Law in Plain English: Johnson v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Johnson v. United States

Argument: Nov 5 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Pursuant to an undercover investigation, the FBI determined that Samuel Johnson (a felon) illegally possessed an AK-47 and a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Johnson was later arrested while attending a meeting with his probation officer. Among other charges, Johnson was indicted with being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a mandatory 15-year sentence for those who have been convicted of three "violent felon[ies.]" Johnson pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to challenge the applicability of the ACCA based upon a review of his prior convictions. On appeal, Johnson alleged that a prior conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun did not constitute a "violent felony." The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that possession of a short-barreled shotgun presented a serious risk of physical injury to another because it is roughly similar to the listed offenses within the ACCA, both in kind as well as the degree of risk for harm posed. As a result, the conviction was considered a violent felony and Johnson's conviction as an armed career criminal was affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Holding: In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that imposing an increased sentence under ACCA’s residual clause violates due process.

Law in Plain English: Yates v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Yates v. United States

Argument: Nov 5 2014 (Aud.) 

Background: While fishing in the Gulf of Mexico, the Miss Katie was boarded by a fisheries officer, who measured several red grouper fish and found them to be less than 20 inches (the minimum size limit for red grouper at the time). The officer placed the undersized fish in the Miss Katie's fish box, issued the captain (Yates) a citation, and instructed Yates not to disturb the fish because they would be seized upon return to port. Nonetheless, Yates had his crew throw the undersized fish overboard and replaced them with other undersized (but closer to 20") fish. Yates was charged and convicted of 1) the destruction of property to prevent seizure; and 2) the destruction of a "tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" the government's investigation into harvesting undersized grouper. This second charge was based upon the "anti-shredding" provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, passed in the wake of the Enron scandal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose.

Holding: The Supreme Court ruled that a “tangible object” within §1519’s compass is one used to record or preserve information. Because the grouper caught by Yates were not “tangible objects” under this meaning, his conviction would be reversed.

Law in Plain English: Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean

Argument: Nov 4 2014 (Aud.)

Background: In July 2003, all federal air marshals received a TSA briefing that there was a potential plot to hijack U.S. airliners. Soon after the briefing, however, the TSA sent an unencrypted text message to the marshals' cell phones canceling all missions on flights from Las Vegas until early August. Concerned about the danger the threat posed to the flying public in the absence of marshals on these flights, marshal Robert MacLean contacted his supervisor and the Office of the Inspector General. Dissatisfied, he revealed the cancellation order to an MSNBC reporter. Following an investigation, MacLean was removed from his job as a federal air marshal for revealing sensitive security information (SSI), although the agency had not labeled the text message as SSI when it was originally sent. MacLean challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board, arguing that his disclosure was protected whistleblowing activity. The Board determined that MacLean's disclosure fell outside of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) because the disclosure was specifically prohibited by statute, via the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision because it held that the ATSAdid not specifically prohibit the disclosure made by MacLean. Although the ATSA empowers the agency to prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of SSI, regulations by themselves are not considered laws for the purpose of the WPA. As a result, the case was remanded to the Board for a determination about whether MacLean's disclosures qualify for WPA protection.

Edited to add (Oct 9 2014): Mr. MacLean contacted me to say that he challenges the DHS assertion that the text message was limited to Las Vegas flights, and claims that the cancellation applied to all overnight flights. Specifically, MacLean believes that DHS deliberated narrowed the facts from a general whistlelower claim to just the Las Vegas flights because that would be a "specific detail[] of aviation security measure[];" thereby bolstering the claim against him. I'm not sure that matters at this stage; the Federal Circuit's opinion only referenced the Las Vegas flights, and facts generally cannot be challenged at this level. But because MacLean contacted me, I included that information here. Stay tuned to see whether his lawyers raise the issue during oral arguments.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether certain statutory protections codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), which are inapplicable when an employee makes a disclosure “specifically prohibited by law,” can bar an agency from taking an enforcement action against an employee who intentionally discloses Sensitive Security Information.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by the TSA’s regulations for purposes of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) because regulations do not qualify as “law” under that statute.

Law in Plain English: T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell

Argument: Nov 10 2014 (Aud.)

Why did the Supreme Court take this case? In this case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the availability of the minutes and a transcript from a hearing were sufficient to meet the "in writing" requirement. On the other hand, the First,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that a written denial must be separate from the written record and must contain a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons. So-called "circuit splits" are perhaps the most common way cases make it to the Supreme Court.

Monopine-style cell tower

Background: The Federal Communications Act (FCA) requires that the denial of a permit for a cell tower be made "in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). When the City of Roswell, Georgia, denied a permit to T-Mobile, the letter simply indicated that the permit was denied and referred T-Mobile to the minutes from the hearing at which the Mayor and City Council denied the permit. The district ruled ruled for T-Mobile, finding that the city had violated the FCA by failing to provide a written document delineating the specific reasons for the local government's decision. Relying on their intervening decision in T-Mobile South LLC v. City of Milton, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the availability of the minutes and a transcript from the hearing were sufficient to meet the "in writing" requirement.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a document from a state or local government stating that an application has been denied, but providing no reasons whatsoever for the denial, can satisfy the Communications Act’s “in writing” requirement.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) requires localities to provide reasons when they deny applications to build cell phone towers. This conclusion follows from the Act’s provisions, which both preserve and specifically limit traditional state and local government authority. It would be considerably difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether a locality’s denial was supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record or whether a locality had unreasonably discriminated among providers of functionally equivalent services or regulated siting on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions if localities were not obligated to state their reasons for denial.

Law in Plain English: Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.

Argument: Oct 6 2014 (Aud.)

Background: In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court held that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action. In this case, two securities class action lawsuits were filed against IndyMac, alleging violations of the Securities Act. The district court dismissed all claims because the original lead and sole named plaintiffs (a group of Wyoming entities) could not demonstrate standing. The dismissed claims included those involving securities purchased by other members of the asserted class (including the Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi, PERS), but none of whom were named plaintiffs in the original class action. PERS and other municipal retirement systems moved into intervene. Although the three-year period of repose in Section 13 had run on their claims, these plaintiffs invoked the tolling rule set forth in American Pipe. The district court denied the motions to intervene. The Second Circuit affirmed, distinguishing between a statute of limitations (which is subject to equitable considerations such us tolling) and a statute of repose (which is considered an absolute limitation).

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the filing of a putative class action serves, under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, to satisfy the three year time limitation in § 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of putative class members.

Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of ceriorari as improvidently granted.

Law in Plain English: Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer

Argument: Apr 2 2014 (Aud.)

Background: TBD

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Sixth Circuit erred by holding that respondents were not required to plausibly allege in their complaint that the fiduciaries of an employee stock ownership plan abused their discretion by remaining invested in employer stock, in order to overcome the presumption that their decision to invest in employer stock was reasonable, as required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (“ERISA”), and every other circuit to address the issue.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to any special presumption of prudence. Rather, they are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general, §1104(a)(1)(B), except that they need not diversify the fund’s assets, §1104(a)(2).

Law in Plain English: Loughrin v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Loughrin v. United States

Argument: Apr 1 2014 (Aud.)

Background: TBD

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the government must prove that the defendant intended to defraud a bank and expose it to risk of loss in every prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the statute at issue here does not require the government to prove that a defendant intended to defraud a financial institution. The provision requires only that the defendant intended to obtain bank property and this is accomplished by a false statement.

Law in Plain English: Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio (previously Mayorkas v. Cuellar de Osorio)

Argument: Dec 10 2013 (Aud.)

Discussion: The Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) provides rules for determining whether particular aliens qualify as “children” so that they can obtain visas or adjustments of their immigration status as derivative beneficiaries of sponsored family member immigrants (also known as “primary beneficiaries”). Cuellar de Osorio's citizen mother filed a petition for a visa (for a married daughter of a citizen) on her behalf in May 1998. Cuellar de Osorio's son, who was then 13, was listed on the petition as a derivative beneficiary. Cuellar de Osorio's visa was approved in June 1998, but her priority date did not become current until November 2005. By then, her son was 21 and as a result was ineligible for a derivative visa. The United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the request for priority date retention under the CSPA. The District Court ruled in favor of USCIS, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the plain language of the CSPA unambiguously grants automatic conversion and priority date retention to aged-out derivative beneficiaries.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether Section 1153(h)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act–which provides rules for determining whether particular aliens qualify as “children” so that they can obtain visas or adjustments of their immigration status as derivative beneficiaries of sponsored family member immigrants–unambiguously grants relief to all aliens who qualify as “child” derivative beneficiaries at the time a visa petition is filed but age out of qualification by the time the visa becomes available to the primary beneficiary; and (2) whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reasonably interpreted Section 1153(h)(3).

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that BIA’s textually reasonable construction of § 1153(h)(3)’s ambiguous language was entitled to deference.

The Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted the Child Status Protection Act as providing relief to only those aged-out aliens who qualified or could have qualified as principal beneficiaries of a visa petition. In other words, the CSPA provision under review does not apply to derivative beneficiaries piggy-backing on a parent. The Supreme Court agreed that this was a permissible interpretation of the CSPA. In short, if you are principal beneficiary (the sponsored individual), you can keep your place in line. But if you are a derivative beneficiary (a spouse or children of the sponsored individual), you cannot.

Law in Plain English: Bond v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Bond v. United States

Argument: Nov 5 2013 (Aud.)

Did you know? Bond v. United States is one of very
few cases that have been to the Supreme Court twice.

Background: Bond, an employee of the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas, learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's own husband was the baby's father. Bond stole chemicals from work and bought others over the Internet and then applied them to Haynes's mailbox, car door handles, and house doorknob. She was charged and convicted of violating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, which implements the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The questions before the Court are 1) whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy the government’s treaty obligations; and (2) whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland ("If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government").

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 229 of the Act does not reach Bond's simple assault. The Court did not interpret the scope of the international weapons treaty at issue. State laws are sufficient to prosecute an assault like the one in this case. There is no indication in the federal law that Congress intended to abandon its traditional reluctance to define as a federal crime conduct controlled as criminal by the states.

Law in Plain English: Paroline v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Paroline v. United States

News

• Allocating Liability for Child Pornography, in Full or Fractional Shares (New York Times)
• The Price of a Stolen Childhood (New York Times)
• Paying Amy (Slate)

Argument: Jan 22 2014 (Aud.)

Does the "proximate result" requirement in § 2259(b)(3)(F) apply to all losses under § 2259(b)(3)?

§ 2259(b)(3):

Definition.— For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for—
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense. 

Discussion: Doyle Paroline ("Paroline") pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for possessing 150 to 300 images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. At least two images were of Amy. Pursuant to Amy's right to restitution under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, the Government and Amy moved the district court to order restitution under § 2259. The district court held that § 2259 required the Government to prove that by possessing images depicting Amy's sexual abuse, Paroline proximately caused the injuries for which she sought restitution. Concluding that the Government failed to show this causal link, the district court denied Amy restitution. On Appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that § 2259 imposes no generalized proximate cause requirement before a child pornography victim may recover restitution from a defendant possessing images of her abuse; and thus vacated the the district court's judgment.

Issue: The question before the Court is, what, if any, causal relationship or nexus between the defendant's conduct and the victim's harm or damages must the government or the victim establish in order to recover restitution under § 2259?

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that restitution is proper under the statute only to the extent that the defendant's offense proximately caused a victim's losses.

Law in Plain English: Rosemond v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Rosemond v. United States

Argument: Nov 12 2013 (Aud.)

Did you know? Rosemond is represented by John Elwood, a blogger at the Volokh Conspiracy and writer of the Relist Watch at SCOTUSblog.

Discussion: Rosemond was involved in a drug transaction-gone-wrong. He was punched in the face by another man who then fled. Someone then pulled out a nine-millimeter handgun and fired nine or ten shots at the fleeing man. At trial, the District Court instructed jurors on both of the Government's theories, that Rosemond was the shooter and, alternatively, that he aided and abetted another's use of a firearm during the drug deal. Based on a written statement and testimony at trial that Rosemond was the shooter, jurors found Rosemond guilty of using and discharging a firearm during a federal drug-trafficking offense (among other charges). However, they were not required to specify under which theory they convicted. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but acknowledged that most other circuits require jurors to find, additionally, that the defendant took some action to facilitate or encourage his cohort's use of the firearm.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the offense of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2, requires proof of (i) intentional facilitation or encouragement of the use of the firearm, as held by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, or (ii) simple knowledge that the principal used a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the defendant also participated, as held by the Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Government establishes that a defendant aided and abetted a §924(c) violation by proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission. As a result, the Court ruled that the trial judge's jury instructions were erroneous, and remanded the case to determine whether there was harmless error.

Law in Plain English: Lawson v. FMR LLC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Lawson v. FMR LLC

Argument: Nov 12 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) has a whistleblower protection provision for employees of public companies. Lawson and Zang were employees of FMR LLC (and their subsidiaries), private companies working as an advisor or subcontractor to Fidelity, a public company organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and subject to reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Both alleged concerns about internal practices (Lawson resigned, alleging constructive discharge; and Zang was fired). The private companies filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not covered under the whistleblower provision because they were not public companies. However, the District Court agreed with Lawson and Zang and found that SOX whistleblower protection provision extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies. The First Circuit reversed, finding that the District Court's definition was too broad.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether an employee of a privately held contractor or subcontractor of a public company is protected from retaliation by the SOX whistleblower protection provision.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that SOX's whistleblower protection provision includes employees of a public company’s private contractors and subcontractors.

Our dysfunctional government works just as intended, thank you very much

Much has been written over the last decade about gridlock and dysfunctional government. Headlines were made about the "Do-nothing Congress" because of the few number of bills that were passed (as if that is somehow a good proxy for progress; but that's for another blog post). Countless suggestions have been made about how to "fix" things. Far fewer have considered the alternative: that our painfully slow, difficult legislative process works just as it was intended. That disagreements among the branches of government are not a bad thing. Here is one such example of how our dysfunctional government works in practice.

Lilly Ledbetter sued Goodyear under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for gender pay discrimination. The provision at issue says that "[a] charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." Ledbetter's claim was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court because she filed years after the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred.

Now to be fair, Ledbetter didn't know about the alleged unlawful employment practices at the time. Four justices were sympathetic to Ledbetter's cause and would have read the provision in light of the broad remedial purpose of the statute. Justice Ginsburg noted that pay disparities often occur in small increments and may not be noticed.

After Ledbetter's claim was dismissed, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which states that the 180-day statute of limitations for filing an equal-pay lawsuit regarding pay discrimination resets with each new paycheck affected by that discriminatory action. The Act overruled the Supreme Court's decision (Congress can effectively overrule the Court on a statutory decision, but not a constitutional one; for another example, see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and the subsequent RFRA).

This resetting of the statute of limitations with each new paycheck is what Justice Ginsburg had argued for. But if the Court had ruled for Ledbetter in the first place, it seems highly unlikely that the Act would have ever passed. In that case, gender pay discrimination claims would have been based upon a strained Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII, rather than the text of the provision itself. A differently-composed Supreme Court five or ten or twenty years from now could much as easily re-interpret the provision in a narrower way. On the other hand, because the Court interpreted Title VII on its text (as opposed to the broad remedial purpose of the statute), Congress overruled the decision and passed the Act. The Court's new interpretation is now straightforward--the statute of limitations resets with each new paycheck affected by that discriminatory action. The next Lily Ledbetter will have her claim heard.

This interplay between disagreeable branches of government resulted in gender pay discrimination claims that  will have a textual basis in statutory law rather than a strained Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII based upon a controversial 5-4 decision. Surely, this is a better end state for gender pay discrimination claims.

When everyone agrees with one another, you should be very concerned. When that happens, you get the Patriot Act. Is that the functional, agreeable government you want?

Law in Plain English: Burrage v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Burrage v. United States

Argument: Nov 12 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Burrage sold heroin to Banka, who later died. A forensic toxicologist and a doctor from the State Medical Examiner's Office said that heroin contributed to Banka's death, but neither could say that Banka would not have died if he had not taken the heroin. Nonetheless, a jury convicted Burrage of distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in death (which subjected Burrage to a mandatory minimum sentence), and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Burrage's appeal is based on the argument that a death that "results from" heroin required the prosecution to show "proximate cause" (but for the heroin, Banka's death would not have happened); and that heroin contributed to Banka's death as part of a larger mixed drug intoxication was not sufficient to show that it resulted from heroin.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death is a strict liability crime, without a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement; and (2) whether a person can be convicted for distribution of heroin causing death utilizing jury instructions which allow a conviction when the heroin that was distributed “contributed to,” death by “mixed drug intoxication,” but was not the sole cause of death of a person.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that, at least where the use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim's death or serious bodily injury, the defendant cannot be eligible for the mandatory minimum sentence under the statute unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury. As a result, the Eighth Circuit's decision was reversed and Burrage cannot be subject to the penalty enhancement.

Law in Plain English: Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation

Argument: Nov 4 2013 (Aud.)

Background: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), excludes, from the time during which an employee is entitled to be compensated at the minimum hourly wage "any time spent in changing clothes...at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time...by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee." A group of workers at U.S. Steel filed a collection action lawsuit against the company for failing to compensate them for the time they spent putting on and taking off their work clothes in a locker room at the plant. The clothes consist of flame-retardant pants and jacket, work gloves, metatarsal boots (work boots containing steel or other strong material to protect the toes and instep), a hard hat, safety glasses, ear plugs, and a "snood" (a hood that covers the top of the head, the chin, and the neck). The District Court ruled that the FLSA does not require that the clothes-changing time in this case be compensated, and the Seventh Circuit agreed.

Issue: The question before the Court is what constitutes “changing clothes” within the meaning of Section 203(o) of the FLSA?

Holding: In a unanimous decision (except for Justice Sotomayor, who did not join in footnote 7), the Supreme Court ruled that most of the items identified by the workers were indeed clothes, and as a result, the time that petitioners spend donning and doffing their protective gear is not compensable by the operation of federal law. Consequently, the FLSA does not require that the clothes-changing time in this case be compensated and the Seventh Circuit's decision was affirmed.

Gary Works, U. S. Steel’s largest manufacturing plant, is situated on the south shore of Lake Michigan.

Law in Plain English: Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Argument: Oct 15 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Heimeshoff filed for long-term disability benefits under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), but the insurance company denied her claim. The District Court then dismissed her complaint because it fell outside of the insurance policy's three-year statute of limitations period. Heimeshoff alleged that the statute of limitations should not have run until her claim was denied by the insurance company; on the other hand the insurance company's plan provided that its three-year limitations period ran from the time that proof of loss was due under the plan (an earlier period). The Second Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is when should a statute of limitations accrue for judicial review of an disability adverse benefit determination under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act?

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the plan's limitations provision is enforceable. Statutes of limitations provide only a default rule that permits parties to choose a shorter limitations period (although, to be clear, §ERISA 502(a)(1)(B) does not specify a statute of limitations). Parties can agree not only to the length of a limitations period but also to its commencement. As a result, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit and Heimeshoff's disability claim was denied. The practical impact of this decision is that contractual limitations provisions of the kind in this ERISA plan are enforceable so long as the limitations period is of reasonable length and there is no controlling statute to the contrary.

Law in Plan English: United States v. Woods

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: United States v. Woods

Argument: Oct 9 2013 (Aud.)

Why did the Supreme Court take this case? The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that whenever the IRS totally disallows a deduction, it may not penalize the taxpayer for a valuation overstatement included in that deduction. On the other hand, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have held the opposite. So-called "circuit splits" are perhaps the most common way cases make it to the Supreme Court.

Background: On behalf of two general partnerships, Woods participated in an aggressive tax shelter which effectively liquidated the assets of the partnerships and claimed the results as losses. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed these losses, and imposed penalties. At issue in this case is Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code, which prescribes a penalty for an underpayment of federal income tax that is “attributable to” an overstatement of basis in property. 26 U.S.C. 6662(a), (b)(3), (e)(1)(A) and (h)(1). Woods filed a petition for review with the District Court, which affirmed the finding of the IRS disallowing the losses, but reversed the penalty. It relied on prior Fifth Circuit precedent¹ in holding that whenever the IRS totally disallows a deduction, it may not penalize the taxpayer for a valuation overstatement included in that deduction. In a brief, per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court are (1) whether Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code, which prescribes a penalty for an underpayment of federal income tax that is “attributable to” an overstatement of basis in property, applies to an un­derpayment resulting from a determination that a transaction lacks economic substance because the sole purpose of the transaction was to generate a tax loss by artificially inflating the taxpayer’s basis in property; and (2) whether the district court had jurisdiction in this case under 26 U.S.C. §6226 to consider the substantial valuation misstatement penalty.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the partnerships’ lack of economic substance could justify imposing a valuation-misstatement penalty on the partners. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the valuation-misstatement penalty applied in this case. The practical impact of this decision is that whenever the IRS totally disallows a deduction, it may penalize the taxpayer for a valuation overstatement included in that deduction.

¹ Heasley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir.1990).

Law in Plain English: Conley v. United States

Antwaun Conley v. United States

Docket No.	Opinion Below	Argument	Opinion	Vote	Author	Term
No. 11-CF-589	N/A	Nov 20 2012	Sep 26 2013	3-0	Glickman	N/A

Plain English Summary: In 2009, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted a statute making it a felony offense for a person to be present in a motor vehicle if the person knows that the vehicle contains an illegal firearm (“PMVCF”), even if the person has no connection to or control over the weapon and is not involved in any wrongdoing whatsoever. The statute was enacted in order to allow convictions to be obtained when a firearm is found in a car with more than one occupant and the government cannot prove who possessed it. Conley was arrested after police found a loaded handgun in the center console of a car he was driving (there was also a passenger in the front seat; and two passengers in the rear of the vehicle). The jury acquitted Conley of several possessory offenses. It found him guilty only of PMVCF, and the judge sentenced him to thirty-four months in prison.

Holding: The DC Court of appeals found the PMVCF unconstitutional because it violated due process. Instead of requiring the government to prove that the defendant‟s continued presence was voluntary, the law requires the defendant to shoulder the burden of proving that his presence in the vehicle was involuntary. This shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a critical component of the crime is incompatible with due process. Additionally, the Court found it s incompatible with due process to convict a person of a crime based on the failure to take a legally required action—a crime of omission—if he had no reason to believe he had a legal duty to act, or even that his failure to act was blameworthy. In other words, the statute criminalizes entirely innocent behavior—merely remaining in the vicinity of a firearm in a vehicle, which the average citizen would not suppose to be wrongful (let alone felonious)—without requiring the government to prove that the defendant had notice of any legal duty to behave otherwise. As a result, Conley's conviction was overturned.

News Coverage

• Blog of Legal Times (Sep 26 2013)

Is a pellet gun a firearm?

State of Kansas v. Timothy Wayne Craddick

Docket No.	Opinion Below	Argument	Opinion	Vote	Author	Term
No. 108,335	N/A	N/A	Nov 1 2013	3-0	Pierron	N/A

Plain English Summary: Craddick pointed his Ruger Air Hawk pellet rifle at his victims and threatened to shoot them if they did not put his dog on the ground (they had tried to pet his dog after it approached them while they were walking). He was convicted of attempted aggravated assault. The district court found that Craddick had committed his crimes with a firearm, which triggered a presumptive prison sentence under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6804(h). Applying this firearm rule, Craddick was sentenced to a controlling term of 11 months' imprisonment. The question before the Kansas Court of Appeals was whether a pellet gun was a firearm for purposes of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6804(h).

Ruger Air Hawk pellet rifle

Holding: The Kansas Legislature defined firearm as "any weapon designed or having the capacity to propel a projectile by force of an explosion or combustion." Therefore, a pellet rifle is not a firearm because rather than propelling projectiles by force of an explosion or combustion, it propels projectiles by force of air or gas. As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated Craddick's sentence and remanded it to the trial court for resentencing. It is important to note that this decision doesn't overturn his conviction. Craddick will be sentenced for two counts of attempted aggravated assault, but without the firearm enhancement.

News Coverage

• Lawrence Journal-World (Nov 1 2013)
• Topeka Capital-Journal (Nov 1 2013)

Law in Plain English: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Update (8/18/13): For a full timeline of events in this case, see here.

For a previous discussion of this case, see here.

SCOTUSblog: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

Matt and Melanie Capobianco with Veronica.

Argument: Apr 16, 2013 (Tr.) (Aud.)

Discussion: A South Carolina couple adopted the daughter of a young woman who was not a tribal member, but the child was considered to be an Indian because of her father’s tribal membership. The couple had to give up the child after raising her for two years, because the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the federal law took priority over state law.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether a non-custodial parent could invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63, to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law; and (2) whether the ICWA defined “parent” in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings. The Court ruled that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not bar termination of the biological father's paternal rights because it applied to a child who was removed--the ICWA’s primary goal is not implicated when an Indian child’s adoption is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights. In other words, the provisions were not designed to apply to the circumstances presented by this case. As a result, the order returning the baby to the biological father was thrown out. It will be the job of the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide custody--although without the ICWA in the way, it seems likely that the adoptive parents will regain custody of the girl.

Update (6/29/13): In an order of June 28th, Justice Alito wrote that the mandate to the South Carolina Supreme Court will issue on July 5th (normally, such mandates happen 25 days after the original decision; the Capobiancos had applied with the Court for a faster timetime and Justice Alito agreed).

Update (7/17/13): In a 3-2 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court  remanded the case to the Family Court for the prompt entry of an order approving and finalizing Adoptive Couple's adoption of Baby Girl, and thereby terminating Birth Father's parental rights. As a result, the court ruled that custody of Baby Girl shall be transferred to Adoptive Couple.

Update (7/24/13): In a 3-2 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court ordered the adoption to be finalized.

Update (7/26/13): Refusing to give up, the birth father filed an application for a stay of the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Update (7/30/13): On Wednesday, a family court in Charleston, S.C., plans to have a hearing Wednesday to decide how - not if - to transfer custody of Baby Veronica back to her adoptive parents.

Update (7/30/13): Attorneys for Adoptive Couple filed a response to the birth father's application for a stay of the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Update (8/2/13): The Supreme Court denied the birth father's application for a stay.

Update (8/7/13): A South Carolina family court issued an enforcement order which found that Dusten Brown (the birth father) violated the terms of a previous court order by not showing up at the appointed time and place via the terms of the transition plan (Brown himself need not have shown up; Veronica's grandparents or other guardians could have done so). As a result, the court canceled the transition plan and ordered immediate custody of Baby Veronica to the Capobiancos. It also referred the matter to the Charleston County Solicitor's Office, the United States Attorney's Office, and Brown's commanding officer (Brown is in the Army National Guard).

Update (8/18/13): For a full timeline of events in this case, see here.