Law in Plain English: Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean

Argument: Nov 4 2014 (Aud.)

Background: In July 2003, all federal air marshals received a TSA briefing that there was a potential plot to hijack U.S. airliners. Soon after the briefing, however, the TSA sent an unencrypted text message to the marshals' cell phones canceling all missions on flights from Las Vegas until early August. Concerned about the danger the threat posed to the flying public in the absence of marshals on these flights, marshal Robert MacLean contacted his supervisor and the Office of the Inspector General. Dissatisfied, he revealed the cancellation order to an MSNBC reporter. Following an investigation, MacLean was removed from his job as a federal air marshal for revealing sensitive security information (SSI), although the agency had not labeled the text message as SSI when it was originally sent. MacLean challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board, arguing that his disclosure was protected whistleblowing activity. The Board determined that MacLean's disclosure fell outside of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) because the disclosure was specifically prohibited by statute, via the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision because it held that the ATSAdid not specifically prohibit the disclosure made by MacLean. Although the ATSA empowers the agency to prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of SSI, regulations by themselves are not considered laws for the purpose of the WPA. As a result, the case was remanded to the Board for a determination about whether MacLean's disclosures qualify for WPA protection.

Edited to add (Oct 9 2014): Mr. MacLean contacted me to say that he challenges the DHS assertion that the text message was limited to Las Vegas flights, and claims that the cancellation applied to all overnight flights. Specifically, MacLean believes that DHS deliberated narrowed the facts from a general whistlelower claim to just the Las Vegas flights because that would be a "specific detail[] of aviation security measure[];" thereby bolstering the claim against him. I'm not sure that matters at this stage; the Federal Circuit's opinion only referenced the Las Vegas flights, and facts generally cannot be challenged at this level. But because MacLean contacted me, I included that information here. Stay tuned to see whether his lawyers raise the issue during oral arguments.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether certain statutory protections codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), which are inapplicable when an employee makes a disclosure “specifically prohibited by law,” can bar an agency from taking an enforcement action against an employee who intentionally discloses Sensitive Security Information.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by the TSA’s regulations for purposes of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) because regulations do not qualify as “law” under that statute.

Law in Plain English: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.

Argument: Oct 15 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Teva, which manufactures Copaxone® (a drug used in treating multiple sclerosis), sued Sandoz and Mylan, for patent infringement. Sandoz and Mylan sought approval to market generic versions of Copaxone®. The district court concluded that Teva's patents had been infringed. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to one group of claims, but reversed the district court's judgment with respect to a second group of claims. In doing so, the panel reviewed de novo the district court's factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term. On the other hand, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that a district court's factual findings should only be reviewed for clear error.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a district court’s factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when reviewing a district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made in the course of its construction of a patent claim, the Federal Circuit must apply a “clear error,” not a de novo, standard of review.

Law in Plain English: Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International

Argument: Mar 30 2014 (Aud.)

Discussion: Alice, an Australian company, owns several patents which relate to a computerized trading platform used for conducting financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between a first and a second party so as to eliminate "counterparty" or "settlement" risk. Settlement risk refers to the risk to each party in an exchange that only one of the two parties will actually pay its obligation, leaving the paying party without its principal or the benefit of the counterparty's performance. Alice's patents address that risk by relying on a trusted third party to ensure the exchange of either both parties' obligations or neither obligation. CLS Bank filed suit against Alice seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability as to the  patents. Alice answered and counterclaimed, alleging infringement. the district court granted summary judgment in favor of CLS, holding each of the asserted claims of Alice's patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. A panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the claims at issue, including claims drawn to methods, computer-readable media, and systems, were all patent eligible under § 101. Upon consideration en banc, a majority of the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under § 101.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether claims to computer-implemented inventions – including claims to systems and machines, processes, and items of manufacture – are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by this Court.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that because the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, they are not eligible for a patent under Section 101.

Law in Plain English: Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.

Argument: Apr 28 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Biosig Instruments, Inc. is the assignee of a patent for a heart rate monitor associated with an exercise apparatus and/or exercise procedures. Biosig brought a patent infringement action against Nautilus, Inc. alleging that Nautilus infringed Biosig's patent. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §112, requires that the specification of a patent "conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention;" The district found that the term "spaced relationship" in the patent was not defined with any parameters, and as a result, granted Nautilus's motion as to invalidity. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that a claim is indefinite only when it is "not amenable to construction" or "insolubly ambiguous." In this case, the variables affecting the "spaced relationship" could be determined by those skilled in the art. Thus, "spaced relationship" could not be said to be insolubly ambiguous.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the Federal Circuit’s acceptance of ambiguous patent claims with multiple reasonable interpretations – so long as the ambiguity is not “insoluble” by a court – defeats the statutory requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming; and (2) whether the presumption of validity dilutes the requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the patent specification and prosecution history, failed to inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.

Law in Plain English: Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Argument: Apr 30 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Akamai Technologies, Inc., owns a patent that covers a method for efficient delivery of web content. The claimed method consists of placing some of a content provider's content elements on a set of replicated servers and modifying the content provider's web page to instruct web browsers to retrieve that content from those servers. Akamai filed a complaint against Limelight Networks, Inc., alleging infringement of the patent. In its complaint, Akamai alleged both direct and induced infringement. Limelight maintains a network of servers and, as in the patented method, it allows for efficient content delivery by placing some content elements on its servers. Limelight, however, does not modify the content providers' web pages itself. Instead, Limelight instructs its customers on the steps needed to do that modification. The district court held that Limelight did not infringe the patents asserted against them because Limelight's customers (and not Limelight itself) performed one of the steps of the claimed method. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Limelight could be liable for induced infringement if Akamai had performed some of the steps of a claimed method and has induced other parties to commit the remaining steps (divided infringement).

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct infringement under Section 271(a).

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant is not liable for inducing infringement when no one has directly infringed under Section 271(a) or any other statute. Liability for infringement must be predicated on direct infringement. As a result, the decision of the Federal Circuit was reversed.

Law in Plain English: Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (see Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness for another case that discusses the same issue).

Argument: Feb 26 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Highmark, a Pennsylvania insurance company, filed suit against Allcare seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability of all claims of an Allcare patent. Allcare counterclaimed for infringement. The District Court entered final judgment of noninfringement in favor of Highmark. Highmark moved for an exceptional case finding with respect to Allcare and an award of attorneys' fees and expenses under 35 U.S.C. § 285. After reviewing the record, the District Court found the case exceptional. The Federal Circuit affirmed  one § 285 claim and reversed two others, holding that a District Court’s objective baselessness determination is reviewed “without deference.” The Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of six to five.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a district court’s exceptional-case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (which permits the court to award attorney’s fees in exceptional cases), based on its judgment that a suit is objectively baseless, is entitled to deference.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that all aspects of a district court's exceptional-case determination under § 285 should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Prior to Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., this determination was governed by the framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture. Octane rejects the Brooks Furniture framework as unduly rigid and holds that district courts may make the exceptional-case determination under § 285 in the exercise of their discretion. The holding in Octane settles this case.

Law in Plain English: Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness (see Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. for another case that discusses the same issue).

Argument: Feb 26 2014 (Aud.)

Internal emails show ICON's  tactics in using a old patent to go after a smaller start-up.

Background: ICON Health and Fitness filed a complaint against Octane Fitness alleging that Octane's Q45 and Q47 elliptical machines infringed on ICON's patent.  The patent claims at issue focus on the "linkage system" connecting the foot rail to the frame via the "stroke rail." The District Court concluded that the "stroke rail" and "means for connecting" limitations were absent in the Q45 and Q47 machines and granted summary judgment of noninfringement. The District Court ruled, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, that the case was not "exceptional" (§ 285 provides that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party"). The District Court, citing the line of Federal Circuit cases holding that in the absence of litigation misconduct, fees may only be awarded if the allegations are both 1) objectively baseless and 2) there is clear and convincing evidence of subjective bad faith; found that neither prong was met. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Federal Circuit’s promulgation of a rigid and exclusive two-part test for determining whether a case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 improperly appropriates a district court’s discretionary authority to award attorney fees to prevailing accused infringers in contravention of statutory intent and this Court’s precedent, thereby raising the standard for accused infringers (but not patentees) to recoup fees and encouraging patent plaintiffs to bring spurious patent cases to cause competitive harm or coerce unwarranted settlements from defendants.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Brooks Furniture framework that the Federal Circuit relied upon to determine exceptional cases is unduly rigid and impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts. District courts may determine whether a case is exceptional in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.

Law in Plain English: Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States

Argument: Jan 14 2014 (Aud.)

"Though we recognize that the Seventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims have concluded that the United States did not retain any reversionary interest in these railroad rights-of way, we are bound by our precedent."
United States v. Brandt, 496 F. App'x 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 12-1173

Background: In 1976, the government conveyed 83.32 acres of land to Melvin M. Brandt and Lula M. Brandt — the parents of Marvin M. Brandt. The land patent conveyed the property in fee simple and stated that it was subject to a right-of-way granted to the Laramie, Hahn's Peak, and Pacific Railroad Company for railroad purposes in 1908. In 1987, the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc. ("WYCO") acquired the railroad right-of-way and operated the rail line for a number of years. In May 1996, WYCO filed a Notice of Intent to Abandon Rail Service with the Surface Transportation Board ("STB"). The STB approved abandonment of the rail line in December 2003, and, in January 2004, WYCO notified the STB that it had completed its abandonment of the railroad right-of-way. The United States sought to quiet title on the theory that it had an implied reversionary interest in the right-of-way. The District Court found in favor of the United States, who sought to use the right-of-way for a rails-to-trails conversion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed a parallel claim by Brandt for lack of jurisdiction, but the Federal Circuit reversed.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether the United States retained an implied reversionary interest in rights-of-way created by the General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875 after the underlying lands were patented into private ownership.

Holding: In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the right of way was an easement that was terminated by the railroad’s abandonment, leaving Brandt’s land unburdened. As a result, the Government did not retain an implied reversionary interest in the right-of-way.

Law in Plain English: Medtronic, Inc. v. Merowski Family Ventures, LLC

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Medtronic, Inc. v. Merowski Family Ventures, LLC

Argument: Nov 5 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Medtronic, a leading manufacturer of medical devices and equipment, sued for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of several patents owned by Mirowski Family Ventures. The District Court entered judgment of noninfringement in favor of Medtronic and judgment of validity and enforceability in favor of MFV. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the decision, finding that the court relied on a legally incorrect allocation of the burden of proof to find noninfringement in the limited circumstances of this case and incorrectly construed the claim terms in question.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether, in a declaratory judgment action brought by a licensee under MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the licensee has the burden to prove that its products do not infringe the patent, or whether (as is the case in all other patent litigation, including other declaratory judgment actions), the patentee must prove infringement.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against a patentee that its products do not infringe the licensed patent, the patentee bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of infringement. As a result, the Federal Circuit was reversed. The impact of this decision is that the burden of proof does not shift, even when the patentee is a defendant in a declaratory judgment action, and the plaintiff (the potential infringer) seeks a judgment that he does not infringe the patent.

An interesting admission from Justice Scalia in the DNA patent case?

Justice Scalia's concurrence in today's decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.:

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief. It suffices for me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and the expert briefs presented here, that the portion of DNA isolated from its natural state sought to be patented is identical to that portion of the DNA in its natural state; and that complementary DNA (cDNA) is a synthetic creation not normally present in nature.

A very interesting admission from a Supreme Court Justice, and especially from Justice Scalia? He seems to be saying "I don't quite understand the science enough to join the entire opinion, but I'm sufficiently informed to agree with the overall decision."

Law in Plain English: Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.

Myriad Genetics obtained several patents on “isolated” forms of several genes. A group of challengers (four national organizations of doctors, researchers, clinicians, and other health professionals, along with six leading geneticists, two genetic counselors, two women’s health and breast cancer organizations, and six patients who had been diagnosed as being at risk for one of the hereditary forms of cancer) opposed Myriad Genetics by claiming that Myriad hadn't created anything, since the genes remained unchanged, and “natural phenomena” or something that is merely the product of “the laws of nature” cannot be patented. The District Court ruled in favor of the challengers, but the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that all of the challengers (but one, a doctor from NYU who had been doing research on the genes in question but stopped because he feared Myriad might take action against him) lacked standing, and that Myriad's patents were valid. The question before the Court was whether human genes are patentable. In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that natural isolated DNA is not patentable, but synthetic DNA is patentable. A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring. As a result, Myriad's patents (which were based on natural isolated DNA) are not valid.

Law in Plain English: Case or Controversy

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe the structure, procedures, and legal issues of the federal courts in plain English. For similar posts, click here.

The Case or Controversy Clause, part of Article III of the United States Constitution, reads as follows:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In plain English, this means that the courts only have power to hear cases when an actual controversy exists. Federal courts cannot decide issues based on hypothetical scenarios, cannot give advisory opinions, or decide issues  that aren't yet ripe.

To illustrate this concept, let's take a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

A group of farmers, many of who grew organic crops, did not want to have their crops contaminated by genetically-modified Monsanto seeds. They were concerned that the widespread proliferation of Monsanto's seeds would contaminate their organic crops, and afraid that Monsanto would then sue them for patent infringement (in some cases like this recent Supreme Court case, Monsanto has sued farmers for such infringement). So, the farmers asked the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to declare (essentially, make a legally-binding judgment) that Monsanto's patents were invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed.

After filing the suit, the farmers asked Monsanto for a covenant not to sue (something we saw in this Supreme Court case earlier this term), which is exactly what it sounds like: a legally binding agreement not to sue. Monsanto declined to issue the covenant, but instead declared (via their website) that "[i]t has never been, nor will it be Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or traits are present in farmer’s fields as a result of inadvertent means." Additionally Monsanto advised the farmers that

Monsanto is unaware of any circumstances that would give rise to any claim for patent infringement or any lawsuit against your clients. Monsanto therefore does not assert and has no intention of asserting patent-infringement claims against your clients. You represent that “none of your clients intend to possess, use or sell any transgenic seed, including any transgenic seed potentially covered by Monsanto’s patents.” Taking your representation as true, any fear of suit or other action is unreasonable, and any decision not to grow certain crops unjustified.

The District Court concluded that, given these facts, there was no controversy. As a result, it is important to note that the court could not hear the substance of the farmers' claims. On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed.

Given our understanding of the Case or Controversy Clause, it's not difficult to understand why the courts decided as they did. The farmers were asking the court to rule on something that might happen. Given's Monsanto's stated policy and their assurances that they were unaware of any circumstances that would give rise to any claim for patent infringement or any lawsuit, the court concluded that the farmers had not been injured in any way:

In sum, Monsanto’s binding representations remove any risk of suit against the appellants as users or sellers of trace amounts (less than one percent) of modified seed. The appellants have alleged no concrete plans or activities to use or sell greater than trace amounts of modified seed, and accordingly fail to show any risk of suit on that basis. The appellants therefore lack an essential element of standing. The district court correctly concluded that it lacks Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction.

And now you know!

Law in Plain English: Sebelius v. Cloer

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Sebelius v. Cloer

The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (provides compensation to those who are injured by certain vaccines. Claims are generally required to be filed within three years of the first symptom. Lawyers cannot charge fees for representing their clients, but can recover fees from the program for petitions filed in good faith and with a substantial basis. Cloer filed a claim in 2005 for symptoms first noticed in 1997. A special master and the Court of Federal Claims dismissed her petition as untimely. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, and then the circuit en banc reversed yet again, finding the petition untimely. Cloer's lawyer sought attorney's fees, and a divided Federal Circuit agreed. The question before the Court was whether a person whose petition under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is dismissed as untimely may recover from the United States an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that an untimely petition may qualify for an award of attorney’s fees if it is filed in good faith and there is a reasonable basis for its claim. As a result, Cloer's attorney can recover fees. The statute of limitations for the claim is not tied to the fees recovery provision.

Law in Plain English: Bowman v. Monsanto Co.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Bowman v. Monsanto Co.

Monsanto developed and patented genetically modified seeds which they sold to farmer Bowman. Bowman planted the seeds, and then saved (and used) the harvested seeds for later plantings. Monsanto then sued Bowman for planting the saved seeds as an infringement of Monsanto's patents. Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, once an authorized sale of a patented article occurs, the patent holder’s rights to control the use and sale of that article are exhausted, and the purchaser is free to use or resell that article without further restraint (this is analogous to the first-sale doctrine in copyright and trademark law). However, in this case, patent exhaustion would allow farmers to buy Monsanto's patented, genetically modified seeds just once and then use the harvested seeds again and again without compensating Monsanto. The District Court and the Federal Circuit agreed with Monsanto that patent exhaustion shouldn't apply, and as a result, Bowman's use of the harvested seeds infringed on Monsanto's patents. The questions before the Court were whether the Federal Circuit erred by (1) refusing to find patent exhaustion in relation to the genetically modified seeds; and (2) creating an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion for self-replicating technologies. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that patent exhaustion does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.As a result, Bowman's conduct infringes on Monsanto's patents. The practical impact of this decision may reach beyond genetically modified seeds to other areas--any areas where copies of a particular item can be made.

SCOTUS in Plain English: United States v. Bormes

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe Supreme Court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case at SCOTUblog below. For similar posts, click here.

United States v. Bormes

James Bormes sued the United States under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), claiming that a receipt they provided to him revealed too much information about his credit card. Bormes brought his case in federal court under the Little Tucker Act, which authorizes claims against the government under $10,000. The Supreme Court found that the Little Tucker Act does not waive the government's sovereign immunity (sovereign immunity provides that the government cannot be sued unless that immunity has been waived, or if the government consents). The FCRA specified its own procedures for making claims, and the courts should consider whether the FCRA itself (not the Little Tucker Act) waives the government's sovereign immunity. As a result, Bormes's suit will be transferred to the 7th Circuit on that issue. The practical impact of this decision is those alleging violations by the United Staes cannot use the Little Tucker Act to get their claims into federal court.

SCOTUS in Plain English: Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe Supreme Court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case at SCOTUblog below. For similar posts, click here.

Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States

In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed the Clearwater Dam in Arkansas. For a number of years, the Corps (at the request of farmers downstream) released water over a longer period of time which resulted in extended flooding. The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (who owned and managed the flooded land) sued the United States, claiming that the extended flooding was a "taking" of property without compensation under the Fifth Amendment because the flooding damaged or destroyed more than 18 million board feet of timber. The Supreme Court ruled that flooding need not be permanent to be considered a taking; even temporary takings may be subject to compensation. The practical impact of this decision is that the government may need to compensate a landowner for takings even when the taking is temporary, although it will depend upon the frequency and duration.