Showing posts with label california. Show all posts
Showing posts with label california. Show all posts

19 February 2016

Choosing sides in the FBI-Apple dispute: who has the better argument?

Many people know my interests are at the intersection of the law and technology, and as a result, have asked my opinion on the merits of the FBI-Apple dispute. In large part because there was a lot of misinformation about the basic factual circumstances of the case, I wrote a short case summary here, but tried to remain neutral. Even as I wrote it, I really had no sense of which side had the better argument. I'll also add the obvious here, because sometimes it is not as obvious to others as it is to me: this is only my personal opinion and not work-related. It's worth what you've paid for it. I'll happily (ok, perhaps not happily) acknowledge I am wrong if the results come out contrary to my opinion.

On the other hand, most people in the tech and infosec communities chose sides in the FBI-Apple dispute pretty quickly. I was initially surprised that people's views were split as much as they were, even if it appeared (and still appears) that the split leans in favor of Apple (which is admittedly anecdotal evidence on my part). Upon further review, I am not surprised that views are as split as they are.

I took a lot longer to decide precisely because I am acutely aware of the nuances that often get lost in 140-character tweets or Facebook updates. In the end, from both my personal perspective and also what I think will actually happen, I think the FBI has the stronger argument. Apple is likely to draw out the process, but I think they will ultimately lose (although, speculating ahead, their best chance of winning may be at the Ninth Circuit if the case gets that far).

My decision is based upon the specific text of the Magistrate Judge's order, especially because it overcomes some of the more potent claims about what Apple is being asked to do. In an article entitled, "Why Lawyers Need to Stand By Apple" (which I cite because it was written by a lawyer addressed to other lawyers), we can see an example of what is being said about the case:
[Apple] is being ordered to create a master key to hack any iPhone on the planet.
Such an order is well beyond the scope of reason, and what the court is demanding Apple to do will ultimately undermine any hope of any of us ever having any privacy in the digital age.
This is not an exaggeration.
[Once Apple] creates the tool to break the encryption of any iPhone, that tool will be used again and again.
Emphases are mine. This is the core argument of the article. And it is disappointingly inaccurate. 

According to the court order, 
The court is requiring Apple to "provid[e] the FBI with a signed...Software Image File ("SIF") that can be loaded onto the SUBJECT DEVICE.... The SIF will be coded by Apple with a unique identifier of the phone so that the SIF would only load and execute on the SUBJECT DEVICE.
The court also gives Apple the option to do all of this at an Apple facility; meaning they could assist the FBI with this particular phone and then destroy the SIF without it ever being in the hands of the FBI or without ever leaving Apple's facility.

Could the FBI steal the SIF? Yes, but it wouldn't work on another phone without modification that it appears the FBI is not capable of doing. And if anyone ever found out that the FBI stole it, it is my belief no one would ever cooperate with the FBI again under similar circumstances, court order or not.

Neither would the SIF "break the encryption of any iPhone," or even this particular iPhone. This case doesn't really even have anything to do with encryption. The SIF would bypass or degrade software measures in place to prevent the auto-erase function from working, and from introducing delays after incorrect passcode attempts. It is true that even if and when Apple destroys the SIF, it will then still have actual knowledge of how to bypass these features--but do you really believe Apple doesn't already know? As others have pointed out, what they are being asked to do is already technically possible. They're not being asked here to do the impossible.

Using phrases like "this is not an exaggeration" does not grant your claims immunity from being exaggerated. In this case, it's worse than that: they're just not accurate. Moreover, words like "backdoor" are designed to elicit a certain response. The word has very negative connotations that , quite honestly, poisons the debate. Most infosec folks who hear the word "backdoor" will oppose it on its face.

I also recognize that this article doesn't represent everyone's views who is siding with Apple. I chose it partly because of it's outlandish claims and partly because I believe it captures a general perspective of how many people feel (even if not agreeing on the specific details).

You might also notice that I didn't discuss the Fourth Amendment in this blog post. There's a very specific reason why: the key issue in this case has nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment. The day after the shooting, the FBI sought and received a search warrant for a black Lexus. Pursuant to this search warrant, the FBI recovered an Apple iPhone 5C that was assigned to Farook but owned by his employer. The employer gave consent to the FBI to search the phone. So the FBI already has the consent of the phone's owner to search it. Likewise, Apple has no privacy interest in the phone. Anyone discussing this case as a Fourth Amendment issue should go back to law school or stop talking about it.

Let me last address the argument about "creating a dangerous precedent."  That may, or may not, be true. Generally speaking, decisions at the District Court level don't hold a lot of weight as legal precedent (and this is just a Magistrate Judge's decision--not even an Article III federal judge). Yes, if this case were to make it up to the Ninth Circuit (or even the Supreme Court), it would have precedential value. But that argument is circular. Any case that is not squarely on point with another previous case will quite possibly have some value one way or another. That may be a policy argument, but it's not a legal one.

What remains clear from a legal perspective is that Apple has complied (at least) 70 times with court orders for technical assistance (presumably under the All Writs Act, but not necessarily clear from this transcript). The red meat in this case is whether Apple's technical assistance under specific facts of this case are an unreasonable burden to Apple. In those 70 cases, Apple already had the technical ability to extract information from older iPhones even while they remained locked. In this case, the iPhone 5c has additional security measures that would prevent Apple from cooperating in the same way. In one sense, the additional hurdles to cooperation are self-generated on Apple's part (which is good for Apple's customers, of course--no one would argue otherwise). The difference between those 70 cases and this one is an existent technical capability to extract information from a locked phone (which no one has seriously argued against) versus the unrealized, but technically possible capability to reduce the security measures on this particular iPhone so that the FBI can brute force the passcode. It's clear to me that the burden on Apple is greater now than it was for any of those previous 70 cases. But is it unreasonably burdensome? I believe, given the situation I described above, that a court will find it to not be such a burden. As a result, from my personal perspective and also what I think will actually happen, I think the Government has the stronger argument. Apple will be forced to cooperate.

Whether you agree or disagree--and I know many of you will feel strongly one way or another--feel free to comment or tweet. If you have a question that you're curious about that I haven't addressed--ask it. Free and open debate in a wide-ranging marketplace of ideas makes us a better place--regardless of which side you come down on.

25 June 2014

Law in Plain English: Riley v. California

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Riley v. California (see also Wurie v. United States)

Argument: Apr 29 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Following a gang shooting, Riley (a known gang member)'s car was stopped by police and searched. The search found two handguns. As a result of the arrest, police seized his cell phone, and discovered (without a warrant) pictures of Riley making gang signs and videos showing Riley's gang affiliation. The trial cout ruled the search of the cell phone was lawful, and the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether evidence admitted at petitioner's trial was obtained in a search of petitioner's cell phone that violated petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.

22 April 2014

Law in Plain English: Navarette v. California

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Navarette v. California

Argument: Jan 21 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Lorenzo and Jose Navarette were detained by officers of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and subsequently arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. The marijuana was discovered in the Navarettes' pickup truck during a traffic stop after the officers received a report from an unidentified citizen that the vehicle had been observed driving recklessly. The Navarettes' motion to suppress the evidence seized from their truck was denied, and they pled guilty to transportation of marijuana. On appeal, the Navarettes alleged that the evidence against them should have been suppressed because the anonymous tip received by police was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying an investigative stop of the vehicle, where the officers directly confirmed only significant innocent details of the tip but did not directly observe any illegal activity. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of California denied review.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck's driver was intoxicated.

26 February 2014

Law in Plain English: United States v. Apel

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Dennis Apel. Photo from Paul Wellman,
Santa Barbara Independent.
SCOTUSblog: United States v. Apel

Argument: Dec 4 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Dennis Apel is a frequent protester at the front gate of  Vandenberg Air Force Base. He was as subject to a pre-existing order barring him from the base, and was convicted of trespassing under 18 U.S.C. § 1382. After his conviction, the Ninth Circuit ruled in another case that a stretch of highway running through the base was subject to an easement "granted to the State of California, which later relinquished it to the County of Santa Barbara," and as a result the federal government lacked the exclusive right of possession of the area on which the trespass allegedly occurred. Therefore, a trespassing conviction under § 1382 was not valid. In a per curiam decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed Apel's conviction.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which prohibits a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter, may be enforced on a portion of a military installation that is subject to a public roadway easement.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that for purposes of § 1382, a military installation emcompasses the commanding officer's area of responsibility; and here, it includes Vandenberg's highways and protest area. As a result, the Ninth Circuit's decision was vacated and Apel's conviction would be reinstated.

The painted green line marks the boundary for peaceful
protest activity, according to Vandenberg Air Force Base.

22 October 2013

Controversial Court Decisions: Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe controversial, notorious, infamous, and outrageous court decisions. For similar posts, click here.

Case: Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49 (1983).

Facts: Bigbee was was injured when an allgedly intoxicated driver lost control of her car, veered off the street into a parking lot, and crashed into a telephone booth in which the man was standing. The phone booth was about 15 feet from the road, and the door was allegedly "sticky."  Bigbee sued the driver and the companies that served her alcohol. In addition (and this is what this case is about), he also sued the companies responsible for the design, location, installation, and maintenance of the telephone booth. 

Appellate Court: The California Supreme Court ruled that the risk someone might veer off the road and crash into the telephone booth was not unforeseeable as a matter of law. The Court also determined that it was of no consequence that the harm to the plaintiff came about through the negligent or reckless acts of an allegedly intoxicated driver. The Court concluded that "there are no policy considerations which weigh against imposition of liability" against the defendants, and referred specifically to "the probable availability of insurance tor these types of accidents." After the case was remanded, the defendants settled with Bigbee for an undisclosed amount.

Why It's Controversial: The Court's decision that the companies responsible for the design, installation and maintenance of the telephone booth could be held liable endorsed a wide-ranging definition of forseeability: A jury need not find that the defendants could forsee an intoxicated driver crashing into a phone booth located on that particular street, but rather whether a jury could foresee any driver crashing into a man standing in any phone booth similarly situated (the dissent notes that public telephones have long been maintained adjacent to roads for the convenience of the public, despite obvious but remote risks). This broad definition of forseeability is a license for a considerable expansion of liability. For more background and a different perspective on the Bigbee case, see here.

26 June 2013

Law in Plain English: Hollingsworth v. Perry

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

My preview of the case is here.


In 2008, Californians passed Proposition 8, which amended the California constitution to prohibit same sex marriage. Perry and her spouse and another same sex couple filed suit, alleging that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. California refused to defend the constitutionality, but the District Court allowed Hollingsworth and other residents, who had placed Prop 8 on the ballot, to intervene and defend the law. The District Court found that Prop 8 violated both the Due Process Clause, because the state had no compelling interest in denying the right to marry to same sex couples; and the Equal Protection Clause, because there was no rational basis for limiting the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. The results below, and the decision by California not to defend the law, raised two questions before the Court: first, whether Hollingsworth had standing to defend Prop 8; and second, whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. It is important to note that the first question was threshold question, meaning it must be decided in the affirmative for the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality question. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Hollingsworth did not have standing to appeal. As a result, the Ninth Circuit's decision was reversed and remanded. The practical impact of this decision is that same sex marriage will be permitted in California, because the petitioners do not have standing to defend the law. This is a narrow ruling that will not apply outside of California.

16 April 2013

Reason #453 why people hate lawyers

As if you needed any other reasons why people hate lawyers (h/t Ted Frank at Point of Law):
In the early hours of December 4, 1997, 15-year-old Joshua Daniel had the clever idea of throwing baseball-sized chunks of concrete at vehicles on Interstate 5 from the top of a canal levee. He hit three cars before he tossed a 2.5-pound chunk at a big rig driven by William Collins, going through the windshield, hitting Collins in the forehead, and leaving him in a coma. Daniel pled guilty and was sentenced to 12 years. 
Collins sued a deep pocket. Guess who? 
Yes, the manufacturer of the truck...
I also noticed this from  footnote 3 of the opinion. Can you spot the error?
The angle of windshields varies by type of vehicle. Heavy trucks are generally 27 degrees from vertical (63 degrees from horizontal), while passenger cars are more sloped at 55 or 65 degrees from vertical (45 or 35 degrees from horizontal).

25 March 2013

Law in Plain English: Hollingsworth v. Perry (Prop 8 preview)

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

UPDATE: A summary of the Supreme Court's decision is here.

For a preview of the other same sex marriage case, United States v. Windsor, see here.


In 2008, Californians passed Proposition 8, which amended the California constitution to prohibit same sex marriage. Perry and her spouse and another same sex couple filed suit, alleging that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. California refused to defend the constitutionality, but the District Court allowed Hollingsworth and other residents, who had placed Prop 8 on the ballot, to intervene and defend the law. The District Court found that Prop 8 violated both the Due Process Clause, because the state had no compelling interest in denying the right to marry to same sex couples; and the Equal Protection Clause, because there was no rational basis for limiting the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. The results below, and the decision by California not to defend the law, raises two questions before the Court: first, whether Hollingsworth has standing to defend Prop 8; and second, whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. It is important to note that the first question is a threshold question, meaning it must be decided in the affirmative for the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality question. If the Court decides that Hollingsworth couldn't intervene to defend the law because he didn't have standing, then the Court could not decide on the constitutionality of Prop 8 (the other same sex marriage case involves DOMA and doesn't implicate Prop 8). The outcome is likely to be one of five choices; for a fuller understanding of all of the options at the disposal of the Supreme Court, see here.