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Showing posts with label criminal procedure. Show all posts

21 April 2015

Law in Plain English: Rodriguez v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Rodriguez v. United States

Argument: Jan 21 2015 (Aud.)

Background: A Nebraska K-9 police officer stopped Dennys Rodriguez's vehicle for veering onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and returned to his vehicle to complete a records check. He returned to the vehicle and issued a written warning. The officer then asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle. When Rodriguez refused consent, the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle. Rodriguez then exited the vehicle and stood in front of the patrol car while they waited for a second officer to arrive. A few minutes later, a deputy sheriff arrived, and a minute later, Struble walked the dog around the outside of Rodriguez’s car. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway through the second pass, approximately twenty or thirty seconds later. All told, seven or eight minutes had passed from the time the officer had issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine. Rodriguez was charged with possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The district court denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the delay caused by the dog sniff did not violate Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the seven- or eight-minute delay was reasonable because the officer waited for a second officer to arrive to ensure his safety, and that the the delay was a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez's personal liberty.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether an officer may extend an already completed traffic stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

27 May 2014

Law in Plain English: Hall v. Florida

Argument: Mar 3 2014

Discussion: Freddie Lee Hall was tried and convicted for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. His conviction and sentence was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal. After multiple appeals, Hall filed a motion to vacate his sentence because Florida law prohibits the trial court from sentencing to death a mentally retarded defendant who is convicted of a capital felony. The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of mental retardation mandates a cutoff IQ score of 70. According to several IQ tests, Hall's score was recorded at 73, 80, and 71. Florida law requires the defendant to show that the trial court's finding that Hall was not mentally retarded was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Florida Supreme Court found that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Hall is not mentally retarded. As a result, the Court denied his motion.

Issue: The questions before the Court is whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the state's threshold requirement as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court is unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment and disregards established medical practice.

22 April 2014

Law in Plain English: Navarette v. California

Argument: Jan 21 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Lorenzo and Jose Navarette were detained by officers of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and subsequently arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. The marijuana was discovered in the Navarettes' pickup truck during a traffic stop after the officers received a report from an unidentified citizen that the vehicle had been observed driving recklessly. The Navarettes' motion to suppress the evidence seized from their truck was denied, and they pled guilty to transportation of marijuana. On appeal, the Navarettes alleged that the evidence against them should have been suppressed because the anonymous tip received by police was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying an investigative stop of the vehicle, where the officers directly confirmed only significant innocent details of the tip but did not directly observe any illegal activity. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of California denied review.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.

Holding: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck's driver was intoxicated.

25 February 2014

Law in Plain English: Kaley v. United States

Argument: Oct 16 2013 (Aud.)

Background: The Kaleys were indicted for conspiracy to transport prescription medical devices (PMDs) from hospitals and then selling them on the black market (among other charges). The indictment also sought criminal forfeiture of all property traceable to the charged offenses. The government asked the District Court for an ex parte protective order restraining the Kaleys from transferring or otherwise disposing of the property listed in the forfeiture count. Included in this property was a $500,000 certificate of deposit purchased with a home equity line of credit on their home which they intended to use to fund their criminal defense. The Kaleys contended that the order prevented them from retaining counsel of their choice in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to the representation of counsel. Further, they asked the court to vacate the protective order and and expressly requested a pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary hearing, both of which were denied. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether, when a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order freezes assets needed by a criminal defendant to retain counsel of choice, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pre-trial, adversarial hearing at which the defendant may challenge the evidentiary support and legal theory of the underlying charges.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when challenging the legality of a §853(e)(1) pre-trial asset seizure, a criminal defendant who has been indicted is not constitutionally entitled to contest a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes charged. As a result, the Kaleys do not have a right to a pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary hearing.

Law in Plain English: Fernandez v. California

Argument: Nov 13 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Police responded to an apartment where there was a report of an assault with a deadly weapon by members of a gang. Police heard screaming from an apartment, and knocked on the door. A bruised woman answered the door and told the police she had been in a fight. When police tried to conduct a sweep of the apartment, Fernandez stepped forward and denied entry to the police. He was then arrested. Police went back to the woman and asked for the woman's consent to search, which she gave. The police found weapons that tied Fernandez to the gang. He was tried and convicted of robbery, assault, and the use of a weapon in connection with gang activity. The Court of Appeal of California ( Second District) affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied review. Under a previous Supreme Court case, a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Randolph does not extend to this situation, where the woman's consent was provided well after petitioner had been removed from the apartment. In other words, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search. That Fernandez was absent because he was arrested does not matter because the police had probable cause to arrest him (and he conceded as much).

27 January 2014

Law in Plain English: Burrage v. United States

Argument: Nov 12 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Burrage sold heroin to Banka, who later died. A forensic toxicologist and a doctor from the State Medical Examiner's Office said that heroin contributed to Banka's death, but neither could say that Banka would not have died if he had not taken the heroin. Nonetheless, a jury convicted Burrage of distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in death (which subjected Burrage to a mandatory minimum sentence), and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Burrage's appeal is based on the argument that a death that "results from" heroin required the prosecution to show "proximate cause" (but for the heroin, Banka's death would not have happened); and that heroin contributed to Banka's death as part of a larger mixed drug intoxication was not sufficient to show that it resulted from heroin.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death is a strict liability crime, without a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement; and (2) whether a person can be convicted for distribution of heroin causing death utilizing jury instructions which allow a conviction when the heroin that was distributed “contributed to,” death by “mixed drug intoxication,” but was not the sole cause of death of a person.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that, at least where the use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim's death or serious bodily injury, the defendant cannot be eligible for the mandatory minimum sentence under the statute unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury. As a result, the Eighth Circuit's decision was reversed and Burrage cannot be subject to the penalty enhancement.

11 December 2013

Law in Plain English: Kansas v. Cheever

Scott Cheever. Photo from HutchPost.

SCOTUSblog: Kansas v. Cheever

Argument: Oct 16 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Cheever was charged with murder in federal court for the death of a law enforcement officer. Cheever intended to claim that although he killed the sheriff, he was intoxicated (by methamphetamine). As a result, the judge ordered a mental examination. The federal charges were later dismissed and reinstated in Kansas state court, where Cheever raised the same intoxication claim and presented an expert witness on his behalf. In response, prosecutors called the doctor who had examined Cheever in the federal case as a witness to testify that Cheever was not impaired at the time of the crime. Cheever was convicted and sentenced to death. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the admission of the doctor's testimony violated Cheever’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether, when a criminal defendant who affirmatively introduces expert testimony that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit capital murder of a law enforcement officer due to the alleged temporary and long-term effects of the defendant’s methamphetamine use, the state violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by rebutting the defendant’s mental state defense with evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant.

Holding: In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence. As a result, the court-ordered mental examination and the doctor's testimony was admissible. The Court distinguished Estelle v. Smith, in which the Court had previously held that the state may not force a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination solely for the purposes of sentencing, with Buchanan v. Kentucky. In Buchanan, the Court ruled that if the defendant had raised a psychiatric defense and joined in the motion for a mental evaluation, the Fifth Amendment was not offended if the prosecution used the examination results to rebut the defense's claims. The practical impact of this decision is that prosecutors will continue to be able to use the defendant's mental evaluation as rebuttal evidence when the defense raises issues concerning the defendant's requisite mental state as an element of the crime.

07 November 2013

The government can anally rape you, literally

You have probably already read about this horrific case of David Eckert, who was suspected of holding drugs in his anus. Eckert was subjected to an x-ray, two digital (finger) exams, three enemas, a second x-ray, and finally, a colonoscopy. No drugs were ever found. Here is a copy of Eckert's lawsuit.

You may remember that a few weeks ago, I wrote about the article, "Call Yourself A Hacker, Lose Your 4th Amendment Rights:"

...this case has zero, zilch, squat, nothing, to do with the Fourth Amendment.... This case is about a temporary restraining order between two private parties. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures only applies to “state action." There is simply no state action here. Perhaps the author chose the title as link bait. Nonetheless, the headline is not only misleading, but erroneous, and detracts from the issue at hand.

In this case, all of the invasions of Eckert's body were done by doctors. The doctors, of course, are not government officials. So, where is the state action? In this case, the doctors acted at the request of law enforcement to aid law enforcement. The doctors, then, acted under "color of law," which means that the doctors were using authority given to them by a government official; in this case, the police officer. As a result, the doctors' actions can potentially subject them, and the government, to liability.

This post is only meant to address issue of the doctors acting on behalf of the state. For a fuller legal analysis of this case, see Orin Kerr's post at Volokh Conspiracy and Ken White's post at Popehat. They're both worth reading in full.

05 November 2013

Law in Plain English: Burt v. Titlow

Argument: Oct 8 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Titlow was implicated for participation in a plot (with her Aunt Billie) to murder her uncle. Her first lawyer negotiated a plea deal (a 7-to-15-year sentence, on the conditions that she plead guilty, submit to a lie-detector test, testify against Billie at trial, and not challenge the prosecutor's recommended sentencing range on appeal). After the court accepted the plea agreement, but before sentencing, Titlow spoke with Eric Ott, a sheriff's deputy assigned to the jail, who advised her not to plead guilty if she believed that she was innocent. She ultimately brought on a new attorney who withdrew her guilty plea, but the attorney soon withdrew (he did not obtain Titlow's file, inspect the government's discovery materials, or speak with the previous attorney a half after the plea-withdrawal hearing). Titlow was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to 20-to-40 years. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Titlow then filed a habeas petition which the District Court denied. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, finding that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to give appropriate deference to a Michigan state court under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in holding that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allowing respondent to maintain his claim of innocence; (2) whether a convicted defendant’s subjective testimony that he would have accepted a plea but for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone, sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted the plea; and (3) whether Lafler v. Cooper always requires a state trial court to resentence a defendant who shows a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer but for ineffective assistance, and to do so in such a way as to “remedy” the violation of the defendant’s constitutional right.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit because it failed to apply the “doubly deferential” standard of review recognized by the Court’s case law when it refused to credit the state court’s reasonable factual finding and assumed that counsel was ineffective where the record was silent. The impact of this decision is that the Supreme Court continues to reinforce the strong deference federal courts should give to state courts' fact finding, as mandated by AEDPA and Strickland, even when the record is sparse. Rather, a defendant must go beyond an otherwise-silent record and present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptions of AEDPA and Strickland.

09 August 2013

Using surveillance data in criminal investigations undermines the rule of law

From Reuters:

A secretive U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration unit is funneling information from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants and a massive database of telephone records to authorities across the nation to help them launch criminal investigations of Americans.

The unit is the Special Operations Division (SOD).

Agents were instructed to omit any references to the SOD from investigative reports, affidavits, any court proceedings, and in discussions with federal and state prosecutors and attorneys, state and local officials and task forces, and their foreign counterparts. Here's an example from a former federal agent:

"You'd be told only, ‘Be at a certain truck stop at a certain time and look for a certain vehicle.' And so we'd alert the state police to find an excuse to stop that vehicle, and then have a drug dog search it," the agent said... After an arrest was made, agents then pretended that their investigation began with the traffic stop, not with the SOD tip, the former agent said. The training document reviewed by Reuters refers to this process as "parallel construction."

It should also be troubling when a former federal judge says that she had never heard of such a program.

I see (at least) two problems with this program. The first seems obvious; the second, perhaps less so. Both are equally troubling.

First, this program seems to openly encourage agents to file misleading information with the courts. Judges rely on information submitted in affidavits for a whole host of reasons, including probable cause determinations that can go to the heart of whether an initial search was valid. When this information is inaccurate, judges rule on critical issues with less than complete information. This alone should be enough to call into doubt the legitimacy of this program.

Second, and perhaps more insidious, is that the scrubbing of SOD sourcing effectively denies a defendant the possibility of exculpatory evidence, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Let's use the example above cited by the former agent. Suppose that, in addition to the intelligence to "be at a certain truck stop at a certain time and look for a certain vehicle," there was evidence that the driver was coerced into driving the vehicle--potentially at gunpoint, or based on a threat to someone else (i.e., a family member). This could be exculpatory evidence--but because the agents scrubbed SOD as the source, the prosecutors would never see this evidence. And then they could not provide this evidence to defense attorneys--because they would never know about it. Even if the defense blindly asked for such evidence, there is no record that it ever existed. As a result, it seems highly unlikely then that any court could find that the prosecutor withheld the evidence. Thus, no Brady violation.

In essence, defendants are being convicted based on evidence that they don't know ever existed. The prosecutors are unwitting accomplices. And the conviction by a unknowing jury or judge puts an official stamp of approval on the unseemly procedure. At its core, this program undermines the rule of law and raises serious constitutional doubts as to whether anyone convicted as a result of such evidence had a fair trial.

24 June 2013

Law in Plain English: United States v. Kebodeaux

In 1999, Kebodeaux was convicted of statutory rape in whole in the military. He served his sentence and was discharged (and under no further control of the military or the federal government in general). In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) that required registration of sex offenders, and he was convicted of failing to update his change of address when he moved. A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction, but it was reversed en banc. The questions before the Court were: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in conducting its analysis on the premise that respondent was not under a federal registration obligation until SORNA was enacted, when pre-SORNA federal law obligated him to register as a sex offender; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Congress lacks the Article I authority to provide for criminal penalties as applied to a person who was convicted of a sex offense under federal law and completed his criminal sentence before SORNA was enacted. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that SORNA’s registration requirements as applied to Kebodeaux fall within the scope of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court reasoned that, upon his release, Kebodeaux was still subject to the Wetterling Act and thus his release was condition. As a result, Congress still had the power to require him to register. The practical impact of this decision affirms the power of Congress to exert control over offenders even after their sentences have been served.

17 June 2013

Law in Plain English: Salinas v. Texas

The police asked Salinas to accompany them to the police station, where he went voluntarily (and he was not under arrest). They asked Salinas questions about a murder, all of which he answered. But when asked whether shell casings found at the scene matched a shotgun given to police by Salinas's father, he looked down and did not answer. Salinas was later arrested and charged with the murder. At trial, the prosecutor used Salinas's silence as evidence of his guilt. An innocent person, he said, would have protested. The jury convicted Salinas, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. The question before the Court was whether or under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects a defendant’s refusal to answer law enforcement questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not expressly invoke the privilege in response to the officer’s question. As a result, his silence can be used against him. The practical impact of this decision is unclear--the majority's reasoning was split between the failure to invoke (Alito, Roberts, Kennedy) and whether the Fifth Amendment should apply at all (Thomas, Scalia). Prosecutors may be able to use silence as evidence of guilt when a person under voluntary questioning (but not arrest), but the reasoning is not necessarily clear.

13 June 2013

Law in Plain English: United States v. Davila

A judge told Davila that he should accept responsibility for his crimes (filing over 130 fraudulent tax returns) and that pleading guilty might be the best advice an attorney could provide him. However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (specifically, rule 11(c)) state that judges must not participate in plea agreements between an attorney for the government and the defendant's attorney. Davila pled guilty and was sentenced. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that any participation by the judge requires automatic reversal. The question before the Court was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that any degree of judicial participation in plea negotiations, in violation of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, automatically requires vacatur of a defendant’s guilty plea, irrespective of whether the error prejudiced the defendant. In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that under rule 11(h), vacatur of the plea is not in order if the record shows no prejudice to Davila’s decision to plead guilty. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit's automatic reversal rule is overturned. The practical impact of this decision is that when such a rule violation occurs, courts will have to examine the record to show that the violation actually resulted in prejudice.

09 June 2013

Justice Scalia on solving crimes vs. suspicionless law-enforcement searches

"Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The Fourth Amendment must prevail."

--Justice Antonin Scalia, Maryland v. King (dissent)

03 June 2013

Best footnote ever?

From Justice Scalia's scathing dissent in Maryland v. King:

...I therefore dissent, and hope that today’s incursion upon the Fourth Amendment, like an earlier one,⁶will some day be repudiated.

⁶ Compare, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981) (suspicionless search of a car permitted upon arrest of the driver), with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 (2009) (on second thought, no).

Nice.

Law in Plain English: Maryland v. King

King was arrested for assault. Pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act, which allows the state to collect DNA from those arrested for a crime of violence (as well as burglary), law enforcement collected King's DNA. Before he was tried on the assault charge (for which he was ultimately convicted), King's DNA was found to match a sample from an unsolved rape case. For this, he was indicted and convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison. King filed a motion to suppress in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, which was denied. King then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the highest court in Maryland) issued a writ of certiorari (and as a result, the case skipped the Court of Special Appeals, which is the intermediate appellate court in Maryland) and found the procedure unreasonable. The question before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment allows the states to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested and charged (but not yet convicted) with serious crimes. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause for a serious offense and bring the suspect into the station, taking a cheek swab (and analyzing) is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a reasonable police procedure under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the Maryland Court of Appeals is reversed and the DNA evidence can be used against King.The practical impact of this decision is that police departments will be able to collect and analyze DNA from people who are arrested and charged with serious crimes.

28 May 2013

Law in Plain English: McQuiggan v. Perkins

Perkins was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. He lost on direct appeal. He then raised several post-conviction claims on collateral attack in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Perkins lost again. He then filed a federal habeas petition raising the same claims. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provided a one-year statute of limitations claim, Perkins alleged a claim of actual innocence, which would overcome the statute of limitations and allow the court to hear the case (an extenstion of the courts' pre-AEDPA "miscarriage of justice" exception). ruling that Perkins had not acted with reasonable diligence. Then, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that diligence was not a prerequisite to the exception. The question before the Court was whether, under AEDPA, there is an actual-innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner show an extraordinary circumstance that “prevented timely filing” of a habeas petition, and if so, whether there is an additional actual-innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner demonstrate that “he has been pursuing his rights diligently.” In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass if the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations is a procedural bar. As a result, Perkins's petition can go forward. The practical impact of this decision is to expand the exception to allow habeas petitioners to have their claims heard by the courts even when they are otherwise barred by statute.

Law in Plain English: Trevino v. Thaler

Trevino was convicted for the rape and murder of a fifteen year old girl in Texas, and subsequently sentenced to death. He made both a direct appeal and a post-conviction collateral attack, pursuant to Texas law in capital cases. All of the claims in both cases were rejected. Trevino then raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in a new federal habeas claim, despite having never raised this issue in either of his state proceedings. Texas law prefers claims of IAC to be made in collateral proceedings (because they often rely on evidence outside of the trial record), but does not explicitly prohibit such a claim to be raised on direct appeal. Because Trevino had not previously raised his IAC claim in either state proceeding, his claim was procedurally defaulted. However, in last year's decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that where, under state law, IAC claims must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those claims if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. In other words, IAC at the initial collateral proceeding is cause to overcome procedural default. Because Texas law prefers claims of IAC to be made in collateral proceedings (but does not explicitly prohibit such a claim to be raised on direct appeal), the question before the Court was whether the holding in Martinez should extend to Trevino. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when a state's procedural framework by reason of its design and operation makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, the exception recognized in Martinez v. Ryan applies, and Martinez should extend to this case. As a result, Trevino's claim can proceed. The practical impact of this decision is that petitioners making post-relief convictions claims will have a (slightly) easier opportunity to bring them under similar circumstances.

20 May 2013

Law in Plain English: Metrish v. Lancaster

Lancaster shot and killed his girlfriend in 1993. At trial in 1994, he claimed diminished capacity, but the jury convicted him. He later obtained federal habeas relief and a new trial. By the time of his second trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had subsequently rejected the diminished capacity defense. The judge disallowed this defense, and Lancaster was again convicted. He filed another federal habeas petition which the District Court denied. The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling that the Michigan trial court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. The questions before the Court were: (1) Whether the Michigan Supreme Court’s recognition that a state statute abolished the long-maligned diminished-capacity defense was an “unexpected and indefensible” change in a common-law doctrine of criminal law; and (2) whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ retroactive application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” so as to justify habeas relief. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection of Lancaster’s due process claim does not represent an unreasonable application of the law. As a result, Lancaster was not entitled to federal habeas relief. The practical impact of this decision is that where a state supreme court, squarely addressing a particular issue for the first time, rejects a consistent line of lower court decisions based on the supreme court’s reasonable interpretation of the language of a controlling statute, the Supreme Court will not find a due process violation.

30 April 2013

Law in Plain English: Boyer v. Louisiana

Boyer was indicted for capital murder in Louisiana, where the law requires the state to provide two lawyers to an indigent defendant. Although he had one court-appointed lawyer, funding for the second lawyer was never allocated. Boyer remained in prison for five years, when the state reduced the charges to second-degree murder in order to avoid the second counsel requirement. He was then was tried and convicted of second-degree murder (among other lesser charges) and sentenced to life in prison for the murder. The question before the Court was whether the state’s failure to fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years as a direct result of the prosecution’s choice to seek the death penalty should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes. In a single sentence per curiam (unsigned, anonymous) decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted ("DIG"). A DIG is a Court admission that they should not have accepted the case. In a concurrence, Justice Alito reasoned that the record showed the reason for the long delays in Boyer's trial were due to defense requests for continuances, not the lack of funding for a second lawyer. Four justices dissented, arguing that the Court should have ruled on the merits of the case. As a result, the decision of the Louisiana Court of Appeals stands and Boyer's conviction and sentences remain in place.