Showing posts with label 6th circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 6th circuit. Show all posts

26 June 2015

Law in Plain English: Same Sex Marriage Cases

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Obergefell v. Hodges (consolidated with Tanco v. Haslam, DeBoer v. Snyder, Bourke v. Beshear)

Argument: Apr 28 2014 (Aud.)


Background: James Obergefell and John Arthur are from Ohio, and were married in Maryland. When Arthur died, Ohio would not list Obergefell as his spouse on their death certificates. Obergefell sought an injunction to require the State to list him as a spouse on the certificate. The district court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental right to keep existing marital relationships intact, and that the State failed to justify its law under heightened scrutiny. The court likewise concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation deserve heightened scrutiny under equal protection, and that Ohio failed to justify its refusal to recognize the couples’ existing marriages. Even under rational basis review, the court added, the State came up short. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to expand the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples. Further, the court found that the Constitution does prohibit a State from denying recognition to same-sex marriages conducted in other States.

Issue: The questions before the Court: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State.

24 March 2015

Law in Plain English: Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund

Argument: Nov 3 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Omnicare is the nation's largest provider of pharmaceutical care services for the elderly and other residents of long-term care facilities in the United States and Canada. A group of investors filed a lawsuit against Omnicare alleging, among other things, that Omnicare made material misstatements and/or omissions in a Registration Statement filed with the Securities and Exchanges Commission in connection with a public stock offering, in violation of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Furthermore, district court found that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded the defendants' knowledge of falsity. As a result, the claim was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that § 11 provides for strict liability, and as a result, the defendants' knowledge is not relevant to the claim. Therefore, the plaintiffs should not have been required to plead knowledge in connection with the claim. It is sufficient enough that the plaintiffs plead that the defendants' statement is objectively false.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether, for purposes of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, a plaintiff may plead that a statement of opinion was “untrue” merely by alleging that the opinion itself was objectively wrong, as the Sixth Circuit has concluded, or must the plaintiff also allege that the statement was subjectively false – requiring allegations that the speaker’s actual opinion was different from the one expressed – as the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a statement of opinion does not constitute an “untrue statement of...fact” simply because the stated opinion ultimately proves incorrect. Because a statement of opinion admits the possibility of error, such a statement remains true—and thus is not an “untrue statement of...fact”—even if the opinion turns out to have been wrong. Nevertheless, opinion statements are not wholly immune from liability. A statement of opinion thus qualifies as an “untrue statement of...fact” if that fact is untrue—i.e., if the opinion expressed was not sincerely held. If a registration statement omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into, or knowledge concerning, a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor, reading the statement fairly and in context, would take from the statement itself, then §11’s omissions clause creates liability. For purposes of §11’s omissions clause, whether a statement is “misleading” is an objective inquiry that depends on a reasonable investor’s perspective.

26 January 2015

Law in Plain English: M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett

Argument: Nov 10 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Retirees and dependents of retirees from an M&G plant brought a class action lawsuit against M&G after the company announced that retirees would be required to make contributions to their health care costs. The retirees and their union sought an injunction ordering M&G to reinstate the retirees to the current versions of the benefits plans they were enrolled in to receive health care for life without contributions. The labor agreements were originally negotiated between the union as a whole and the employer, and provided for retiree health care benefits (among other things). Individual (local) plants would either adopt the master agreement as a whole or adopt the master agreement with certain exceptions or differences. Some local agreements included "side" letters or "cap" letters that capped the company's contribution toward the cost of retiree health care benefits, although these letters were not reproduced in booklets distributed to retirees and (allegedly) not ratified as part of the agreement between the employer and the local plant. The district court found that, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the master agreements indicated an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free health care benefits, even if the agreement itself was silent as to the duration of retiree health care benefits. The district court also concluded. then, that the cap letters did not apply to the master agreement because those benefits could not be bargained away without retiree permission. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether, when construing collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, courts should presume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to survive the termination of the collective bargaining agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should require at least some language in the agreement that can reasonably support an interpretation that health-care benefits should continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits hold.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Circuit’s decision rested on principles that are incompatible with ordinary principles of contract law. ERISA governs pension and welfare benefits plans, including those established by collective-bargaining agreements. ERISA establishes minimum funding and vesting standards for pension plans, but exempts welfare benefits plans—which provide the types of benefits at issue here—from those rules. The Court interprets collective-bargaining agreements, including those establishing ERISA plans, according to ordinary principles of contract law, at least when those principles are not inconsistent with federal labor policy. As a result, the Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded it for the appeals court to apply ordinary principles of contract law in the first instance.

25 June 2014

Law in Plain English: Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer

Argument: Apr 2 2014 (Aud.)

Background: TBD

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Sixth Circuit erred by holding that respondents were not required to plausibly allege in their complaint that the fiduciaries of an employee stock ownership plan abused their discretion by remaining invested in employer stock, in order to overcome the presumption that their decision to invest in employer stock was reasonable, as required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (“ERISA”), and every other circuit to address the issue.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to any special presumption of prudence. Rather, they are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general, §1104(a)(1)(B), except that they need not diversify the fund’s assets, §1104(a)(2).

16 June 2014

Law in Plain English: Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus

Argument: Apr 22 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Shortly before the 2010 general election, then-Congressman Steven Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission against Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List), a pro-life advocacy organization that planned to run advertisements against him. SBA List then initiated a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Driehaus, the Commission's members, and the Ohio Secretary of State. The Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST), an anti-tax advocacy organization, filed a similar federal action, although no state proceedings had been brought against it. When Driehaus lost his bid for reelection, he filed a motion to withdraw his Commission complaint. SBA List consented to this and the Commission proceedings ceased. SBA List then amended its complaint to allege that the Commission proceedings following Driehaus's complaint chilled its speech and associational rights. This could happen again, SBA List alleged, if any complainant decided to hale the organization before the Commission. SBA List stated its intent to engage in "substantially similar activity in the future" and offered that Driehaus "may run for Congress again." COAST also filed suit against only the Commission. It claimed that it did not publish its own messages because its knowledge of the Commission proceedings against SBA List chilled its ability to speak. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss on standing, ripeness, and mootness grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that neither SBA List nor COAST's allegations were ripe.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether, to challenge a speech-suppressive law, a party whose speech is arguably proscribed must prove that authorities would certainly and successfully prosecute him, as the Sixth Circuit holds, or should the court presume that a credible threat of prosecution exists absent desuetude or a firm commitment by prosecutors not to enforce the law, as seven other Circuits hold; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Eighth Circuit, that state laws proscribing “false” political speech are not subject to pre-enforcement First Amendment review so long as the speaker maintains that its speech is true, even if others who enforce the law manifestly disagree.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that that petitioners have alleged a sufficiently imminent injury under Article III to enable them to challenge the constitutionality of the false statement law.

27 May 2014

Law in Plain English: Plumhoff v. Rickard


This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Plumhoff v. Rickard

Argument: Mar 4 2013

Discussion: In March 2001, a police officer in Georgia rammed a vehicle from behind to stop it following a high speed chase. As a result of the ramming, the suspect lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed. The suspect was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic. In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that a police officer did not violate the constitutional rights of a suspect when he tried to terminate a chase by ramming the car from behind. In a July 2004 chase, three West Memphis police officers fired shots into a vehicle that had repeatedly rammed police cruisers and (allegedly) revved its engine when the officers surrounded the vehicle. Both occupants of the vehicle were killed. On constitutional claims under 42 USC § 1983, the District Court determined that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and analyzed the 2004 incident using the standard set by the Supreme Court in the 2007 case, as opposed to the clearly established law that existed at the time of the 2004 incident. In other words, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the case under a standard that did not exist when the incident occurred.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the Sixth Circuit wrongly denied qualified immunity to the petitioners by analyzing whether the force used in 2004 was distinguishable from factually similar force ruled permissible three years later in Scott v. Harris. Stated otherwise, the question presented is whether, for qualified immunity purposes, the Sixth Circuit erred in analyzing whether the force was supported by subsequent case decisions as opposed to prohibited by clearly established law at the time the force was used; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying qualified immunity by finding the use of force was not reasonable as a matter of law when, under the respondent's own facts, the suspect led police officers on a high-speed pursuit that began in Arkansas and ended in Tennessee, the suspect weaved through traffic on an interstate at a high rate of speed and made contact with the police vehicles twice, and the suspect used his vehicle in a final attempt to escape after he was surrounded by police officers, nearly hitting at least one police officer in the process.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the officers' conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment because they acted reasonably in using deadly force; they did not fire more shots than necessary to end the public safety risk. Even if the officers' conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment, the officers would still be entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Law in Plain English: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

Argument: Dec 2 2013 (Aud.)

"Tendentious, junk-drawer arguments like this one are best left out of a brief. They waste opposing counsel's time and ours. We reject the argument here." State v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 695 F.3d 406, 416 (6th Cir. 2012)

Bay Mills Casino in Vanderbilt, MI.
Image from 500Nations.com.
Discussion: The Bay Mills Indian Community entered a Tribal-State compact with the State of Michigan, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which permitted the tribe to conduct gaming activities on Indian lands. Bay Mills then purchased 40 acres of land in Vanderbilt, Michigan (more than 100 miles from the tribe's reservation) to construct a small casino. The State of Michigan and the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians ("Little Traverse") brought suit to prevent Bay Mills from operating their casino. Little Traverse sued Bay Mills on the theory that its Vanderbilt casino (total slot machines: 84) would divert millions of dollars of revenue from Little Traverse's vastly larger casino in Petoskey, Michigan — a high-end community located on the shores of Lake Michigan. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop gaming at the Vanderbilt casino. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs' claims, and that Bay Mills's sovereign immunity bars the others. As a result, they vacated the injunction.

Issue:  The questions before the Court are (1) whether a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin activity that violates the IGRA, but takes place outside of Indian lands; and (2) whether tribal sovereign immunity bars a state from suing in federal court to enjoin a tribe from violating IGRA outside of Indian lands.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Michigan's suit is barred by tribal sovereign immunity.

23 April 2014

Law in Plain English: White v. Woodall

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: White v. Woodall

Argument: Dec 11 2013 (Aud.)

Did you know? At the Sixth Circuit, this case was known as Woodall v. Simpson because Thomas L. Simpson was the warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary at the time the case started. Since then, Randy White has become the warden, and thus the case has been restyled as White v. Woodall.

Discussion: Woodall pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. At the penalty trial, Woodall did not testify and requested that the trial judge instruct the jury that it should not draw any adverse inference from his decision not to testify. The trial judge concluded that Woodall was not entitled to the requested instruction, determining that, by entering a guilty plea, Woodall had waived his right to be free from self-incrimination. The trial court adopted the recommendation of the jury and sentenced Woodall to death on the murder conviction and life imprisonment for the remaining convictions. His conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Woodall then filed a federal habeas petition. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), requires that an application shall not be granted unless adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The District Court granted based on his claim that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by failing to instruct the jury to draw no adverse inference from Woodall's decision not to testify, despite Woodall's request for such an instruction. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the Sixth Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) by granting habeas relief on the trial court's failure to provide a no adverse inference instruction even though the Supreme Court has not "clearly established" that such an instruction is required in a capital penalty phase when a non-testifying defendant has pled guilty to the crimes and aggravating circumstances; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit violated the harmless error standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson in ruling that the absence of a no adverse interference instruction was not harmless in spite of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the face of a guilty pleas to the crimes and aggravators.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and ruled that because the Kentucky Supreme Court’s rejection of respondent’s Fifth Amendment claim was not objectively unreasonable, the Sixth Circuit erred in granting the writ.

22 April 2014

Law in Plain English: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

Argument: Oct 15 2013 (Aud.)

Did you know? Jennifer Gratz, executive director of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (Proposal 2), was the plaintiff in Gratz v. Bollinger, a Supreme Court case about affirmative action in college admissions.

Background: In 2006, Michigan voters passed (by a 58%-42% margin) a ballot initiative (Proposal 2) to amend the state constitution "to prohibit all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting..." The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and other interest groups filed a lawsuit alleging that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding that that Proposal 2 impermissibly altered the political process in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Sitting en banc, a fractured Sixth Circuit agreed with the panel's decision and reversed the District Court.

Jennifer Gratz. Photo from Wikipedia.
Issue: The question before the Court is whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in public-university admissions decisions (Kagan, J., recused.).

Holding: In a 6-2 decision (with Justice Kagan recused), the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and ruled that there is no authority in the Federal Constitution or in this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit to the voters the determination whether racial preferences may be considered in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions. In doing so, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education; but rather decided that it is permissible for the people, through a referendum, to resolve the issue.

26 March 2014

Law in Plain English: United States v. Castleman

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: United States v. Castleman

Argument: Jan 15 2014 (Aud.)

Background: In 2001, James Castleman pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault in violation of Tennessee Code § 39-13-111(b) for "intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to [the mother of his child]." Several years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Under the Castlemans' scheme, Castleman's wife purchased firearms, allegedly lied on federal firearms paperwork by stating that she was the actual buyer of the firearms, and turned the firearms over to her husband, who was legally prohibited from purchasing firearms because of his domestic assault conviction. One of the firearms Castleman's wife allegedly purchased was recovered in a homicide investigation in Chicago, Illinois. An investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) led agents to the Castlemans. A grand jury indicted Castleman on two counts of possession of a firearm after being "convicted...of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The District Court dismissed the § 922(g)(9) counts in Castleman's indictment, reasoning that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction did not qualify as a domestic violence crime because the statute required "force in the sense of violent contact" instead of merely "force as a scientific concept relating to the movement of matter." The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the respondent’s Tennessee conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to the mother of his child qualifies as a conviction for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Castleman's conviction qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Section 922(g)(9)’s “physical force” requirement is satisfied by the degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction—namely, offensive touching.

25 March 2014

Law in Plain English: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.

Argument: Dec 3 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Lexmark, a producer of laser printers and toner cartridges for its laser printers, developed microchips for both the toner cartridges and the printers so that Lexmark printers will reject any toner cartridges not containing a matching microchip. Static Control Components identified how to replicate the cartridge microchips. Lexmark then sued Static Control for copyright violations related to its source code in making the duplicate microchips. Static Control made a counterclaim under federal and state antitrust and false-advertising laws (including the Lanham Act). Lexmark successfully moved to dismiss all of Static Control's counterclaims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Static Control's federal antitrust claims, but reversed the dismissal of Static Control's claims under the Lanham Act and certain claims under state law.

Issue: The question before the Court is to determine the appropriate analytic framework for determining a party’s standing to maintain an action for false advertising under the Lanham Act. The three competing possibilities are: (1) the factors set forth in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters as adopted by the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits; (2) the categorical test, permitting suits only by an actual competitor, employed by the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits; or (3) a version of the more expansive “reasonable interest” test, either as applied by the Sixth Circuit in this case or as applied by the Second Circuit in prior cases.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Static Control has adequately pleaded the elements of a Lanham Act cause of action for false advertising. The Court dismissed the three possibilities above and adopted a fourth test: the cause of action extends to plaintiffs who 1) fall with in the zone of interests protected by that statute and 2) whose injury was proximately caused by a violation of that statute. To come within the zone of interests in a suit for false advertising, a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. A plaintiff must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff.

Law in Plain English: United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.

Argument: Jan 14 2014 (Aud.)

Why did the Supreme Court take this case? In this case, the Sixth Circuit held that payments Quality Stores made to its employees upon terminating their employment involuntarily due to business cessation constituted supplemental unemployment compensation benefits that are not taxable as wages under FICA. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit ruled in an earlier case that such payments are subject to taxation. So-called "circuit splits" are perhaps the most common way cases make it to the Supreme Court.

Background: Quality Stores was the largest agricultural-specialty retailer in the country serving farmers, hobby gardeners, skilled trade persons, and do-it-yourself customers. Following an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Quality Stores closed sixty-three stores and nine distribution centers and terminated the employment of approximately seventy-five employees in the corporate office. Quality Stores made severance payments to those employees whose employment was involuntarily terminated. Because the severance payments constituted gross income to the employees for federal income tax purposes, Quality Stores reported the payments as wages on W-2 forms and withheld federal income tax. Although Quality Stores collected and paid the FICA tax, it did not agree with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that the severance payments constituted wages for FICA purposes. Quality Stores filed with the IRS seeking the refund of $1,000,125 in FICA tax. When the IRS did not allow or deny the refund claims, Quality Stores filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court ordered a full refund, holding that payments Quality Stores made to its employees upon terminating their employment involuntarily due to business cessation constituted supplemental unemployment compensation benefits that are not taxable as wages under FICA. The District Court and the Sixth Circuit both affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether severance payments made to employees whose employment was involuntarily terminated are taxable under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act.

Holding: In a unanimous decision (with Justice Kagan not participating), the Supreme Court ruled that the severance payments at issue are taxable wages for FICA purposes.

05 November 2013

Law in Plain English: Burt v. Titlow

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Burt v. Titlow

Argument: Oct 8 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Titlow was implicated for participation in a plot (with her Aunt Billie) to murder her uncle. Her first lawyer negotiated a plea deal (a 7-to-15-year sentence, on the conditions that she plead guilty, submit to a lie-detector test, testify against Billie at trial, and not challenge the prosecutor's recommended sentencing range on appeal). After the court accepted the plea agreement, but before sentencing, Titlow spoke with Eric Ott, a sheriff's deputy assigned to the jail, who advised her not to plead guilty if she believed that she was innocent. She ultimately brought on a new attorney who withdrew her guilty plea, but the attorney soon withdrew (he did not obtain Titlow's file, inspect the government's discovery materials, or speak with the previous attorney a half after the plea-withdrawal hearing). Titlow was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to 20-to-40 years. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Titlow then filed a habeas petition which the District Court denied. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, finding that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to give appropriate deference to a Michigan state court under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in holding that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allowing respondent to maintain his claim of innocence; (2) whether a convicted defendant’s subjective testimony that he would have accepted a plea but for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone, sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted the plea; and (3) whether Lafler v. Cooper always requires a state trial court to resentence a defendant who shows a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer but for ineffective assistance, and to do so in such a way as to “remedy” the violation of the defendant’s constitutional right.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit because it failed to apply the “doubly deferential” standard of review recognized by the Court’s case law when it refused to credit the state court’s reasonable factual finding and assumed that counsel was ineffective where the record was silent. The impact of this decision is that the Supreme Court continues to reinforce the strong deference federal courts should give to state courts' fact finding, as mandated by AEDPA and Strickland, even when the record is sparse. Rather, a defendant must go beyond an otherwise-silent record and present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptions of AEDPA and Strickland.

28 May 2013

Law in Plain English: McQuiggan v. Perkins

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

McQuiggin v. Perkins

Perkins was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. He lost on direct appeal. He then raised several post-conviction claims on collateral attack in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Perkins lost again. He then filed a federal habeas petition raising the same claims. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provided a one-year statute of limitations claim, Perkins alleged a claim of actual innocence, which would overcome the statute of limitations and allow the court to hear the case (an extenstion of the courts' pre-AEDPA "miscarriage of justice" exception). ruling that Perkins had not acted with reasonable diligence. Then, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that diligence was not a prerequisite to the exception. The question before the Court was whether, under AEDPA, there is an actual-innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner show an extraordinary circumstance that “prevented timely filing” of a habeas petition, and if so, whether there is an additional actual-innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner demonstrate that “he has been pursuing his rights diligently.” In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass if the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations is a procedural bar. As a result, Perkins's petition can go forward. The practical impact of this decision is to expand the exception to allow habeas petitioners to have their claims heard by the courts even when they are otherwise barred by statute.

20 May 2013

Law in Plain English: Metrish v. Lancaster

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

Metrish v. Lancaster

Lancaster shot and killed his girlfriend in 1993. At trial in 1994, he claimed diminished capacity, but the jury convicted him. He later obtained federal habeas relief and a new trial. By the time of his second trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had subsequently rejected the diminished capacity defense. The judge disallowed this defense, and Lancaster was again convicted. He filed another federal habeas petition which the District Court denied. The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling that the Michigan trial court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. The questions before the Court were: (1) Whether the Michigan Supreme Court’s recognition that a state statute abolished the long-maligned diminished-capacity defense was an “unexpected and indefensible” change in a common-law doctrine of criminal law; and (2) whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ retroactive application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection of Lancaster’s due process claim does not represent an unreasonable application of the law. As a result, Lancaster was not entitled to federal habeas relief. The practical impact of this decision is that where a state supreme court, squarely addressing a particular issue for the first time, rejects a consistent line of lower court decisions based on the supreme court’s reasonable interpretation of the language of a controlling statute, the Supreme Court will not find a due process violation.

10 January 2013

SCOTUS in Plain English: Ryan v. Gonzales and Tibbals v. Carter

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe Supreme Court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case at SCOTUblog below. For similar posts, click here.

Ryan v. Gonzales
Tibbals v. Carter

(note: these cases had very similar facts, so the legal issues were decided in one opinion)

Gonzales and Carter were death row inmates in Arizona and Ohio, respectively. Both sought habeus corpus proceedings--essentially, they were challenging the lawfulness of their imprisonment (note: habeus proceedings are very common among prison inmates--thousands are filed every year). Lawyers for both sought to suspend the proceedings (a delay in the courts is called a "stay") because they claimed their clients were mentally incompetent to assist the lawyers in their defense. The respective courts agreed to the stay (again, a common tactic; anything to delay an execution). The Supreme Court decided that a prisoner has no statutory right to suspend his federal habeas proceedings when he is found incompetent. The practical impact of this decision is that attorneys for death row inmates have lost one of their procedural methods for delaying executions.

31 December 2011

2011 predictions update

Everyone makes predictions for the upcoming year, but how many people go back and actually score themselves?

1. The Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.
TRUE

2. Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida will find the health care reform law to be unconstitutional.
TRUE

3. The FCC will approve new net neutrality rules (that will probably happen in the next week or so), but the federal courts will find that this oversteps their authority (again).
PARTIALLY TRUE (case is still pending)

4. At least one politician (state legislator or above) will resign when a video of their misconduct goes viral.
Thankfully, we didn't get video of Weiner's weiner, but he did resign. PARTIALLY TRUE

5. North Korea's Kim Jong-il will die and his son, Kim Jong-un, will take over.
TRUE and TRUE

6. At least one Philadelphia sports team will make it to the Super Bowl, NHL Finals, or World Series.
FALSE (unfortunately)

7. Patriots' QB Tom Brady will win the NFL MVP and Eagles' QB Michael Vick will finish second.
TRUE (Note: Brady was unanimous; there was no second place)

8. Baltimore (BWI) will record less than 30 inches of snowfall this winter (please)
TRUE (I think the official number was 18-19 inches)

9. I will get accepted to law school (please) and actually go this time!
FALSE (long story)

10. Stuxnet's creator(s) will be revealed (total guess).
FALSE

And one more for the road that I am most certain of:

DEFCON19 will be canceled.
Always TRUE

20 June 2011

Top ten update

With the news this morning that Wal-Mart succeeded at the Supreme Court in having the Dukes class action suit dismissed, it's time to update the top ten predictions for 2011. Here's a look back at the predictions with updates:


1. The Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. YES

2. Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida will find the health care reform law to be unconstitutional. YES

3. The FCC will approve new net neutrality rules (that will probably happen in the next week or so), but the federal courts will find that this oversteps their authority (again). YES and NO

4. At least one politician (state legislator or above) will resign when a video of their misconduct goes viral.  YES and NO (Chris Lee and Anthony Weiner have both resigned, but over pictures and not video)

5. North Korea's Kim Jong-il will die and his son, Kim Jong-un, will take over. NO

6. At least one Philadelphia sports team will make it to the Super Bowl, NHL Finals, or World Series. NO (only the Phillies are left)

7. Patriots' QB Tom Brady will win the NFL MVP and Eagles' QB Michael Vick will finish second. YES (Brady was unanimous)

8. Baltimore (BWI) will record less than 30 inches of snowfall this winter (please) YES (14.4 inches)

9. I will get accepted to law school (please) and actually go this time! NO (wait-listed, blah!)

10. Stuxnet's creator(s) will be revealed (total guess). NO


And of course, the bonus prediction: DEFCON19 will be canceled. YES :-)

17 December 2010

Some thoughts about 2011

I'm not big on predictions, mostly because people make ambiguous ones that are difficult to judge.  So here's my attempt at a handful of predictions for 2011 that should be easily distinguishable with a yes or no answer:

1. The Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.

2. Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida will find the health care reform law to be unconstitutional.

3. The FCC will approve new net neutrality rules (that will probably happen in the next week or so), but the federal courts will find that this oversteps their authority (again).

4. At least one politician (state legislator or above) will resign when a video of their misconduct goes viral.

5. North Korea's Kim Jong-il will die and his son, Kim Jong-un, will take over.

6. At least one Philadelphia sports team will make it to the Super Bowl, NHL Finals, or World Series.

7. Patriots' QB Tom Brady will win the NFL MVP and Eagles' QB Michael Vick will finish second.

8. Baltimore (BWI) will record less than 30 inches of snowfall this winter (please)

9. I will get accepted to law school (please) and actually go this time!

10. Stuxnet's creator(s) will be revealed (total guess).

And one more for the road that I am most certain of:

DEFCON19 will be canceled.

25 November 2010

On the constitutionality of airport searches

If you're wondering what the courts have said about the constitutionality of airport searches, you'd probably end up where I did; still looking.  It turns out the the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of such searches, although there have been some related rulings.

It turns out that the most relevant case is one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (United States of America v. Daniel Kuualoha Aukai) which ruled that:
We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are “conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings.”
And because "the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of so-called “administrative searches,.” it is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would find these searches constitutional, generally.

The caveat to this decision:
Although the constitutionality of airport screening searches is not dependent on consent, the scope of such searches is not limitless.  A particular airport security screening search is constitutionally reasonable provided that it “is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [][and] that it is confined in good faith to that purpose.”
So the key to the current set of procedures, in regards to the full-body scanners and enhanced pat-downs, is whether or not these tools are "more extensive" or "more intensive than necessary under the circumstances."

It seems to me that you could argue that in some specific cases, the procedures used by the TSA may have crossed this line (and in fact, they've more-or-less admitted this is the case in some cases); but there might be some difficulty arguing that these procedures in general cross the line (especially with the current Court).

Here is the text of the decision in its entirety:

United States of America v. Daniel Kuualoha Aukai