agreed on the first two claims and granted habeas relief. The Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed a timely notice of appeal. The district court decided against Jennings on the third claim regarding the closing argument. Jennings did not file a notice of appeal on the closing argument claim, nor did he seek a certificate of appealability (COA). The Fifth Circuit acknowledged a circuit split on the issue of whether a petitioner can raise arguments in opposition to the state's appeal for relief not adopted by the district court without first seeking a COA when the state appeals a grant of habeas relief (as was the case here). Nonetheless, the panel (while also reversing the district court's decision on the first two claims) ruled that Jennings's closing argument claim was procedurally barred because he failed file a notice of appeal or seek a COA. According to the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) requires that a petitioner must seek a COA, and a state's appeal on a different claim does not displace this section's gate-keeping function with regards to the claim that the district court decided adversely to the petitioner.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected even though the Fifth Circuit acquired jurisdiction over the entire claim as a result of the respondent’s appeal.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Jennings’ theory was a defense of his judgment on alternative grounds, and thus he was not required to take a cross-appeal or obtain a certificate of appealability to argue it on appeal.

Law in Plain English: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.

Argument: Mar 5 2013

Discussion: The Erica P. John Fund, Inc. ("the Fund") represent a putative class of shareholders who allege that they suffered material losses as a result of fraudulent misrepresentations by Halliburton (see here for this case's first trip to the Supreme Court back in 2011). The Fund's claims are based upon the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, which suggests that that an efficient, well-organized market will reflect all of the information that there is about a given security. Under this theory, investors can be presumed to have relied upon the distortions made by Halliburton's allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations without specific proof that they had done so. The Court adopted this theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, although that decision was made in 1988; three of the justices (including Justices Kennedy and Scalia) recused themselves at the time, and three justices in last term's Amgen case said they the Court should perhaps review Basic's premise. Halliburton attempted to show evidence that its allegedly fraudulent mispresentations caused no market price impact, but the District Court ruled that Halliburton was not entitled to do so. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether this Court should overrule or substantially modify the holding of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the fraud-on-the-market theory; and (2) whether, in a case where the plaintiff invokes the presumption of reliance to seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Halliburton has not shown a special justification for overruling Basic’s presumption of reliance. For the same reasons the Court declines to overrule Basic’s presumption of reliance, it also declines to modify the prerequisites for invoking the presumption by requiring plaintiffs to prove “price impact” directly at the class certification stage. The Court agrees with Halliburton, however, that defendants must be afforded an opportunity to rebut the presumption of reliance before class certification with evidence of a lack of price impact.

Law in Plain English: Paroline v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Paroline v. United States

News

• Allocating Liability for Child Pornography, in Full or Fractional Shares (New York Times)
• The Price of a Stolen Childhood (New York Times)
• Paying Amy (Slate)

Argument: Jan 22 2014 (Aud.)

Does the "proximate result" requirement in § 2259(b)(3)(F) apply to all losses under § 2259(b)(3)?

§ 2259(b)(3):

Definition.— For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for—
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense. 

Discussion: Doyle Paroline ("Paroline") pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for possessing 150 to 300 images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. At least two images were of Amy. Pursuant to Amy's right to restitution under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, the Government and Amy moved the district court to order restitution under § 2259. The district court held that § 2259 required the Government to prove that by possessing images depicting Amy's sexual abuse, Paroline proximately caused the injuries for which she sought restitution. Concluding that the Government failed to show this causal link, the district court denied Amy restitution. On Appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that § 2259 imposes no generalized proximate cause requirement before a child pornography victim may recover restitution from a defendant possessing images of her abuse; and thus vacated the the district court's judgment.

Issue: The question before the Court is, what, if any, causal relationship or nexus between the defendant's conduct and the victim's harm or damages must the government or the victim establish in order to recover restitution under § 2259?

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that restitution is proper under the statute only to the extent that the defendant's offense proximately caused a victim's losses.

Law in Plain English: Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Allen Stanford. Photo from Wikipedia.

SCOTUSblog: Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice; Willis of Colorado Inc. v. Troice; Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice

Argument: Oct 7 2013 (Aud.)

Discussion: In 2012, Allen Stanford was convicted of cheating investors out of more than $7 billion over 20 years in one of the largest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history. Three cases sough to use state class-actions to attempt to recover damages for losses resulting from the Stanford Ponzi scheme. On the other hand, a preclusion provision of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") provides that "[n]o covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security" (emphasis added). The district court dismissed the claims, finding that they were precluded by the SLUSA provision. The Fifth Circuit then reversed, holding that that the purchase or sale of securities (or representations about the purchase or sale of securities) was only tangentially related to the fraudulent scheme, and thus the preclusion provision did not apply.

Issue: The questions before the Court were (1) whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) precludes a state-law class action alleging a scheme of fraud that involves misrepresentations about transactions in SLUSA-covered securities; and (2) whether SLUSA precludes class actions asserting that defendants aided and abetted SLUSA-covered securities fraud when the defendants themselves did not make misrepresentations about the purchase or sale of SLUSA-covered securities.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that SLUSA does not preclude the plaintiff's state-law class actions, because SLUSA only applies when the plaintiffs allege a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. Since the plaintiffs did not allege such in this case, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.: Previously articulated principles of statutory interpretation or ideological bias?

Professor Gifford

My torts professor, Don Gifford, wrote a law review article which can be summed up as follows: 

Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. will test the principles of both its conservative and liberal wings. A textualist interpretation, usually favored by Justice Scalia and his conservative colleagues, would not allow such removal — a decidedly anti-business result. At the same time, a purposive approach to interpreting the statutory provision, promoted by Justice Breyer, possibly would allow such removal. For each group of Justices, the conflict is clear: Will they follow their previously articulated principles of statutory interpretation or their ideological bias?

And what result? In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because Mississippi is the only named plaintiff, this suit does not constitute a mass action under CAFA. As a result, the case could be removed to federal court. Perhaps to the surprise of Professor Gifford (I reached out to him for a response, and he said he was surprised!), Scalia went along with the rest of the Court in reaching what Professor Gifford called "a decidedly anti-business result."

Law in Plain English: Mississippi ex. rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Mississippi ex. rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.

Argument: Nov 6 2013 (Aud.)

Did you know? Mississippi state law specifically prohibits class action lawsuits.  Miss.Code Ann. § 75-24-15(4).

Discussion: Mississippi filed a parens patriae lawsuit against manufacturers and distributors of liquid crystal display ("LCD") panels. These parties had the case removed to federal court because the claim was either a "class action" or "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Mississippi then moved to remand the case to state court, and the District Court granted the motion. The Fifth Circuit ruled that Mississippi was not the sole party of interest--the State (as a purchaser of LCD products) and individual citizens who purchased the products within Mississippi possessed rights sought to be enforced." As a result, the lawsuit qualified as a "mass action" under CAFA and reversed the District Court's order.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a state’s parens patriae action is removable as a “mass action” under CAFA when the state is the sole plaintiff, the claims arise under state law, and the state attorney general possesses statutory and common-law authority to assert all claims in the complaint.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because Mississippi is the only named plaintiff, this suit does not constitute a mass action under CAFA. As a result, the case cannot be removed to federal court.

Law in Plain English: Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

Argument: Oct 9 2013 (Aud.)

Background: The United States Corps of Engineers contracted with Atlantic Marine Construction for construction of a child development center at Fort Hood. Atlantic entered into a Subcontract Agreement with J-Crew Management, Inc. for provision of construction labor and materials. This Subcontract Agreement included a forum-selection clause, providing that disputes "shall be litigated in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division." When a dispute arose over pay, J-Crew instead filed suit in the Western District of Texas. Generally, courts will operate on the premise that such clauses are valid contract clauses, and should be enforced. On the other hand, federal law can govern a motion to transfer a case between federal courts. Atlantic filed a motion to transfer the case, but the District Court denied it. Atlantic then appealed to the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus, which was denied.

Issue: The questions before the Court are  (1) what is the standard for enforcement of clauses that designate an alternative federal forum, limiting review of such clauses to a discretionary, balancing-of-conveniences analysis; and (2) whether district courts should allocate the burdens of proof among parties seeking to enforce or to avoid a forum-selection clause.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to transfer under §1404(a), which provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” Additionally, when a defendant files a §1404(a) motion, a district court should transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer. No such exceptional factors appeared to be present in this case. The practical impact of this decision is that the presence of a forum selection clause will require district courts to modify the way they evaluate motions to transfer venue. Rather than evaluate both the private interests of the parties and public-interest considerations, the forum-selection clause will generally control except in unusual cases.

Law in Plan English: United States v. Woods

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: United States v. Woods

Argument: Oct 9 2013 (Aud.)

Why did the Supreme Court take this case? The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that whenever the IRS totally disallows a deduction, it may not penalize the taxpayer for a valuation overstatement included in that deduction. On the other hand, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have held the opposite. So-called "circuit splits" are perhaps the most common way cases make it to the Supreme Court.

Background: On behalf of two general partnerships, Woods participated in an aggressive tax shelter which effectively liquidated the assets of the partnerships and claimed the results as losses. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed these losses, and imposed penalties. At issue in this case is Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code, which prescribes a penalty for an underpayment of federal income tax that is “attributable to” an overstatement of basis in property. 26 U.S.C. 6662(a), (b)(3), (e)(1)(A) and (h)(1). Woods filed a petition for review with the District Court, which affirmed the finding of the IRS disallowing the losses, but reversed the penalty. It relied on prior Fifth Circuit precedent¹ in holding that whenever the IRS totally disallows a deduction, it may not penalize the taxpayer for a valuation overstatement included in that deduction. In a brief, per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court are (1) whether Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code, which prescribes a penalty for an underpayment of federal income tax that is “attributable to” an overstatement of basis in property, applies to an un­derpayment resulting from a determination that a transaction lacks economic substance because the sole purpose of the transaction was to generate a tax loss by artificially inflating the taxpayer’s basis in property; and (2) whether the district court had jurisdiction in this case under 26 U.S.C. §6226 to consider the substantial valuation misstatement penalty.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the partnerships’ lack of economic substance could justify imposing a valuation-misstatement penalty on the partners. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the valuation-misstatement penalty applied in this case. The practical impact of this decision is that whenever the IRS totally disallows a deduction, it may penalize the taxpayer for a valuation overstatement included in that deduction.

¹ Heasley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir.1990).

Clarence Thomas, affirmative action, and Brown v. Board of Education

From Justice Thomas's concurrence in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin:

The University’s arguments today are no more persuasive than they were 60 years ago. Nevertheless, despite rejecting identical arguments in Brown, the Court in Grutter deferred to the University’s determination that the diversity obtained by racial discrimination would yield educational benefits. There is no principled distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational benefits and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same benefits.  Educational benefits are a far cry from the truly compelling state interests that we previously required to justify use of racial classifications.

...

My view of the Constitution is the one advanced by the plaintiffs in Brown: “[N]o State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”

...

Although cloaked in good intentions, the University’s racial tinkering harms the very people it claims to be helping.

Law in Plain English: University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

Nassar, is a physician who was employed by the University of Texas's Southwestern Medical Center. He complained about racial and religious discrimination, and arranged to become an employee of the Medical Center itself rather than the University (as a means of switching to a different supervisor). He then claimed that the University blocked his switch in retaliation. On the other hand, the University argued that because its agreement with the Medical Center required that all physicians be members of the University faculty, the retaliation could not be the so-called “but for” cause of his loss of the position. A jury found for Nassar, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The question before the Court was a matter of the standard of proof to apply to retaliation claims--whether the retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and similarly worded statutes require a plaintiff to prove but-for causation (i.e., that an employer would not have taken an adverse employment action but for an improper motive), or instead require only proof that the employer had a mixed motive (i.e., that an improper motive was one of multiple reasons for the employment action). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in §2000e–2(m). As a result, Nassar is required to meet a tougher standard to prove his claim. The practical impact of this decision is that employees will have a more difficult time proving retaliation because their claims will need to meet a higher standard.

Law in Plain English: United States v. Kebodeaux

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United States v. Kebodeaux

In 1999, Kebodeaux was convicted of statutory rape in whole in the military. He served his sentence and was discharged (and under no further control of the military or the federal government in general). In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) that required registration of sex offenders, and he was convicted of failing to update his change of address when he moved. A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction, but it was reversed en banc. The questions before the Court were: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in conducting its analysis on the premise that respondent was not under a federal registration obligation until SORNA was enacted, when pre-SORNA federal law obligated him to register as a sex offender; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Congress lacks the Article I authority to provide for criminal penalties as applied to a person who was convicted of a sex offense under federal law and completed his criminal sentence before SORNA was enacted. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that SORNA’s registration requirements as applied to Kebodeaux fall within the scope of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court reasoned that, upon his release, Kebodeaux was still subject to the Wetterling Act and thus his release was condition.  As a result, Congress still had the power to require him to register. The practical impact of this decision affirms the power of Congress to exert control over offenders even after their sentences have been served.

Law in Plain English: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin

Any Texas resident who graduates from high school in the top ten percent of their class is automatically admitted to the University of Texas (the "Top Ten Percent Plan"). The remaining spots are filled by students based on a number of other factors, including race. When Fisher was denied admission, she filed a lawsuit alleging that considering race discriminated against her because is white. She alleged that the Top Ten Percent Plan already resulted in making the University a highly diverse institution, and that considering race among the factors for the remainder of students was unconstitutional racial balancing. The question before the Court was whether the University's use of race in admissions decisions as a means of affirmative action violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 7-1 decision (with Justice Kagan recused), the Supreme Court ruled that because the Fifth Circuit did not hold the University to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, its decision affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the University was incorrect. As a result, the case will return to the Fifth Circuit for another look. The practical impact of this decision is that the Court did not directly rule on the merits--this is a compromise decision that will be taken up again next term in a different case.

Law in Plain English: Trevino v. Thaler

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Trevino v. Thaler

Trevino was convicted for the rape and murder of a fifteen year old girl in Texas, and subsequently sentenced to death. He made both a direct appeal and a post-conviction collateral attack, pursuant to Texas law in capital cases. All of the claims in both cases were rejected. Trevino then raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in a new federal habeas claim, despite having never raised this issue in either of his state proceedings. Texas law prefers claims of IAC to be made in collateral proceedings (because they often rely on evidence outside of the trial record), but does not explicitly prohibit such a claim to be raised on direct appeal. Because Trevino had not previously raised his IAC claim in either state proceeding, his claim was procedurally defaulted. However, in last year's decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that where, under state law, IAC claims must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those claims if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. In other words,  IAC at the initial collateral proceeding is cause to overcome procedural default. Because Texas law prefers claims of IAC to be made in collateral proceedings (but does not explicitly prohibit such a claim to be raised on direct appeal), the question before the Court was whether the holding in Martinez should extend to Trevino. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when a state's procedural framework by reason of its design and operation makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, the exception recognized in Martinez v. Ryan applies, and Martinez should extend to this case. As a result, Trevino's claim can proceed. The practical impact of this decision is that petitioners making post-relief convictions claims will have a (slightly) easier opportunity to bring them under similar circumstances.

Law in Plain English: City of Arlington v. FCC

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City of Arlington v. FCC (consolidated with Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee v. FCC)

Under the Court's previous decision in Chevron, courts will grant deference ("Chevron deference") to a government agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers when the intent of Congress is not clear. The City of Arlington, Texas, challenged a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in which the FCC concluded that it had authority to interpret the provision based on its general authority to administer the Communications Act. The statutory provision required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time--but the important factor here was not the FCC's interpretation of the reasonable time period itself, but rather that the FCC claimed it had the authority to interpret its own jurisdiction.  The question before the Court was whether a court should apply Chevron deference to review an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that courts must apply the Chevron framework to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency’s statutory authority (i.e., its jurisdiction). As a result, the FCC's claim of authority to interpret its own jurisdiction should be given the same deference as it would to an agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers.The practical impact of this decision is to broaden the extent to which the courts defer to executive agencies and how they interpret the statutes they administer.

Law in Plain English: Moncrieffe v. Holder

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Moncrieffe v. Holder

Moncrieffe, a Jamaican native and legal permanent resident in the United States, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under Georgia law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to have Moncrieffe removed under a federal law that requires removal (deportation) for controlled substances offenses; and "as an aggravated felon" because the conviction was for a drug trafficking crime. Moncrieffe alleged that the punishment for his crime was equivalent to a misdemeanor, and as a result he shouldn't be subject to removal. The question before the Court was whether Moncrieffe's conviction under Georgia's law constituted an aggravated felony for the purposes of removal. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Moncrieffe’s conviction for a marijuana distribution offense faild to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana. Therefore, it was not an aggravated felony. As a result, Moncrieffe's conviction will not subject him to automatic deportation. The practical impact of this decision (and two others like it in recent years) is that low-level drug offenses, absent remuneration or a sufficient quantity of drugs so to be considered trafficking, will not be subject to automatic deportation.