Law in Plain English: Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter

Argument: TBD (Aud.)

Background: In 2011 (after several previous attempts and amendments), former employee Benjamin Carter filed a qui tam (whistleblower) action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that KBR falsely billed the United States for services performed in Iraq in 2005. The district court ruled that the complaint was filed outside of the FCA's six year statute of limitations. The court also found that another substantially similar complaint had been filed before Carter's, and was therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to the FCA's first-to-file bar (a provision to prevent parasitic lawsuits based upon previously disclosed fraud). The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act tolled the statute of limitations while the United States was engaged in combat in Iraq even if war was not formally declared. Additionally, the panel found that, while Carter's claim was properly denied by the district court pursuant to the first-to-file bar, dismissing the claim with prejudice was erroneous because Carter could re-file his claim later if the other complaint was dismissed (as it later was).

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act – a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud against the government “[w]hen the United States is at war,” 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be “narrowly construed” in favor of repose – applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling; and (2) whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act’s so-called “first-to-file” bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) – which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims – functions as a “one case- at-a-time” rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that As shown by the WSLA’s text, structure, and history, the Act applies only to criminal offenses, not to civil claims like those in this case. The FCA’s first-to-file bar keeps new claims out of court only while related claims are still alive, not in perpetuity. Thus, dismissal with prejudice was not called for in this case.

Law in Plain English: Young v. United Parcel Service

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Young v. United Parcel Service

Argument: Dec 3 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Peggy Sue Young was a part-time "air driver" for UPS, responsible for picking up and delivering packages that arrived by air carrier the previous night. During a leave of absence, Young became pregnant and left a doctor's note with her supervisor that she should not lift more than twenty pounds during the first twenty weeks of her pregnancy and not more than ten pounds thereafter. UPS's occupational health manager, Carolyn Martin, informed Young that UPS policy prevented Young from working while she was under the 20 pound restriction. Martin also determined that Young was ineligible for light duty assignment because light duty was only permitted for those with on-the-job injuries (as opposed to off-the-job injuries), those accommodated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (federal courts have largely held that pregnancy is not a "disability" under the ADA), and those who had lost their Department of Transportation (DOT) certification, but not for pregnancy. Young filed a charge with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC), which issued Young a right to sue letter. Young then filed suit, alleging, among other things, that UPS's policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). The district court concluded that Young had not shown direct evidence of discrimination. Likewise, she failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The panel reasoned that the text of the PDA was placed in the definitions section of Title VII; and as a result, it does not create a "distinct and independent cause of action" that would otherwise cause pregnancy to be treated more favorably than any other basis, including non-pregnancy-related sex discrimination covered by Title VII. A policy that treats pregnant and non-pregnant workers alike complied with the PDA. Even though UPS's policy might have been "insufficiently charitable," a lack of charity itself did not rise to discriminatory animus directed at pregnant employees.

Issue: The question before the Court are whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), requires an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are "similar in their ability or inability to work."

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that an individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation.

Law in Plain English: North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC

Argument: Oct 14 2014 (Aud.)

Background: The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is a state agency comprised primarily of licensed dentists, elected by dentists within the state, and funded by fees paid by dentists. The Board opened an investigation into teeth­ whitening services performed by non-dentists, and ultimately issued at least 47 cease-and-desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whitening providers. In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against the Board, alleging a violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by engaging in unfair competition. The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the FTC, concluding that when a state agency appears to have the attributes of a private actor and is taking actions to benefit its own membership, it should be treated as a private entity. The Board was a private entity because it was operated by market participants who were elected by other market participants and was not actively supervised by the state. Allowing the antitrust laws to apply to the unsupervised decisions of self-interested regulators acts as a check to prevent conduct that is not in the public interest; absent antitrust to police their actions, unsupervised self-interested boards would be subject to neither political nor market discipline to serve consumers' best interests.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether, for purposes of the state-action exemption from federal antitrust law, an official state regulatory board created by state law may properly be treated as a “private” actor simply because, pursuant to state law, a majority of the board’s members are also market participants who are elected to their official positions by other market participants.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because a controlling number of the Board’s decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the Board regulates, the Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it was subject to active supervision by the State, and here that requirement is not met. 

Law in Plain English: Whitfield v. United States

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SCOTUSblog: Whitfield v. United States

Argument: Dec 2 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Larry Whitfield and an accomplice tried (unsuccessfully) to rob a bank, and then fled. Whitfield ended up in the home of an elderly woman. After directing the woman to a room within her home, Whitfield tried to escape and was captured. The woman died of a heart attack. Whitfield was charged and convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), the federal forced accompaniment statute. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), which provides a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a bank robber who forces another person “to accompany him” during the robbery or while in flight, requires proof of more than a de minimis movement of the victim.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a bank robber “forces [a] person to accompany him,” for purposes of §2113(e), when he forces that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over a short distance (as was the case here).

Law in Plain English: Abramski v. United States

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SCOTUSblog: Abramski v. United States

Argument: Jan 22 2014 (Aud.)

Discussion: Abramski bought a handgun in Virginia for his uncle in Pennsylvania, but told the firearms dealer he was the "actual buyer." Subsequently, he was charged with being an illegal "straw purchaser" of the firearm. Abramski was convicted for two firearm offenses: (1) making a false statement that was material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); and (2) making a false statement with respect to information required to be kept in the records of a licensed firearms dealer — that is, that he was the actual buyer of the firearm, when in fact he was buying it for someone else — in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). Abramski appealed and argued that he and his uncle were legally entitled to purchase and own the handgun, and as a result, his conduct was outside the purview of § 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A). Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether a gun buyer’s intent to sell a firearm to another lawful buyer in the future a fact is “material to the lawfulness of the sale” of the firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); and (2) whether a gun buyer’s intent to sell a firearm to another lawful buyer in the future is a piece of information “required...to be kept” by a federally licensed firearm dealer under Section 924(a)(1)(A).

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Abramski's misrepresentation is material under the federal statute for making a false statement with respect to the information to be kept in the gun dealer's records.

Law in Plain English: CTS Corp. v. Waldburger

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: CTS Corp. v. Waldburger

Argument: Apr 23 2014 (Aud.)

CTS of Asheville Superfund site

Background: Waldburger and other landowners brought a nuisance action against CTS Corporation (CTS) when they discovered concentrated levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) and cis-1, 2-dichloroethane (DCE), both solvents that have carcinogenic effects, in their well water. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that North Carolina's ten-year limitation on the accrual of real property claims was a statute of repose and thus barred the suit. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)'s provision aimed at preempting state statute of limitations also was meant to preempt state statutes of repose.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted the preemption provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9658, to apply to state statutes of repose in addition to state statutes of limitations.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that § 9658 does not preempt state statutes of repose because the statute uses language consistent with statutes of limitations, but not statutes of repose. The majority concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt state statutes of repose. As a result, the original complaint would be dismissed consistent with the state's statute of repose.

"The Court’s decision creates a precedent about precedent that may have greater precedential effect than the dubious decisions on which it relies."

The conclusion of Justice Alito's dissent in Alleyne v. United States, regarding the impact of overruling a previous decision of the Court:

The Court’s decision creates a precedent about precedent that may have greater precedential effect than the dubious decisions on which it relies.

Law in Plain English: Maracich v. Spears

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Maracich v. Spears

Several lawyers filed a class action lawsuit on behalf several car purchasers against hundreds of state car dealerships, alleging that the dealers had charged unlawful fees in violation of a state consumer protection statute.  The lawyers obtained the names and contact information of thousands of other state residents who had also paid the challenged fee from the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. The lawyers wrote to the consumers, offering to talk to them about joining the class action. One of the lawyers for the car dealers found some consumers and sued the original lawyers, alleging that the solicitations violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act. The DPPA has a "litigation exception" which allows use of personal data “in connection with any civil...proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court...including...investigation in anticipation of litigation;” and a "solicitation" exception which allows use of the information “[f]or bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations...if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.” The Fourth Circuit agreed with the original lawyers that their use of the DPPA data fell within the litigation exception and dismissed the lawsuit. The question before the Court was whether the litigation exception applied to the original lawyers when they obtained, disclosed, or used personal information solely to find clients to represent in their class action (the solicitation exception didn't apply, because both sides conceded that the lawyers didn't have the consent of their parties). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that an attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose covered by the (b)(4) litigation exception. As a result, the class action lawsuit fails. The practical impact of this decision is that courts will have to limit the scope of the litigation exception to exclude client solicitation.

Law in Plain English: Alleyne v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Alleyne v. United States

Generally, issues of fact are decided by juries and issues of law are decided by judges. So in a previous decision (Apprendi v. New Jersey), the Supreme Court ruled that the right to a jury trial guarantees that any fact that leads to a sentence longer than the maximum provided by law must be found by the jury, applying the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in a different decision (Harris v. United States), the Court held that the Constitution does not require facts which increase a mandatory minimum sentence to be determined by a jury. Alleyne was tried and convicted for 1) robbery affecting commerce and 2) use or carry of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, both federal crimes. At sentencing, the district judge held him responsible for brandishing a firearm, despite the fact that the jury did not find him guilty of brandishing. This finding elevated Alleyne's mandatory minimum sentence for the firearm conviction from five to seven years. The question before the Court was whether the decision in Harris should be overruled. In a larger sense, the question for the Court was how far to extend Apprendi. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime, any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury. As a result, Harris is overruled. The practical impact of this decision is that Apprendi, which held that any fact that leads to a sentence longer than the maximum provided by law must be found by the jury, now extends to facts which increase a mandatory minimum sentence.

Law in Plain English: McBurney v. Young

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

McBurney v. Young

McBurney is a citizen of Rhode Island with ties to Virginia through divorce, child custody, and child support decrees. He filed a Virginia FOIA request for documents pertaining to his application for child support. The Commonwealth denied his request on the grounds that he was not a citizen of Virginia. A second party, Hurlburt, was a California citizen and a business owner who requested assessment records for real estate in Virginia. His request was also denied. Both claimed that Virginia's FOIA law, which restricted access to only those who were citizens of Virginia, violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). Hurlburt also alleged that the law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it prevented him from pursuing any business stemming from Virginia public records on substantially equal terms with Virginia citizens. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Virginia’s FOIA law does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which protects only those privileges and immunities that are “fundamental,” nor does it violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the FOIA law does not regulate commerce in any meaningful way. As a result, Virginia's FOIA law is not unconstitutional.The practical impact of this decision is that states can restrict the access of information available via FOIA to its own citizens, especially when much of that information is available to other state's citizens through other means.

Law in Plain English: Wos v. E.M.A.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Wos v. E.M.A.

E.M.A. was born with serious injuries, and part of her medical expenses were paid by North Carolina's Medicaid program. Her parents filed a medical malpractice suit against the doctor who delivered her and the hospital. They settled for $2.8 million, and the court placed a third of that amount into escrow pending a determination of how much should be reimbursed to the state's Medicaid program (North Carolina has a statute that presumes that one-third of a recovery or settlement is attributable to medical expenses). However, this one-third rule conflicts with a federal Medicare statute that prevents such liens for portions not "designated as payment for medical care." The problem here was that the North Carolina statute presumed one-third of the settlement was for medical care without any specific evidence. When state and federal statutes conflicts, the state statute is preempted by the federal one (on account of the Supremacy Clause). The question before the Court was whether the anti-lien provision of the federal Medicaid statute preempts North Carolina’s statutory presumption that one-third of any tort recovery by a Medicaid beneficiary is attributable to medical expenses. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal statute did preempt the North Carolina law. As a result, North Carolina's share of the settlement is likely to be less than the one-third their statute presumes. The practical impact of this decision is that states (many who have similar provisions) will be able to recover less expenses from such settlements, and families involved will be able to keep more of the settlement.

Law in Plain English: United States v. Deffenbaugh

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

United States v. Deffenbaugh

"In order to avoid a state probation violation hearing, Larry Deffenbaugh designed a plan to fake his death with the assistance of his girlfriend [Giannetta]." He went fishing with his brother, jumped overboard when his brother wasn't watching, leading his brother to believe he had fallen off the boat and possibly drowned (a curious result for Deffenbaugh, who was a longtime boat captain and trained scuba diver). His brother called 911 and a Coast Guard search ensued. Deffenbaugh swam ashore and disappeared with Giannetta. A viewer on America's Most Wanted later recognized Deffenbaugh and he was arrested. He was charged with causing a distress call to be made to the Coast Guard; and conspiracy to commit a crime against the United States. After being convicted, Deffenbaugh appealed claiming that because Giannetta didn't know that causing a distress call was a federal offense, she didn't have the same criminal objective as Deffenbaugh and thus he could not be charged with conspiracy against the United States. A panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Deffenbaugh and Giannetta's plan to disappear was made with the intent of causing a distress call, affecting a search, and having Deffenbaugh declared dead. It didn't matter if she didn't know she was committing a crime against the United States. Her conduct wasn't any less blameworthy. As a result, Deffenbaugh's conviction was affirmed (Deffenbaugh also challenged the length of his sentence as unreasonable, but that part of his appeal is not covered here).

A yacht once owned by Larry Deffenbaugh of Calvert County is listed for sale in Florida. It was seized by lenders in 2006. (Hmy Yacht Sales)