Law in Plain English: Alabama Redistricting Cases

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (consolidated with Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama)

Argument: Nov 12 2014 (Aud.)

Background: After the 2000 Census, the Democrat-controlled Legislature in Alabama adopted districts that favored its partisan interests. When Republicans challenged the district lines adopted after the 2000 Census, they targeted the systematic underpopulation of the majority-black districts, but State officials and Democratic leaders successfully defended the population deviations as “the product of the Democratic Legislators’ partisan political objective to design Senate and House plans that would preserve their respective Democratic majorities.” The partisan gerrymander that protected Democratic control of the Legislature collapsed in 2010 when Republicans gained supermajority control of both houses of the Legislature, which then adopted new redistricting acts based on the 2010 Census. The Republican-controlled Legislature adopted district lines with smaller deviations in population equality, which upended the partisan gerrymander adopted by the Democrat-controlled Legislature after the 2000 Census. The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus alleged that the purpose and effect of the new districts is to dilute and isolate the strength of black voters, in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Alabama Democratic Conference alleged that the purpose and effect of the new districts is to dilute the opportunities for minority voters to participate in the political process and that the new districts are products of racial gerrymandering. A three-judge panel for the Middle District of Alabama dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs and ruled in favor of the state, finding that he plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of vote dilution, invidious discrimination, or racial gerrymandering. 

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether Alabama's legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts; and (2) whether Alabama’s effort to redraw the lines of each majority-black district to have the same black population as it would have using 2010 census data as applied to the former district lines, when combined with the state's new goal of significantly reducing population deviation among districts, amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Court’s analysis of the racial gerrymandering claim as referring to the State “as a whole,” rather than district-by-district, was legally erroneous; that the District Court also erred in deciding that the Conference lacked standing; and that the District Court also did not properly calculate “predominance” in its alternative holding that “[r]ace was not the predominant motivating factor” in the creation of any of the challenged districts. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court’s final alternative holding—that “the [challenged] Districts would satisfy strict scrutiny”—rests upon a misperception of the law. Section 5 does not require a covered jurisdiction to maintain a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice. The Court explained that the District Court and the legislature both asked the wrong question with respect to narrow tailoring. They asked how to maintain the present minority percentages in majority-minority districts, instead of asking the extent to which they must preserve existing minority percentages in order to maintain the minority’s present ability to elect the candidate of its choice. As a result, the decision of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded.

Law in Plain English: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

Argument: Oct 15 2013 (Aud.)

Did you know? Jennifer Gratz, executive director of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (Proposal 2), was the plaintiff in Gratz v. Bollinger, a Supreme Court case about affirmative action in college admissions.

Background: In 2006, Michigan voters passed (by a 58%-42% margin) a ballot initiative (Proposal 2) to amend the state constitution "to prohibit all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting..." The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and other interest groups filed a lawsuit alleging that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding that that Proposal 2 impermissibly altered the political process in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Sitting en banc, a fractured Sixth Circuit agreed with the panel's decision and reversed the District Court.

Jennifer Gratz. Photo from Wikipedia.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in public-university admissions decisions (Kagan, J., recused.).

Holding: In a 6-2 decision (with Justice Kagan recused), the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and ruled that there is no authority in the Federal Constitution or in this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit to the voters the determination whether racial preferences may be considered in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions. In doing so, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education; but rather decided that it is permissible for the people, through a referendum, to resolve the issue.

Law in Plain English: Madigan v. Levin

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Madigan v. Levin

Argument: Oct 7 2013 (Aud.)

Discussion: Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General until he was terminated in 2006. He filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Madigan (the Attorney General of Illinois) argued that Levin's 1983 claim is precluded by the ADEA because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claim. The District Court ruled that Levin's 1983 claim could preceed and the Seventh Circuit agreed, finding that nothing in the text of ADEA expressly precluded a 1983 claim, and that the rights protected by ADEA and § 1983 were sufficiently different to allow the 1983 claim.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding, in an acknowledged departure from the rule in at least four other circuits, that state and local government employees may avoid the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s comprehensive remedial regime by bringing age discrimination claims directly under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of ceriorari as improvidently granted. A "DIG" is essentially the Court saying that it should not have accepted the case.

Law in Plain English: Hollingsworth v. Perry

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

My preview of the case is here.

Hollingsworth v. Perry

In 2008, Californians passed Proposition 8, which amended the California constitution to prohibit same sex marriage. Perry and her spouse and another same sex couple filed suit, alleging that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. California refused to defend the constitutionality, but the District Court allowed Hollingsworth and other residents, who had placed Prop 8 on the ballot, to intervene and defend the law. The District Court found that Prop 8 violated both the Due Process Clause, because the state had no compelling interest in denying the right to marry to same sex couples; and the Equal Protection Clause, because there was no rational basis for limiting the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. The results below, and the decision by California not to defend the law, raised two questions before the Court: first, whether Hollingsworth had standing to defend Prop 8; and second, whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. It is important to note that the first question was threshold question, meaning it must be decided in the affirmative for the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality question. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Hollingsworth did not have standing to appeal. As a result, the Ninth Circuit's decision was reversed and remanded. The practical impact of this decision is that same sex marriage will be permitted in California, because the petitioners do not have standing to defend the law. This is a narrow ruling that will not apply outside of California.

Law in Plain English: Shelby County v. Holder

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

See here for a previous discussion and more background on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.

Shelby County v. Holder

In 2006, Congress reauthorized Section 5 the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which kept in place a pre-existing coverage formula in Section 4(b) which determined which jurisdictions are required see seek preclearance for changes to voting procedures. Shelby County, Alabama filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Voting Rights Act (specifically, Sections 4(b) and 5) were unconstitutional. The District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the Attorney General. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The question before the Court was whether Congress’ decision to reauthorize Section 5 of the VRA under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the VRA exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act t is unconstitutional; its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance. As a result, Congress cannot use the VRA's existing preclearance formula to single out jurisdictions--they must use data about current conditions.

Clarence Thomas, affirmative action, and Brown v. Board of Education

From Justice Thomas's concurrence in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin:

The University’s arguments today are no more persuasive than they were 60 years ago. Nevertheless, despite rejecting identical arguments in Brown, the Court in Grutter deferred to the University’s determination that the diversity obtained by racial discrimination would yield educational benefits. There is no principled distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational benefits and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same benefits.  Educational benefits are a far cry from the truly compelling state interests that we previously required to justify use of racial classifications.

...

My view of the Constitution is the one advanced by the plaintiffs in Brown: “[N]o State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”

...

Although cloaked in good intentions, the University’s racial tinkering harms the very people it claims to be helping.

Law in Plain English: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin

Any Texas resident who graduates from high school in the top ten percent of their class is automatically admitted to the University of Texas (the "Top Ten Percent Plan"). The remaining spots are filled by students based on a number of other factors, including race. When Fisher was denied admission, she filed a lawsuit alleging that considering race discriminated against her because is white. She alleged that the Top Ten Percent Plan already resulted in making the University a highly diverse institution, and that considering race among the factors for the remainder of students was unconstitutional racial balancing. The question before the Court was whether the University's use of race in admissions decisions as a means of affirmative action violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 7-1 decision (with Justice Kagan recused), the Supreme Court ruled that because the Fifth Circuit did not hold the University to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, its decision affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the University was incorrect. As a result, the case will return to the Fifth Circuit for another look. The practical impact of this decision is that the Court did not directly rule on the merits--this is a compromise decision that will be taken up again next term in a different case.

Law in Plain English: Hollingsworth v. Perry (Prop 8 preview)

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

UPDATE: A summary of the Supreme Court's decision is here.

For a preview of the other same sex marriage case, United States v. Windsor, see here.

Hollingsworth v. Perry

In 2008, Californians passed Proposition 8, which amended the California constitution to prohibit same sex marriage. Perry and her spouse and another same sex couple filed suit, alleging that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. California refused to defend the constitutionality, but the District Court allowed Hollingsworth and other residents, who had placed Prop 8 on the ballot, to intervene and defend the law. The District Court found that Prop 8 violated both the Due Process Clause, because the state had no compelling interest in denying the right to marry to same sex couples; and the Equal Protection Clause, because there was no rational basis for limiting the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. The results below, and the decision by California not to defend the law, raises two questions before the Court: first, whether Hollingsworth has standing to defend Prop 8; and second, whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. It is important to note that the first question is a threshold question, meaning it must be decided in the affirmative for the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality question. If the Court decides that Hollingsworth couldn't intervene to defend the law because he didn't have standing, then the Court could not decide on the constitutionality of Prop 8 (the other same sex marriage case involves DOMA and doesn't implicate Prop 8). The outcome is likely to be one of five choices; for a fuller understanding of all of the options at the disposal of the Supreme Court, see here.