Law in Plain English: Johnson v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Johnson v. United States

Argument: Nov 5 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Pursuant to an undercover investigation, the FBI determined that Samuel Johnson (a felon) illegally possessed an AK-47 and a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Johnson was later arrested while attending a meeting with his probation officer. Among other charges, Johnson was indicted with being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a mandatory 15-year sentence for those who have been convicted of three "violent felon[ies.]" Johnson pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to challenge the applicability of the ACCA based upon a review of his prior convictions. On appeal, Johnson alleged that a prior conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun did not constitute a "violent felony." The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that possession of a short-barreled shotgun presented a serious risk of physical injury to another because it is roughly similar to the listed offenses within the ACCA, both in kind as well as the degree of risk for harm posed. As a result, the conviction was considered a violent felony and Johnson's conviction as an armed career criminal was affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Holding: In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that imposing an increased sentence under ACCA’s residual clause violates due process.

Law in Plain English: Mellouili v. Holder

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Mellouli v. Lynch

Argument: Jan 14 2015 (Aud.)

Background: Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty in July 2010 to violating a Kansas misdemeanor drug paraphernalia statute. Mellouli had been stopped for DUI and police found four Aderrall pills in his sock; the sock was the "drug paraphernalia." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found that he was removable because his conviction was a conviction “relating to a controlled substance” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Mellouli argued that he was not removable because the state court record of conviction did not identify the controlled substance underlying his state paraphernalia conviction, and therefore the government failed to prove that the conviction related to a federal controlled substance, as § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires. The Eighth Circuit denied his petition, finding that there was a nearly complete overlap between the definition of controlled substance in 21 U.S.C. § 802 and in the statutes of States such as Kansas that adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. It was therefore reasonable for the BIA to conclude that any drug paraphernalia conviction in these States was, categorically, a violation of a law “relating to a controlled substance” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

Issue: The question before the Court is whether, to trigger deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that a noncitizen may be removed if he has been convicted of violating “any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21) . . . ,” the government must prove the connection between a drug paraphernalia conviction and a substance listed in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Mellouli’s Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his sock did not trigger removal under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The categorical approach historically taken in determining whether a state conviction renders an alien removable looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars of the alien’s conduct. The state conviction triggers removal only if, by definition, the underlying crime falls within a category of removable offenses defined by federal law. The BIA has long applied the categorical approach to assess whether a state drug conviction triggers removal under successive versions of what is now §1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The BIA announced and applied a different approach that, in this case, finds no home in §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text and leads to consequences Congress could not have intended. 

Law in Plain English: Rodriguez v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Rodriguez v. United States

Argument: Jan 21 2015 (Aud.)

Background: A Nebraska K-9 police officer stopped Dennys Rodriguez's vehicle for veering onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and returned to his vehicle to complete a records check. He returned to the vehicle and issued a written warning. The officer then asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle. When Rodriguez refused consent, the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle. Rodriguez then exited the vehicle and stood in front of the patrol car while they waited for a second officer to arrive. A few minutes later, a deputy sheriff arrived, and a minute later, Struble walked the dog around the outside of Rodriguez’s car. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway through the second pass, approximately twenty or thirty seconds later. All told, seven or eight minutes had passed from the time the officer had issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine. Rodriguez was charged with possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The district court denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the delay caused by the dog sniff did not violate Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the seven- or eight-minute delay was reasonable because the officer waited for a second officer to arrive to ensure his safety, and that the the delay was a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez's personal liberty.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether an officer may extend an already completed traffic stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

Holding: In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.

Law in Plain English: B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.

Argument: Dec 2 2014 (Aud.)

Background: In 2007, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) denied Hargis' application for registration of its "Sealtite" mark for a line of self-drilling and self-taping screws that are commonly used in the construction of metal buildings. The TTAB determined that there was a likelihood of confusion with B&B Hardware's "Sealtight" mark for fasteners that is used predominantly in the aerospace industry. B&B later brought trademark infringement and unfair competition claims against Hargis, and argued that the TTAB's decision should be given preclusive effect on the question of likelihood of confusion. Alternatively, B&B attempted to admit the TTAB decision into evidence. Hargis filed counterclaims for false advertising and false designation of origin. The jury rejected B&B's trademark infringement and unfair competition claims. Hargis prevailed on its counterclaims. The district court also awarded Hargis attorney fees, holding that B&B's conduct of willfully and deliberately manufacturing evidence to support its trademark infringement claim made the case an exceptional one appropriate under the Lanham Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the TTAB, in denying registration, did not decide the same likelihood-of-confusion issues presented to the district court. Additionally, the panel ruled that admitting the TTAB' s decision into evidence would be confusing and misleading to the jury because the TTAB applied its factors and analyzed the evidence in a manner significantly different than the jury would be required to do in an infringement action.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes respondent from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element; and (2) whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the district court was obliged to defer to the Board’s finding of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence to rebut it.

Holding: In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that so long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met, when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially thesame as those before a district court, issue preclusion should apply.

Law in Plain English: Holt v. Hobbs

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Holt v. Hobbs

Argument: Oct 7 2014 (Aud.)

Hobbs filed his own, handwritten cert petition.

Background: Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad), an inmate under the supervision of the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC), filed a lawsuit challenging the ADC's grooming policy. The policy allowed trimmed mustaches but otherwise no facial hair, with quarter-inch beards permitted for a diagnosed dermatological problems. Holt alleged that the policy substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court initially granted temporary injunctive relief, but vacated its order and dismissed the complaint after hearing evidence of Holt's other religious accommodations and the ADC's justifications for the grooming policy in terms of prison security. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that ADC's grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling penological interest.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Arkansas Department of Correction's grooming police policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et. seq., to the extent that it prohibits petitioner from growing a one-half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Department’s grooming policy violates RLUIPA insofar as it prevents petitioner from growing a ½-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. While the Department has a compelling interest in regulating contraband, its argument that this interest is compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a ½-inch beard is unavailing, especially given the difficulty of hiding contraband in such a short beard and the lack of a corresponding policy regulating the length of hair on the head.

Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Muhammad

Law in Plain English: Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Argument: Nov 4 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Three years to the day after consummating a $611,000 home loan, mortgagors Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski mailed a notice to the lenders seeking to rescind the loan due to alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which requires that a borrower must notify the creditor in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction. The lenders denied the request to rescind. A year later (now four years after consummating the loan), the Jesinoskis sued the lenders to rescind the loan. The district court ruled for the lenders. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that to notify the creditor, a party seeking to rescind a loan transaction must file suit within three years of consummating the loan.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether a borrower exercises his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635, by “notifying the creditor” in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or must instead file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file
suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s unequivocal terms—a borrower “shall have the right to rescind . . .by notifying the creditor. . .of his intention to do so” (emphasis added)—leave no doubt that rescission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his intention to rescind.

Law in Plain English: Warger v. Shauers

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Warger v. Shauers

Argument: Oct 8 2014 (Aud.)

Background: Gregory Warger sued Randy Shauers for injuries he sustained during a traffic accident. The jury returned a verdict for Shauers. However, after the jury was released, one of the jurors contacted Warger's lawyer and expressed his concern as to the jury foreperson having behaved inappropriately during deliberations. Specifically, the juror alleged the foreperson had focused on her own daughter's past experience with a serious traffic accident, rather than the evidence presented at trial, In an affidavit, the juror contended that during deliberations the foreperson stated her daughter's life would have been ruined had her daughter been held liable for damages caused by the accident, and that she was unwilling to return a verdict for Warger because the Shauers were a young couple and their lives would also be ruined should they be found liable. Courts have held that juror testimony can be used to show dishonesty during voir dire for the purpose of contempt proceedings against the juror, but there is a split among the circuits as to whether such testimony may be used to challenge a verdict. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the juror's affidavit was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which prohibits inquiries into the validity of a verdict. Although Rule 606 provides three exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the admissibility of such evidence, the panel ruled that jurors' personal experiences do not meet the extraneous information exception.

Issue: The question before the Court was whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits a party moving for a new trial based on juror dishonest during voir dire to introduce juror testimony about statements made during deliberations that tend to show the alleged dishonesty.

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir dire because the plain meaning of Rule 606(b) applies to “an inquiry into the validity of [the] verdict.”

Law in Plain English: Burrage v. United States

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Burrage v. United States

Argument: Nov 12 2013 (Aud.)

Background: Burrage sold heroin to Banka, who later died. A forensic toxicologist and a doctor from the State Medical Examiner's Office said that heroin contributed to Banka's death, but neither could say that Banka would not have died if he had not taken the heroin. Nonetheless, a jury convicted Burrage of distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in death (which subjected Burrage to a mandatory minimum sentence), and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Burrage's appeal is based on the argument that a death that "results from" heroin required the prosecution to show "proximate cause" (but for the heroin, Banka's death would not have happened); and that heroin contributed to Banka's death as part of a larger mixed drug intoxication was not sufficient to show that it resulted from heroin.

Issue: The questions before the Court are (1) whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death is a strict liability crime, without a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement; and (2) whether a person can be convicted for distribution of heroin causing death utilizing jury instructions which allow a conviction when the heroin that was distributed “contributed to,” death by “mixed drug intoxication,” but was not the sole cause of death of a person.

Holding: In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that, at least where the use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim's death or serious bodily injury, the defendant cannot be eligible for the mandatory minimum sentence under the statute unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury. As a result, the Eighth Circuit's decision was reversed and Burrage cannot be subject to the penalty enhancement.

Law in Plain English: Sprint Communications Company v. Jacobs

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

SCOTUSblog: Sprint Communications Company v. Jacobs

Argument: Nov 5 2013 (Aud.)

Discussion: The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) ordered Sprint to pay intrastate access charges to Windstream, an Iowa communications company, for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls. Sprint filed a complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The same day, Sprint also filed a petition for review in Iowa state court, asserting that the IUB's order was preempted under federal law. The federal district court abstained pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts were required to abstain from hearing any civil rights tort claims brought by a person who is currently being prosecuted for a matter arising from that claim ("Younger abstention"). Sprint argued that the proceedings were remedial, not coercive, and therefore Younger should not apply. Nonetheless, the District Court abstained and dismissed the action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issue: The question before the Court is whether the Eighth Circuit erred by concluding that Younger abstention is warranted not only when there is a related state proceeding that is “coercive” but also when there is a related state proceeding that is, instead, “remedial.”

Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that this case did not fall within any of the three classes of exceptional cases for which Younger abstention is appropriate. As a result, the lower federal court cannot abstain and must consider the merits of Sprint's preemption complaint.

Law in Plain English: The Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case below. For similar posts, click here.

The Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles

Knowles filed a proposed class action lawsuit in an Arkansas state court and agreed (in legal terms, this is called a stipulation) that he (and the class) would seek less than $5 million in damages. This amount is important because the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) gives federal courts jurisdiction over class actions where the amount exceeds $5 million. Knowles wanted to keep the case in state court because some state courts, particularly in Arkansas, are more favorable for class actions than federal courts. CAFA was passed to address this problem, and Knowles was trying to find a way around CAFA. The Standard Fire Insurance Co. removed the case to federal court, but the federal district court remanded it back to Arkansas state court because of the amount in controversy. Standard Fire appealed to the Eighth Circuit, who refused to hear the case. The question before the Court was whether Knowles's stipulation was actually binding on other members of the proposed class. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that this was not the case; Knowles's stipulation could not bind members of a proposed class action before the class was certified. The practical impact of this decision is that class action plaintiffs won't be able to avoid federal jurisdiction by stipulating amounts in controversy less than the amount specified in CAFA before the class is certified. This ruling gives additional teeth to CAFA in allowing defendants to remove class actions to federal courts.

SCOTUS in Plain English: Kloeckner v. Solis

This is one in a series of posts designed to describe Supreme Court decisions in plain English. For more detail and background on the legal issues, see the link to the case at SCOTUblog below. For similar posts, click here.

Kloeckner v. Solis

Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint against the Department of Labor (while still an employee), alleging sex and age discrimination. Her original complaint was filed with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Most MSPB decisions are appealable to the Federal Circuit, except in certain "mixed cases." She was then fired, and claimed it was because of her complaint, which made her complaint a "mixed case." The Supreme Court ruled that a federal employee who claims that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute should seek judicial review in a federal district court, not in the Federal Circuit. The practical impact of this decision is to clarify a somewhat confusing procedure for how (and where) to file a complaint under similar circumstances.

2011 predictions update

Everyone makes predictions for the upcoming year, but how many people go back and actually score themselves?

1. The Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.
TRUE

2. Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida will find the health care reform law to be unconstitutional.
TRUE

3. The FCC will approve new net neutrality rules (that will probably happen in the next week or so), but the federal courts will find that this oversteps their authority (again).
PARTIALLY TRUE (case is still pending)

4. At least one politician (state legislator or above) will resign when a video of their misconduct goes viral.
Thankfully, we didn't get video of Weiner's weiner, but he did resign. PARTIALLY TRUE

5. North Korea's Kim Jong-il will die and his son, Kim Jong-un, will take over.
TRUE and TRUE

6. At least one Philadelphia sports team will make it to the Super Bowl, NHL Finals, or World Series.
FALSE (unfortunately)

7. Patriots' QB Tom Brady will win the NFL MVP and Eagles' QB Michael Vick will finish second.
TRUE (Note: Brady was unanimous; there was no second place)

8. Baltimore (BWI) will record less than 30 inches of snowfall this winter (please)
TRUE (I think the official number was 18-19 inches)

9. I will get accepted to law school (please) and actually go this time!
FALSE (long story)

10. Stuxnet's creator(s) will be revealed (total guess).
FALSE

And one more for the road that I am most certain of:

DEFCON19 will be canceled.
Always TRUE

Top ten update

With the news this morning that Wal-Mart succeeded at the Supreme Court in having the Dukes class action suit dismissed, it's time to update the top ten predictions for 2011. Here's a look back at the predictions with updates:


1. The Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. YES

2. Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida will find the health care reform law to be unconstitutional. YES

3. The FCC will approve new net neutrality rules (that will probably happen in the next week or so), but the federal courts will find that this oversteps their authority (again). YES and NO

4. At least one politician (state legislator or above) will resign when a video of their misconduct goes viral.  YES and NO (Chris Lee and Anthony Weiner have both resigned, but over pictures and not video)

5. North Korea's Kim Jong-il will die and his son, Kim Jong-un, will take over. NO

6. At least one Philadelphia sports team will make it to the Super Bowl, NHL Finals, or World Series. NO (only the Phillies are left)

7. Patriots' QB Tom Brady will win the NFL MVP and Eagles' QB Michael Vick will finish second. YES (Brady was unanimous)

8. Baltimore (BWI) will record less than 30 inches of snowfall this winter (please) YES (14.4 inches)

9. I will get accepted to law school (please) and actually go this time! NO (wait-listed, blah!)

10. Stuxnet's creator(s) will be revealed (total guess). NO


And of course, the bonus prediction: DEFCON19 will be canceled. YES :-)

Some thoughts about 2011

I'm not big on predictions, mostly because people make ambiguous ones that are difficult to judge.  So here's my attempt at a handful of predictions for 2011 that should be easily distinguishable with a yes or no answer:

1. The Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.

2. Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida will find the health care reform law to be unconstitutional.

3. The FCC will approve new net neutrality rules (that will probably happen in the next week or so), but the federal courts will find that this oversteps their authority (again).

4. At least one politician (state legislator or above) will resign when a video of their misconduct goes viral.

5. North Korea's Kim Jong-il will die and his son, Kim Jong-un, will take over.

6. At least one Philadelphia sports team will make it to the Super Bowl, NHL Finals, or World Series.

7. Patriots' QB Tom Brady will win the NFL MVP and Eagles' QB Michael Vick will finish second.

8. Baltimore (BWI) will record less than 30 inches of snowfall this winter (please)

9. I will get accepted to law school (please) and actually go this time!

10. Stuxnet's creator(s) will be revealed (total guess).

And one more for the road that I am most certain of:

DEFCON19 will be canceled.

On the constitutionality of airport searches

If you're wondering what the courts have said about the constitutionality of airport searches, you'd probably end up where I did; still looking.  It turns out the the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of such searches, although there have been some related rulings.

It turns out that the most relevant case is one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (United States of America v. Daniel Kuualoha Aukai) which ruled that:

We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are “conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings.”

And because "the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of so-called “administrative searches,.” it is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would find these searches constitutional, generally.

The caveat to this decision:

Although the constitutionality of airport screening searches is not dependent on consent, the scope of such searches is not limitless.  A particular airport security screening search is constitutionally reasonable provided that it “is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [][and] that it is confined in good faith to that purpose.”

So the key to the current set of procedures, in regards to the full-body scanners and enhanced pat-downs, is whether or not these tools are "more extensive" or "more intensive than necessary under the circumstances."

It seems to me that you could argue that in some specific cases, the procedures used by the TSA may have crossed this line (and in fact, they've more-or-less admitted this is the case in some cases); but there might be some difficulty arguing that these procedures in general cross the line (especially with the current Court).

Here is the text of the decision in its entirety:

United States of America v. Daniel Kuualoha Aukai