Law in Plain English: Oneok Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Oneok Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.

Argument: TBD (Aud.)

Background: Learjet and other retail buyers of natural gas sued Oneok and other natural gas traders for state and federal anti-trust claims, alleging that they manipulated the price of natural gas by reporting false information to price indices published by trade publications. The district court ruled for the defendants, finding that the state law anti-trust claims were pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (NGA). The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress had carefully divided up the regulatory power over the natural gas industry. It did not envisage federal regulation of the entire natural gas field to the limit of constitutional power. Rather, it contemplated the exercise of federal power only as specified in the NGA. Congress has previously limited the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and in this case the panel determined that the state law anti-trust claims arose out of transactions outside of FERC's jurisdiction. As a result, the NGA did not preclude these claims.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Natural Gas Act, which occupies the field as to matters within its scope, preempts state-law claims challenging industry practices that directly affect the wholesale natural gas market when those claims are asserted by litigants who purchased gas in retail transactions.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Respondents’ state-law antitrust claims are not within the field of matters pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act.

Law in Plain English: Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association; consolidated with Nickols v. Mortgage Bankers Association

Argument: Dec 1 2014 (Aud.)

Background: In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to exempt mortgage loan officers from FLSA's overtime requirements under the "administrative exemption." In 2010, the Department (without notice or comment) withdrew the 2006 opinion letter and issued a new interpretation that mortgage loan officers did not qualify for the administration exemption. The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) challenged the 2010 interpretation as violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the Department significantly altered the rule without first undergoing notice­-and-comment rulemaking. The district court rejected the argument, finding that MBA had not demonstrated substantial and justifiable reliance on a well­-established agency interpretation. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that reliance is but one factor courts must consider in assessing whether an agency interpretation qualifies as definitive.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a federal agency must engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions and improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the APA’s maximum procedural requirements. When a federal administrative agency first issues a rule interpreting one of its regulations, it is generally not required to follow the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the APA, and the D.C. Circuit's ruling's createt a judge-made procedural right that was inconsistent with Congress’ standards. The practical impact of this decision is that the Department of Labor's interpretation of the FLSA is not required to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking.

Law in Plain English: North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC

Argument: Oct 14 2014 (Aud.)

Background: The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is a state agency comprised primarily of licensed dentists, elected by dentists within the state, and funded by fees paid by dentists. The Board opened an investigation into teeth­ whitening services performed by non-dentists, and ultimately issued at least 47 cease-and-desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whitening providers. In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against the Board, alleging a violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by engaging in unfair competition. The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the FTC, concluding that when a state agency appears to have the attributes of a private actor and is taking actions to benefit its own membership, it should be treated as a private entity. The Board was a private entity because it was operated by market participants who were elected by other market participants and was not actively supervised by the state. Allowing the antitrust laws to apply to the unsupervised decisions of self-interested regulators acts as a check to prevent conduct that is not in the public interest; absent antitrust to police their actions, unsupervised self-interested boards would be subject to neither political nor market discipline to serve consumers' best interests.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether, for purposes of the state-action exemption from federal antitrust law, an official state regulatory board created by state law may properly be treated as a “private” actor simply because, pursuant to state law, a majority of the board’s members are also market participants who are elected to their official positions by other market participants.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because a controlling number of the Board’s decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the Board regulates, the Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it was subject to active supervision by the State, and here that requirement is not met. 

Law in Plain English: Mach Mining v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Mach Mining v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Argument: Jan 13 2015 (Aud.)

Background: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a charge of discrimination in early 2008 from a woman who claimed Mach Mining had denied a number of her applications for coal mining jobs because of her gender. After investigating the charge, the agency determined there was reasonable cause to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against a class of female job applicants at its mine near Johnston City, Illinois. In late 2010, the EEOC notified the company of its intention to begin informal conciliation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directs the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to try to negotiate an end to an employer’s unlawful employment practices before suing for a judicial remedy. In September 2011, the EEOC told Mach Mining that it had determined the conciliation process had been unsuccessful and that further efforts would be futile. The EEOC filed its complaint in the district court two weeks later. Mach Mining’s answer asserted several affirmative defenses, including the allegation that the suit should be dismissed because the EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith. The district court held that judicial review of conciliation is appropriate in the form of an affirmative defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that language of the statute, the lack of a meaningful standard for courts to apply, and the overall statutory scheme convinced the court that an alleged failure to conciliate was not an affirmative defense to the merits of a discrimination suit.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether and to what extent a court may enforce the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit.

Holding: TBD

Law in Plain English: Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation; American Lung Association v. EME Homer City Generation

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation; consolidated with American Lung Association v. EME Homer City Generation

Argument: Dec 10 2013 (Aud.)

Discussion: Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Federal Government sets air quality standards, but States retain the primary responsibility for choosing how to attain those standards within their borders. The CAA contains a "good neighbor" provision which requires upwind States to bear responsibility for their fair share of pollution caused in down-wind States. To implement the statutory good neighbor requirement, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the Transport Rule (or Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, CSAPR), which defines emissions reduction responsibilities for 28 upwind States based on those States' contributions to downwind States' air quality problems. An array of power companies, coal companies, labor unions, trade associations, States, and local governments petitioned for review of EPA's Transport Rule. The D.C. Circuit ruled that States, not the Federal Government, are the primary implementers after EPA has set the upwind States' good neighbor obligations. As a result, the court found that the EPA had exceeded its statutory authority and vacated the rule. In appealing the ruling of the D.C. Circuit, the EPA argued both that the court exceeded its jurisdiction and erred on the merits.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenges to the Clean Air Act on which it granted relief; (2) whether states are excused from adopting state implementation plans prohibiting emissions that “contribute significantly” to air pollution problems in other states until after the EPA has adopted a rule quantifying each state’s inter-state pollution obligations; and (3) whether the EPA permissibly interpreted the statutory term “contribute significantly” so as to define each upwind state’s “significant” interstate air pollution contributions in light of the cost-effective emission reductions it can make to improve air quality in polluted downwind areas, or whether the Act instead unambiguously requires the EPA to consider only each upwind state’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem.

Holding: In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit and ruled that the CAA does not command that States by given a second opportunity to file a State Implementation Plan (SIP) after EPA has quantified the State's interstate pollution obligations. The EPA's cost-effective allocation of emission reductions among upwind States is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision.

Law in Plain English: Verizon v. FCC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For similar posts, click here.

To see the full text of Preserving the Open Internet, click here. For a previous discussion of the net neutrality issue when Preserving the Open Internet was released in December 2010, see here. To see all of my posts tagged with net neutrality, click here.


Docket No.: 11-01355

Argument: September 9, 2013 (Audio)

Discussion: In Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C. Circuit vacated the Federal Communication Commission’s first effort to effect regulation of broadband Internet service through a set of rules known collectively as "net neutrality." The Court ruled that the FCC, in promulgating the rules, exceeded its statutory authority. Later that year, the FCC passed Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (rel. Dec. 23, 2010), 76 Fed. Reg. 59192 (Sept. 23, 2011) (“Order”). Verizon alleges that the FCC again has exceeded its statutory authority. On the other hand, the FCC rested its authority in Sections 706(a) and 706(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which "encourage[s] the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans,” and allows the Commission to "take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market” if reasonable and timely” deployment is not occurring.

Issue: The questions before the DC Circuit are: (1) whether the Order imposes common-carriage requirements on services that are statutorily exempt from such requirements or otherwise exceeds the FCC's statutory authority; (2) whether the Order is unconstitutional; and (3) whether the Order is arbitrary and capricious.

Holding: TBD

Law in Plain English: City of Arlington v. FCC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

City of Arlington v. FCC (consolidated with Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee v. FCC)

Under the Court's previous decision in Chevron, courts will grant deference ("Chevron deference") to a government agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers when the intent of Congress is not clear. The City of Arlington, Texas, challenged a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in which the FCC concluded that it had authority to interpret the provision based on its general authority to administer the Communications Act. The statutory provision required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time--but the important factor here was not the FCC's interpretation of the reasonable time period itself, but rather that the FCC claimed it had the authority to interpret its own jurisdiction.  The question before the Court was whether a court should apply Chevron deference to review an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that courts must apply the Chevron framework to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency’s statutory authority (i.e., its jurisdiction). As a result, the FCC's claim of authority to interpret its own jurisdiction should be given the same deference as it would to an agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers.The practical impact of this decision is to broaden the extent to which the courts defer to executive agencies and how they interpret the statutes they administer.

Law in Plain English: Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) challenged a determination of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  that that stormwater runoff on logging roads was not a "point source." As a result, timber companies did not require Clean Water Act (CWA) permits. NEDC's goal was to force timber companies toget permits as a means of trying to reduce the silty runoff into forest streams.  The question before the Court was whether the CWA requires permits before stormwater runoff from logging roads can be discharged into other navigable waters; and in doing so, deciding whether the EPA's interpretation was reasonable (agencies are permitted to reasonably interpret their own regulations, and are given deference in doing so, per the Court's previous decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). In a 7-1 decision (Justice Breyer recused himself because his brother was one of the judges who heard the case at the Court of Appeals), the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA's determination that no permits were required was a reasonable interpretation. As a result, timber companies will not be required to obtain permits for such stormwater runoff. The practical impact of this decision is that groups such as the NEDC will have to find other means to address their environmental concerns with logging.

Law in Plain English: Gabelli v. SEC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Gabelli v. SEC

Gabelli was charged with violating a federal law by defrauding his clients. The statute of limitations required that charges be "commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued." The question here was "when the claim first accrued" meant when the fraud actually occurred, or when it was discovered. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the natural reading of the law required the statute of limitations began when the fraud actually occurred. To read otherwise would violate the fairness of the statute of limitations concept. In other words, the fraud charges against Gabelli were filed too late. The practical impact of this decision is that violations of federal laws subject to the statue of limitations here will begin to run when the fraud occurred, not when it was discovered.

Law in Plain English: FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.

A Georgia-authorized hospital authority (Phoebe Putney Health System, PPHS) managed one hospital and then purchased the only other hospital in the same county. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an anti-trust complaint alleging that having one hospital authority owning both hospitals in the county would reduce competition. PPHS claimed that as a state-authorized entity, they were entitled to state-action immunity from the anti-trust liability. The question before the Court was whether PPHS was entitled to such immunity. The Supreme Court ruled that PPHS was not entitled to anti-trust immunity because Georgia did not make it affirmatively clear that its hospital authorities could take actions that would reduce competition. The practical impact of this decision is that states that wish to give state-action immunity to their subdivisions need to do so through a clearly articulated policy.

Law in Plain English: Bloem v. Unknown Department of the Interior Employees

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

I've made a slight change to the "SCOTUS in Plain English" series to reflect the opportunity to discuss a few cases not at the Supreme Court level that are nonetheless interesting and worthy of discussion. As a result, the series is now called "Law in Plain English."

Bloem v. Unknown Department of the Interior Employees

The National Park Service distributed flyers warning Occupy protesters in McPherson Square that they would begin enforcing a prohibition on camping. Subsequently, many items of personal property (some that belonged to Bloem) were destroyed. Bloem filed a lawsuit against the unnamed Department of the Interior employees for the seizure and destruction of his property. The DoI filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Bloem had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court ruled that the tent city was expressive conduct, permitted by the First Amendment. Additionally, Bloem's allegations that the DoI had violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were sufficient, and thus Bloem had stated a plausible claim. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, which in this case is a 12(b)(6) motion, Bloem's alleged facts are presumed by the court to be true. In other words, the court looks at the case and says: even if we assume that all of his facts are true, has he made a plausible claim? This is a procedure hurdle to make sure that baseless lawsuits don't consume valuable time of the court. As a result, Bloem's claim survived the government's motion to dismiss and the case can move forward.